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Abstract 
The current study aims to contribute to Corporate Governance CG and Risk Management RM literature 
by providing empirical evidence of the relationship between the three construct: CG, RM and Bank 
Performance BP within the GCC banking sector. Furthermore, the Islamic data and conventional data 
have been separated to investigate the association between CG, RM and BP. To do so, 90 active banks 
(30 Islamic – 60 conventional) banks have been selected as a sample for ten years period from (2003 
– 2012), and subsequently used the regression analysis (Ordinary Least Square OLS) for the four 
selected models as follows; 
Regarding the empirical results of Model (1) which investigate the relationship between CG’s 
variables and BP measured by ROE and ROA for all banks’ data; Islamic data and conventional data, 
the result indicate that the board size, gender diversity, role duality and audit committee are 
insignificantly associated with bank performance measured by ROE in all types of banks. In addition, 
in Islamic banks the Non-Executive Board Member NEBM and credit and investment committee are 
negatively and significantly associated with ROE, however, this association is insignificant in 
conventional banks. The capital ratio is positively and significantly associated with ROA in all types 
of banks. Furthermore, the gender diversity is insignificantly associated with bank performance 
measured by ROA in both Islamic and conventional banks. Interestingly, bank size is significant and 
positive with bank performance measured by both of ROE and ROA in all types of banks.  
Model (2) investigates the relationship between RM’s variables and BP measured by ROE and ROA 
for all banks’ data; Islamic data and conventional data. The results indicate that capital risk and 
liquidity risk are insignificant with BP measured by ROE in all types of banks. The association between 
non-performing loan and credit risk with ROE are insignificant in Islamic banks, however, this 
association is significant and negative in conventional banks. Interestingly, the capital adequacy ratio 
is positively and significantly associated with ROE and ROA in all types of banks. 
Furthermore, as per Model (3) which investigate the relationship between both of CG and RM’s 
variables and BP measured by ROE and ROA for all banks’ data; Islamic data and conventional data, 
it can be concluded that the NEBM is significantly and negatively associated with BP measured by 
ROE and ROA in all types of banks. In this model, it was noted that some variables are insignificantly 
associated with bank performance in both Islamic and conventional banks, those variables are gender 
diversity, role duality, Loan to Deposit Ratio LDR, NPL, credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk. 
In Model (4) which investigate the relationship between CG and RM measured by NPL for all banks’ 
data; Islamic data and conventional data. It can be concluded that NEBM and CEO-turnover are 
insignificant with NPL in all types of banks. Furthermore, board size, Role duality, LDR and Risk 
committee are negatively and significantly associated with NPL in conventional banks, however, they 
are insignificant in Islamic banks. The gender diversity in all types of banks is negative and 
significantly associated with NPL. 
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In addition to the above, the current study provides evidence that the determinants of bank performance 
in the GCC banking sector vary among the different independent variables. No single variable could 
explain the bank performance, this conclusion highlights that there is a need for additional analysis of 
the three constructs in different periods. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 General introduction 
In the economic system of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) the banking sector has a very 
important role in allocating capital. Thus, banking system has been subject to investigation 
and analysis in many literature, the consensus of these literature prove that this sector has an 
impact on business growth (Fritzer 2004).  
Worldwide, and especially in the GCC banking sector, the uncertainty regarding the 
association between the focus of voluntary corporate governance guidelines and risk 
management and their implication on banks’ performance in practice has created a research 
gap in this area. Increased concerns regarding transparency and corporate accountability in 
various developed countries have been associated with the need for appropriate risk 
management. This has been reflected through recent corporate governance guidelines and 
literature. The subjectivity of this area has given rise to different levels of emphasis on 
corporate governance CG and risk management, and is correspondingly reflected in the 
governance systems of various countries.  
The purposes of this study is to address this research gap, by analysing and investigating 
whether there is an association between the emphasis of CG, RM and Bank Performance BP 
in practice. The motivation behind this approach is to contribute to the CG literature on RM 
and BP, by establishing if corporate governance guidelines are an influencing force affecting 
practices in these areas. This will assist in narrowing the research gap in this area and will 
have relevant implications for governance policy makers who might be interested in knowing 
the impact of their corporate governance on risk management and performance.  
The empirical results of this study would provide general indicators of corporate governance 
useful for all concerned parties and stakeholders; owners, employees, regulators, 
management, and any other concerned parties and decisions makers, as well as in rewarding 
or punishing the banks that have great or little intention to improve the corporate governance 
alignment with risk management and bank performance. Furthermore, the empirical results 
of this study could be used by researchers in future literature for benchmarking purposes. The 
empirical contribution of this study have been presented in detail in chapter six,  
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This chapter will present general overview about CG, RM and BP in GCC banking sector as 
follows; section 1.2 will present the basic characteristics of the GCC countries and the 
characteristics of the selected sample. Section 1.3 will present an introduction about the CG. 
The introduction about RM will be presented in section 1.4. Section 1.5 will highlight the BP 
and both of ROA and ROE as a proxy variable for BP. The research objective and question 
shown in section 1.6. Lastly, section 1.7 will present the thesis structure.  
1.2 Basic characteristics of the GCC countries 
The GCC consists of 6 Arab countries; Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Oman, 
Kuwait and Qatar. The financial system in the GCC is dominated by banking sector. Recently, 
the Islamic banks have grown rapidly to become a prominent source of financial 
intermediation in the GCC (Al-Hassan et al. 2010). 
The main characteristics of the structure of the financial system in each country will be 
presented as follow: (Al-Hassan et al. 2012)  
Saudi Arabia U.A.E. Bahrain Oman Kuwait Qatar  
The assets of 
banking sector is 
around 68 % of 
GDP. 
 
The banking 
sector has three 
autonomous 
government 
institutions. 
In addition, this 
sector has five 
sizable specialized 
credit institutions, 
their assets is 
around 50% of the 
total assets of the 
sector, and they 
provide loans with 
interest free for 
public.   
 
This sector 
dealing with total 
assets over 140 % 
of GDP.  
 
The three largest 
banks are; 
Emirates Bank 
International, 
National Bank of 
Abu Dhabi and 
Abu Dhabi 
Commercial 
Bank, this three 
banks dealing 
with 32 % of total 
sector assets.  
 
This sector is the 
largest in GCC.  
This sector’s assets 
is around 260 % of 
the GDP.  
The three largest 
banks are; 
National Bank of 
Bahrain, Bank of 
Bahrain and 
Kuwait and Ahli 
United Bank, the 
three bank’s assets 
represent 41 % of 
the sector’s assets. 
Same like all GCC 
members, this 
sector has been 
strongly affected 
by the 2008 
financial crisis.   
The financial 
system contributes 
about 1/3 of the 
total GDP  
 
This sector is the 
smallest in GCC, it 
represents around 
66% of the total 
GDP.  
 
There are two 
largest banks; 
National Bank of 
Oman and Bank 
Muscat, the two 
banks are dealing 
with around 55 % 
of sector’s assets.  
 
This sector has two 
largest banks; 
Kuwait Finance 
House and National 
Bank of Kuwait, 
their assets is 
around half of the 
total sector’s assets. 
 
This sector include 
95 Investment 
companies, their 
total assets is 
around 102 percent 
of GDP 
This sector dealing 
with assets around 
94 % of the GDP.  
This sector has 
three largest banks; 
Commercial Bank 
of Qatar, Doha 
Bank and Qatar 
National Bank, 
dealing with 70 % 
of total assets.  
 
This sector has 
three specialized 
government-owned 
banks.  
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1.3 Main characteristics of the sample 
The sample of this study consist of 90 banks; 30 Islamic and 60 conventional (appendix 1). 
The distribution of Islamic and conventional banks per country will be as follow; figures 1.1 
and 1.2.  
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Islamic banks 
 
Figure 1.2: Distribution of conventional banks 
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The sample of 90 banks consist of 16 government banks and 74 non-government banks, their 
distribution per country presented in figures 1.3 and 1.4 as follow: 
Figure 1.3: Distribution of government banks 
 
  
Figure 1.4: Distribution of non-government banks 
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Figure 1.5: log of total assets of GCC countries  
 
 
1.4 Corporate governance in banking sector  
The rapid growth in the business sphere has increased the role of management in the running 
of their businesses. Management in turn tries to find the best ways to exercise rational 
management to maximize the wealth of shareholders. Due to the separation between owners 
(shareholders) and managers, management is required to sustain the confidence of their 
shareholders. Unfortunately, this confidence has been affected by many scandals, which have 
led to the collapse of many businesses such as Maxwell, WorldCom, Enron, and the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce (BCCI) (Ezat, 2010). 
Because of these scandals and collapses, some urgent questions have been raised about the 
relationship between shareholders and management of companies, and how to arrange this 
relationship to recognize the optimal management of wealth and use of resources. 
Furthermore, professional institutions and organizations have begun to consider devising a 
system that guarantees the non-repetition of these collapses. Consequently, the concept of 
corporate governance and risk management emerges as a solution to those problems. 
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and risk management and their implications on banking performance, this study will analyse 
and explore the relationship between all of them in order to assist the stakeholders, 
shareholders, management, customers, and investors in achieving their business goals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-6 the Main Constructs of the Study 
This study focuses on corporate governance and risk management practices within GCC 
banking sectors, and attempts to assess their impact on the bank’s performance. Whilst there 
is no strict regime for implementation of corporate governance or risk management 
frameworks such as the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the USA and Basel I, II, and III in Europe, the 
GCC banks, through regulations from individual central banks, have laid down corporate 
governance and risk management requirements within their domains. 
 
The results of this study are based on investigating and analysing the association between the 
selected variables that reflect the banking performance in the GCC region. Furthermore, it 
will study the corporate governance and risk management practices across 90 GCC banks (30 
Islamic and 60 conventional). This study will attempt to correlate these practices with the 
general performance of the bank. More importantly, this research will allow us to assess the 
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impact of corporate governance and risk management as a management tool and assess the 
effect of applying both together. 
Following to the above-mentioned collapses, scandals and East Asian financial crisis, the 
corporate governance came on the top of the global agenda. The financial crisis had some 
harmful consequences towards economic sphere, which prompted more studies and 
investigation as to its origins (Al Karasneh et al. 2006). Moreover, one of the major reasons 
behind these crisis and collapses was the bad corporate governance and risk management 
within the financial system. As a logical solution for that, the adherence to good corporate 
governance and applying effective risk management are currently recognized as crucial in 
averting financial crises.  
Transparency, fairness, accountability and responsibility are the four main principles of 
effective corporate governance, these principles are very important to provide legitimacy to 
the corporate level in the banking sector (OECD, 2004). Furthermore these principles have a 
crucial implication on the growth of banking sector and economic as a whole (World Bank 
report 2006). Furthermore, this report showed that countries could enhance the population 
life style when they enforce rules and clauses of the contracts and eliminating the barriers 
toward any new business.  
The evolution of the concept of Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) has reflecting the 
objectives of reducing costs and mitigating risk. At the same time the management do the best 
to maximize the revenues in order to add real value to the business firm (Robert Wolf 2008).   
As per the OECD (2004) by Goodhart (2011) corporate governance is a group of association 
between all stakeholders; management, board of director, shareholders, employees, customers 
and investors. In addition to the above, corporate governance refers to the organizational 
structures, internal control and business processes of the firm. Corporate governance 
highlighted the importance of responsibility and accountability among the main stakeholders 
within the firm, and focused on the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate 
affairs. Furthermore, corporate governance also provides the structure through which the 
objectives of the company are set, and determines the means for reaching these objectives 
and monitoring performance (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision Principles for 
enhancing corporate governance October 2010). 
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According to the above points of view, it can be concluded that there is no generally accepted 
definition of corporate governance. Nevertheless, a basic line should be maintained by all the 
definitions. This line is the structure of corporate governance, which constitutes to direct, 
manage, and control company affairs and strategies, regardless of the party/parties to which 
the companies are accountable. Corporate governance also provides the structures through 
which the objectives of the company are set, and by which the means of attaining those 
objectives and monitoring performance are determined" Goodhart (2011).  
From the above, corporate governance seeks to maintain a balance between all related parties 
either inside the corporation i.e. the management, the board of directors and CEO, or outside 
the bank i. e. the shareholders and other stakeholders. Therefore, in order to determine the 
objectives of corporate governance, it is worthwhile investigating the forces used by corporate 
governance to balance all the parties.  
Generally, there are four main powers that may be considered in the context of corporate 
governance; the ownership power, directors' power, managerial power and institutional 
shareholders' power (Tricker 1984; Monks and Minow, 2004). All these powers should be 
balanced within the bank. Unfortunately, there is a separation between who owns the money 
and who runs the business. This separation transfers the power from shareholders to 
management, who are then able to run the business more effectively (Monks and Minow, 
2004). 
Accordingly, it can be inferred that the main objectives of corporate governance are:  
a. Maintaining an efficient and effective system to help the banks to achieve its objectives 
and goals.  
b. Monitoring and rewarding executive actions and performance;  
c. Selecting the committee, which protects the shareholders’ interests by maximizing their 
wealth and regulating managers’ behavior within the bank; 
d. Alleviating the conflicts of interest between shareholders, management, board of directors 
and other stakeholders. 
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1.5 Concepts of risk management in banking sector 
The risk management in GCC countries has been evolving rapidly during the last couple of 
decades. From the surging oil prices since 2003, some countries in the region have displayed 
some of the world’s highest GDP growth rates. In these countries, the investments in 
infrastructure have reached the top levels until the financial crisis came in 2008. At the same 
time, the social, economic and political environment are subject to increasing volatility. In 
such an environment, risk management has risen onto the international agenda of GCC and 
especially in banking sector.  
In the GCC banking sector, banks are realizing the need to manage compliance, financial, 
hazard, operational, as well as strategic risks in a comprehensive manner and align these 
activities more closely to the enterprise’s objectives and risk appetite (Randeva et al. (2014)).  
The popular definition of risk management is “a process of identifying, assessing, and 
prioritizing risks of different kinds”. Once the risks have been identified, the risk manager 
will create a plan to minimize or eliminate the impact of negative events. Gordon et al. (2009) 
stated in their study that there are five factors affecting the banking sector: environmental 
uncertainty, industry competition, firm size, firm complexity, and board of directors’ 
monitoring. Moreover, risk management generally encompasses the following process:   
• Identifying the risks,  
• Assessing the risks and measuring the risk level,   
• Monitoring the risks,   
• Determining the internal control system in place,  
• Developing correction plan to mitigate the risks and 
• Reporting to senior management and the board as appropriate the top risks and 
correction plans.   
In addition, public policy makers around the world have started to question the 
appropriateness of the current corporate governance applied to financial institutions.  
Furthermore, risk management’s role in the financial system have been placed under scrutiny. 
This can involve many different actions. As already claimed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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(SOX) in 2002, financial expertise is considered to embody an important role. Other, more 
specific measures involve either the creation of a dedicated risk committee or designating a 
Corporate Risk Officer (CRO) who oversees all relevant risks within the institution (e.g., 
Brancato et al. 2006; Sabato, 2010). Mongiardino and Plath (2010) indicated that the risk 
management in highly structured banks have enhanced and improved to some extent, despite 
the effect of the financial crisis.  
In general, in the banking sector there is a robust correlation between bank performance and 
risk management because the major objective of bank management is to increase bank return 
and enhance performance; this objective could not be achieved unless the bank has a very 
strong risk management team who can manage and mitigate the risks to the acceptable level.   
In addition, banks face various kinds of risks such as interest risk, market risk, credit risk, off-
balance risk, technology and operational risk, foreign exchange risk, country risk, liquidity 
risk, and insolvency risk. The bank’s motivation for risk management comes from those risks 
that can lead in case of failure to bank underperformance. 
1.6 Bank performance in banking sector 
In recent years high attention to the bank performance has become more focused in the 
banking system. After the financial crisis of 2008, bank’s management are taking actions to 
improve and enhance the bank performance measurement capabilities in light of economic 
and market changes. There are number of methods to measure the bank performance such as; 
profitability (Return on Assets ROA, Return on Equity ROE, and Net Interest Margin NIM 
to investigate the interest-related side of the business), efficiency variables (ratios of total 
overhead costs to assets, and personnel costs to assets), asset allocation (Securities to Assets 
ratio), asset quality, liquidity and productivity. 
Here in this study, the profitability represented by ROA and ROE will be used as a proxy for 
BP. The ROA is the bank’s net income to its total assets. This variable has been heavily used 
in many previous literature to measure the BP. The ROE is the bank net income divided by 
common equity. Both of ROA and ROE measure the ability of bank’s management to 
recognize return on their assets and equity.   
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1.7 Research objectives and questions 
Due to the importance of corporate governance, risk management and bank performance in 
economic growth in GCC banking sector, this section will present the main objectives of this 
study are as follows: 
1) To add to an understanding of the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management.  
2) To assess the implication of corporate governance and risk management for the 
performance of banks in the GCC.  
3) To evaluate the significance of corporate governance and risk management in the 
performance of Islamic banks as compared with conventional banks in the GCC.    
4) To explore the relationship between corporate governance and risk management.    
5) To demonstrate that the implementation of both of corporate governance and risk 
management simultaneously will provide a comprehensive explanation of banks’ 
performance, however, the implementation of one of them ignoring the other will not 
do so.   
 
To achieve the objectives of this research, four main questions have been developed are as 
follows: 
Q1. Does better corporate governance lead to better bank performance? 
Managers are considered the agent of the owners, and their main role is to serve the 
shareholders’ interest in order to maximize the returns of the bank and enhance the 
performance. Furthermore, managers are required to accept reasonable risks which 
are suitable to the targeted returns. At the same time, managers as an agents may have 
different interests from their principals (shareholders) because they may spend bank 
assets beyond the optimal size in order to increase incentives and compensation due 
to increasing size, Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
Agency theory suggests that firms should involve managers as insider ownership, in 
order to align their interests. This mechanism shifts the conflict of interests toward 
owners/managers and public or depositors. Regulators protect the public interest by 
issuing rules to compel owners and managers of the bank to be obedient toward the 
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rules (Abdel-Fattah 2008). Furthermore, for the agency problem, the corporate 
government is considered one of the most reasonable solution, whereas, each 
concerned stakeholder has roles and responsibilities and there is also accountability 
from the higher level of management. In addition, whenever banks have a stronger 
governance system, they will achieve banks’ goals and enhance the performance.    
 
Q2. Is there a significant relationship between risk management and bank 
performance? 
If banks’ management manage their risk effectively, they will have the advantage of 
enhancing their performance by increasing the returns. The effective and efficient risk 
management indicates that banks operate their activities at lower relative risk and at 
lower conflicts of interest between all related parties. These advantages of 
implementing better risk management lead to better bank performance. The better 
bank performance enhances their reputation and image and encourages the potential 
investors to invest in the bank. There is a strong relationship between both of risk and 
return, because if the management want to recognize high returns then they should 
keep the risks at acceptable level.   
 
Q3. Does combination of better corporate governance and risk management lead to 
better bank’s performance? 
Banks that implement good corporate governance and manage their risk effectively 
will have the advantage of enhancing their performance presented by bank’s returns. 
Because the owner’s interest is to earn a better return on their investment (equity), 
they will attempt to force the management to implement better corporate governance 
and effectively manage their risk; the results of this study will provide an answer to 
this question and determine the key factors of developed bank performance, which are 
the corporate governance and risk management.   
 
Q4. Does Better Corporate Governance lead to better Risk Management? 
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Good implementation of corporate governance is not only concerned about high-
expected return but is also concerned about managing and controlling the risk better. 
Risk management is determined by mechanisms of corporate governance in the 
banking sector through different points of view. In addition, the main stakeholders of 
the bank are not only concerned about earning a better return on their investment, but 
are also concerned about how the bank’s risk exposure is distributed to them.  
Moreover, the power of markets is not enough to control the operations of banks. 
Therefore, government intervention is needed to overcome the market failure by 
controlling and monitoring the operations of banks, in order to restrain potentially 
expropriating management behavior. Corporate governance also offers some fair 
incentives, compensation, and career plans for the managers that reduce the 
expropriating managerial behavior. In addition, and summary for the above, good 
corporate governance reduces downside risk while increasing firm value (Wang et al. 
(2015)).   
1.8 Thesis structure 
The study is structured as follows; 
• Chapter One gives brief introduction to the concepts of corporate governance and risk 
management; in addition, it sets out the objectives and motivations of the study. Based on 
the four main questions, the relationship between corporate governance, risk 
management, and performance in GCC banking sector will be examined. The chapter 
concludes with the thesis structure. 
• Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework of the current study. A theoretical 
framework will be applied to explain the association between the proxy variables of 
corporate governance, risk management, and performance. The chapter aims to 
demonstrate the related theories of corporate governance and risk management, in order 
to examine their implications on banking performance. Theories referred to in this study 
will aim to develop the research hypothesis and then answer the thesis questions. 
• Chapter Three reviews the previous literature of corporate governance and risk 
management, and their implication on bank performance. This study classifies the 
previous literature into four main groups: 1) Corporate governance and bank performance. 
2) Risk management and bank performance. 3) Corporate governance and risk 
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management and the effect on bank performance. 4) Overall performance of the banking 
sector. All variables will be discussed in detail to achieve the objectives of the study. This 
chapter presents the research hypothesis. The main objective of this chapter is to discuss 
the previous literature in areas of corporate governance, risk management and bank 
performance, to determine the gap which will be filled by the current study. 
• Chapter Four discusses the methodology that will be used as a tool to achieve the 
objective of the study by interpreting the different and expected associations which arise 
from the research objectives and questions. This chapter presents different research 
philosophies, paradigms and approaches to present the most suitable methodology for the 
current study. Moreover, the purpose of the study will be presented through research 
design. This chapter shows the most suitable method for testing the correlation between 
proxy variables of corporate governance, risk management, and bank performance. The 
proxy variables of this study will be presented in detail to clarify the reasons behind 
investigating specific variables in relation to corporate governance, risk management, and 
bank performance. Finally, the chapter demonstrates the data analysis techniques and the 
relevant statistical procedures that will be used for analysing and testing the research 
model. 
• Chapter Five presents the statistical results and discussion, and examines the relationship 
between the proxy variables of corporate governance, risk management, and bank 
performance. The chapter starts with a descriptive analysis of the independent variables 
used in the current study. Both parametric and nonparametric tests as bivariate analysis 
will be used to support this relationship. Moreover, multivariate analysis will be employed 
to support the results obtained from the bivariate analysis. The chapter ends with a 
discussion of the findings. Consequently, the chapter aims to answer the research 
questions and achieve its objectives.  
• Chapter Six presents the main conclusions of the study. It summarizes the findings of the 
research. Furthermore, it presents the contribution of the current study to knowledge. A 
discussion of the limitations of the study will also be addressed. Finally, the chapter 
presents suitable recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Theoretical Framework 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will provide a critical review of the most common theories employed in the field 
of corporate governance, risk management bank performance literature. For the purpose of 
this study, the most common theories related to this thesis are: political economic approach, 
regulatory approach and economic approach. Regulatory approach is presented in section 2.2. 
Economic approach is presented in section 2.3. Political economic approach is provided in 
section 2.4. In section 2.5, the summary and conclusion will be presented. 
Theory is a comprehensive orderings of facts and realities, it gives explanation and 
interpretation to facts in paradigm. The facts observed should be tested to determine the 
values, and there is possibility to accept or reject the theory based on the empirical results. 
(Engheta and Ziolkowski 2005).  
The theoretical framework guides research determines what variables will be measured, and 
what statistical relationships to look for. For the research methods knowledge Base, Trochim 
et al. (2008) stated that there are two main realms in the research; theory and observation.  
Theory is what is going on in the heads of scientists, however observation is what is going on 
in the real world. To do research, one works between these two realms. The theory guides all 
research’s aspects; developing research questions, objectives, hypothesis. 
The theoretical discussion about corporate governance and risk management in the GCC 
Banking sector is based on several main hypotheses; firstly, that corporate governance and 
risk mechanisms influence the performance of the GCC Banks. Secondly, corporate 
governance influences risk management. In this regard, Figure 1-7 is the theoretical 
framework employed in the current study. The theories included in this figure are the most 
common theories in such studies (Abdel-Fattah 2008).  
 
 
 
Page 31 of 272 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1-7 Theoretical Framework of the Study 
 
There are different theoretical frameworks, such as agency theory, stakeholder theory, capital 
market theory, legitimacy theory, signalling theory, and regulatory approach. These 
approaches and theories will be discussed in details to test the relevance of their use as a base 
to explain and analyse the corporate governance and risk management and performance in 
the GCC banking sector. So far, corporate governance does not have an accepted theoretical 
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basis or generally accepted paradigm. Through the review of corporate governance literature, 
it can be noticed that agency theory and stakeholder theory are the dominant theories.  
Abdullah and Valentine (2009) found that the fundamental theories of corporate governance 
are; agency theory, stewardship theory, stakeholder theory and political and ethical related 
theories like business and virtue ethics. From their point of view these theories address the 
cause and effect of variables such as board members, audit committee, role duality, 
independent director and CEO-turnover. They concluded that a combination of various 
theories would be the best approach to describe good corporate governance practice rather 
than focusing on a single theory.  
2.2 Regulatory approach 
There are two common theories related to this approach; public interest theory and private 
interest theory. Public interest theory is an economic theory that should provide regulations 
and legislations in response to the public rights in efficient or equitable market (Riahi-
Belkaoui 2002). The regulation should be useful and to benefit all stakeholders in the society.  
Furthermore, the regulators should be representative for all concerned stakeholders and work 
for the interest of the society as a whole. Private interest theory is primarily directed for the 
interest of special groups to be in assistance of the profession. In addition to the above, Riahi-
Belkaoui (2002) indicated that the regulations under public theory applied to improve the 
public social welfare, however, regulations under private interest theory applied to enhance 
the wealth of specific interested groups.   
Davis and Menon (1987) indicate that the public and private interest’s considerations should 
be the base for any new regulation. Pound (1993) referred to that the public interest is more 
protected than others because the rules and regulations have been formed by government who 
conduct efficient monitoring to the governance system and the performance of all sectors.  
Vlachos (2001) indicated that developing of regulation in every sector depends on different 
variables such as; the efficiency and effectiveness of the sector, social and political issues and 
environmental issues. Public interest theories deal with the failure of banks by two concepts; 
externalities and efficiency. As a result of the failure of large numbers of banks, the external 
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costs of the economy, costs of credit and lending and aggregate investment will be 
substantially affected (Bernanke 1983).  
In addition, Friedman and Schwartz (2008) indicated that as a large number of failures in 
banking sector, the macro-economic could be highly affected in form of altering the money 
supply. The prudential regulation and dedicated monitoring could be a remedy for reducing 
the impact of the banking failure and limit macroeconomic externalities. 
The government policies and regulation could be used as a control tool for monopoly of the 
existing banks by doing one of the following; imposing more requirements on paid-in capital 
or limiting and controlling who can receive a new commercial licenses. In addition, dedicated 
follow up and supervision from authorities could be a solution to ensure that products and 
price are competitive and monitor the enforcement of legal restrictions on bank activity.  
The objectives of the public interest could be affected by the private interest of some 
investors, suppliers, bankers, customers, or political constituencies. In this case the corporate 
governance system will be the most effective solution adding to the dedicated monitoring of 
government’s authorities.  
From the above discussion, it can be noted that number of limitations are attached with 
regulatory approach over banking sector, which may affect the application of bank’s 
corporate government, risk management, and performance. In addition to the above, it can be 
concluded that the regulatory approach is considered relevant to the thesis to limited extent 
and the approach stand alone cannot explain the association between the three construct.    
2.3 Economic approach 
Generally, the economic approach is focusing on the goals, objectives and profit 
maximization. Furthermore it concentrates on the interests of two parties; shareholders 
(principle) and managers (agent). Three main theories under this approach, agency theory, 
signalling theory, and capital market theory. 
2.3.1 Agency theory 
One of the famous theories that has been used widely in corporate governance and risk 
management literature is agency theory. The agency theory has been used in different fields; 
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accounting, marketing, economics, finance, political science, organizational behaviour, and 
sociology (See: Eisenhardt, 1989). Behind the separation between ownership and 
management or internal controls, agency theory has been used to explain the relationship 
between them. The agency theory focuses on the relationship between two contracting parties, 
the principal is (owners) and the agent is (managers). This relationship involves delegating 
some decision making authority to managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Thus, managers 
are empowered to use all kinds of resources (financial, human…etc.) and consequently have 
all information about the bank. On the other hand, the owners have the power to hire 
managers, and they will need a lot of information to evaluate the performance. The problem 
here is the degree of accuracy of this information. It is assumed that individuals are effort-
averse and act in self-interest to maximize their benefits. In addition, the agency theory 
indicates that there is conflict of interest between the agent (managers) and the principal 
(owners). The mentioned conflict of interest assumes that the managers may take decisions 
that maximize their benefits, but not necessarily the benefits of owners. In order to avoid the 
conflict of interest, a number of mechanisms should be adopted to measure and monitor the 
agent’s behaviour, leading to agency costs. 
In the context of corporate governance and risk management, information asymmetry has 
been identified as one of the motivations of enhancing the corporate governance system. It 
can be observed that corporate governance is a very important tool used to reduce agency 
costs (Craswell and Taylor 1992). 
Claessen and Fan (2003) study corporate governance in Asia. They find that agency problems 
arise from certain ownership structures. Conventional corporate governance mechanisms 
(through takeovers and boards of directors) are not strong enough to relieve the agency 
problems in Asia. Firms use other mechanisms to reduce their agency problems (for example, 
employing from the big four auditors), although they have only limited effectiveness. The 
low transparency of Asian corporations relates to these agency problems, and the prevalence 
of connection-based transactions that motivate all owners and investors to protect rents. The 
rents often appear from government actions, including a large safety net provided to the 
financial sector. The research also attempts to cover the unresolved problem by examining 
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the relationship sensitivity between corporate governance and performance for domestic-
owned banks versus foreign-owned banks. 
The agency theory predicts that conflict of interest between managers and owners would harm 
firm value. Agency theory argues that the separation of ownership and controls enforces 
conflict of interests between parties. Ownership structure, as agency theory predicts, will 
reduce conflict between parties when, for example, managers have significant amount of 
ownership in the firm. Meanwhile, existing shareholders will benefit from reducing gap 
between managers’ and shareholders’ interests. 
Furthermore, a number of authors criticized the assumption of agency theory that agents 
(managers) act to maximize their benefits. They indicate that there is an overestimation of 
motivating managers to act in the owners’ interests. In addition, there are internal and external 
pressures that direct the performance of managers to serve the interests of owners in addition 
to their interests. Consequently, it could be helpful to mitigate the severity of the problem.  
The dispersion of ownership structure also plays a major role in reducing agency conflict, 
because the dispersion of ownership plays a significant factor in implementing good corporate 
governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that dispersion of level of ownership will affect 
the corporate governance mechanism. They argue that the effect of free riders’ problems with 
regard to level of concentration of ownership will influence shareholders (with a significant 
proportion of ownership) to control managers. Therefore, ownership structure will play a vital 
role in the corporate governance mechanism. 
Claessens (2006) and LLSV (2000) also support the prediction of the agency theory, that 
better corporate governance helps firms to reduce their cost of equity capital. This is probably 
because outsiders are likely to provide more finance and expect lower rates of return if they 
are given greater assurance (through better governance) of a return on their investment. 
The agency theory suggests that there are many mechanisms to mitigate the agency problem 
in the firm. These include managerial incentive mechanism compensates the managers to 
serve the owners’ interests; dividend mechanism reduces managerial intention to make an 
overinvestment decision which may be financed by internal free cash flow; bonding 
mechanism reduces managerial moral hazard which potentially occurs when they are not 
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restricted by bond contract and bankruptcy risk; choosing a reputable board of directors; 
direct intervention by shareholders. 
In relation to the market failure, agency theory stand alone cannot resolve the agency 
problems due to the external issues of the market that are considered out of the agency theory 
scope. Whereas, the governments plays a very important role in monitoring and controlling 
the banks to protect the public interest for the following reasons; 
• The importance of banking sector in the financial system and economic as a whole.  
• The important role of government in anti-competitive behaviour of some banks 
(Llewellyn and Sinha 2000). 
From the above discussion, it can be noted that there are some limitation over agency theory. 
However it is relevant to explain and support this study, but the theory stand alone cannot 
explain the corporate governance in all circumstances.     
2.3.2 Signalling theory 
As mentioned in the previous section, the information flow is one of the highly emerging 
problems in the business sphere. The signalling concept was emerged by Spence in 1973 
depending on the paper of Akerlof (1970). In addition to the above, the signalling theory 
focusing on that the asymmetry of information could be reduced/eliminated by raising signals 
of information to all concerned parties (An et al. 2011). Consistently with An et al. (2011), 
Morris (1987) who found that the theory shows how asymmetry could be eliminated or 
reduced when the party who has more information signals it to other parties.  
Signalling is a general phenomenon applicable in any market with information asymmetry. 
The signalling theory is similar to agency theory, in that the signalling theory recognizes the 
separation of ownership and management, and recognizes that the market pressures motivate 
managers to work in a transparent environment.  
Furthermore, the recent scandals have renewed attention to corporate transparency. 
According to signalling theory, under information asymmetry, corporations with high 
information transparency signal better corporate governance. Previous research has also 
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indicated that firms that have better corporate governance signal better performance (Chiang 
and Chai 2005). 
If there is information asymmetry between a firm’s managers and investors, the firm can 
signal information to the investors in order to eliminate the asymmetry (Spence 1973). In 
other words, if information asymmetry exists, the investor will not understand the real 
situation of the firm’s operations. Previous research indicates that investors rely on the 
information sent out from the firm to take investment decisions (Poitevin 1990; Ravid and 
Saring 1991). In practice, banks with good corporate governance and performance often 
signal information to the public to promote positive impressions of their banks. 
Under signalling theory, the management with agency problems have been encouraged to 
signal to the market that they have effective and efficient internal corporate governance and 
attempt to reduce agency costs. The transparency increases the value of the firm and send 
assurance to the stakeholders that management works well for their interest (Wang and Zhou 
2006; Ye 2009). Managers have more information about the company than others such as 
owners and investors. Managers may desire to send signals to interested parties; owners, 
investors, and governmental agencies, that the governance and performance is perfect. 
The assumption of signalling theory is that individuals are acting in their own interest; the 
same criticism received by agency theory. In addition, a number of authors criticize the 
assumption of equal distribution of power. They argue that it is not individuals who exercise 
power, but institutions (Gray et al. (1996) as cited in Watson et al. 2002). Furthermore, 
Newman and Sansig (1993) draw attention to the difficulty of the signalling process when 
many parties or multiple users are involved. 
Regarding the interaction between agency theory and signalling theory, Morris (1987) 
concludes that agency theory and signalling theory are almost consistent, and there is kind of 
overlap that exists between both of them, and the sufficient conditions of both are consistent. 
The two theories recognize rational behaviour; information asymmetry is implied in agency 
theory; the quality can be defined as a variable of agency theory; and signalling costs are 
implicit in some bonding devices of agency theory.  
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As mentioned in the above discussion, it can be observed that the signalling theory is relevant 
to limited extent to explain and support this study, but the theory stand alone cannot explain 
this study constructs in all circumstances.     
2.3.3 Capital need theory 
According to this theory, the managers are motivated to have good corporate governance, risk 
management and performance in order to encourage others to invest in their bank, and to raise 
capital at the lowest possible cost. To get capital with lower cost, either in the form of shares, 
bonds, or loans, a bank’s management should inform all stakeholders about the enhancement 
and development of the bank as a means to help in reducing investor uncertainty, and 
information asymmetry.  
Current governance theories such as agency theory (Fama and Jensen 1983) and capital theory 
(Lin et al. 2001) target two simultaneously coexisting mechanisms that influence the 
behavioural and consequently financial outcomes of the firm. Firstly, the motivation of the 
mangers to serve shareholders’ interests through effective competitive actions; secondly, the 
organizational capability to take enough competitive actions that are possibly enhanced by 
corporate governance arrangements. In addition to the above, Fama and Jensen 1983 found 
that the management and the board of directors could influence both motivation and capability 
of the firm, while non-board components of the corporate governance system such as 
executive compensation and institutional ownership are mainly motivation-aligning 
instruments. Thus, the role of the board of directors cannot be fully understood without 
consideration of the capital theory (for the firm’s capabilities in perceiving and implementing 
strategies that are enhanced by its board members). 
2.3.4 Evaluation of economic approach 
All of agency, signalling and capital need theories are derived from the economic approach. 
There are some limitations around this approach, which is based on the desire for income and 
avoiding loss (Bedford, 1973 as cited in Haniffa 1999). In addition, the economic approach 
focuses on profit maximization and cost minimization. Furthermore, in banking sectors most 
management concentrates on profit maximization and cost minimization base, and they 
ignore other important goals. 
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Furthermore, the economic approach highly focuses on two parties only (managers and 
shareholders), and pays less attention to other important parties in the society, such as 
(employees, creditors, suppliers, government, taxation authorities, and consumer groups). In 
addition, the economic approach cannot be studied in isolation from the political, social and 
institutional framework within which the economic actions take place (Gray et al. 1995). 
From the above discussion, the signalling theory has some limitation such as; investors could 
be less sophisticated or there are data unavailability. That is why the signalling theory stand 
alone cannot explain the CG, RM and BP.  
Due to the abovementioned limitations of the economic approach, a number of studies employ 
the political economic approach that takes into consideration the relation with society and 
other institutions. 
2.4 Political economic approach 
The political economic approach recognizes the interaction between economic activities and 
politics, institutions, and society. Therefore, the emphasis is not on the relationship between 
management and shareholders only but also other stakeholders. Furthermore, the political 
economic approach considers the issue of distribution of power and wealth in society, which 
means that it recognizes the interaction between all parties mentioned above. The prominent 
corporate governance theories that are derived from this approach are stakeholder theory, 
legitimacy theory.   
2.4.1 Stakeholder theory 
All individuals or groups who could affect or be affected by the performance of the firm 
(Freeman, 1984, P. 46). As mentioned before, the agency theory concentrates only on the 
relationship of two parties; shareholders as a (principal) and managers as an (agent), however, 
stakeholder theory considers the relationship between all stakeholders such as shareholders, 
managers, employees, customers, suppliers, and government. As per stakeholder theory, all 
stakeholders who are concerned with the performance of the firm are waiting for some return 
against their involvement (Crowther and Jatana 2007).  
Sternberg (1997) indicates that there is a radical shift from those who affect the firm, which 
could not survive if they withdrew, to those who are affected by it as they have a stake in the 
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company. Furthermore, under stakeholder theory, firms need support from all their 
stakeholders to be able to survive and continue in the business for the long term (Smith et al., 
2005). 
Practically, stakeholders can be classified into two main categories. First is a primary 
stakeholder group, which includes those who are essential to the continuation of the business, 
such as shareholders, employees, suppliers, investors and the government. The second is a 
secondary stakeholder group that includes those who are not essential to the continuity of the 
business (Rizk 2006). There are two sources of accountability under the stakeholder theory: 
ethical responsibilities, and managerial responsibilities. As per stakeholder theory, the 
managers have responsibility to assess the importance of every group of stakeholders, and 
they should do their best to satisfy them.  
In the stakeholders’ approach, the role of the board of directors will be even more important, 
as it will not only control that the top management main decisions comply with the 
shareholders’ interests, but also that all the other stakeholders are satisfied in order to keep 
the firm going on. From some point of view, the stakeholders’ approach is a way to relieve 
the management from excessive attention to the short-term financial results, and to redirect 
its attention to the long term overall performance. 
Stakeholder theory focusing on the concept that organizations are dependent to stakeholders 
for success, and every stakeholder have stakes in the firm. Under the stakeholder’s theory, 
managers must work on behalf of all stakeholders and not only the shareholders for the 
purpose of maximizing benefit; furthermore, shareholders will benefit, as the main 
stakeholders, in the long run. On one hand, Sternberg (1997) criticizes stakeholder theory and 
argues that this theory is incompatible with business and with corporate governance. It rules 
out the objective of business, which maximizes long term owner value. In addition, the theory 
implies that the firm should be accountable to everyone, not only to their owners, and 
encourages managers to violate their prior obligations to owners. Sternberg indicates in his 
study that stakeholder theory undermines private property and accountability and the 
balancing of stakeholder benefits is an unworkable objective and unjustified. 
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Inconsistent with Sternberg, Turnbull (1997) indicates that there are empirical evidences that 
do not support the first two criticisms of Sternberg. On the contrary, Turnbull argues that 
stakeholder relationships are legitimate and protect private property, agency, and wealth. 
However, three aspects of stakeholder theory can be identified, descriptive, instrumental and 
normative (Donaldson and Preston 1995). The first, descriptive, is used to describe and 
explain specific firm characteristics and behaviours. The second, instrumental, concerns the 
connections between stakeholder management and the achievement of corporate objectives. 
The third one, normative, is used to interpret the function of the corporation and the related 
moral and ethical guidelines. 
Based on both agency and stakeholder theories, Hill and Jones (1992) have constructed a 
paradigm called “stakeholder-agency approach”. In addition, they indicated that this approach 
is considered a modification of agency theory, which assumes efficient markets and rejects 
the concept of power differentials between managers and stakeholders to accommodate 
theories of power, and is a resource dependence theory that assumes inefficient markets which 
recognize the existence of unequal resource dependencies between managers and 
stakeholders. 
2.4.2 Legitimacy theory 
As mentioned by An et al. (2011), Legitimacy theory is the relationship between the business 
firm and society, and this relationship could be described as a “social contract”. Legitimacy 
is a generalized perception that the decisions and actions taken by the entity are desirable and 
accepted within the whole social system of values, norms and definitions (Suchman 1995, p. 
574, emphasis in original). As per legitimacy theory, all organizations and their 
representatives are ultimately seek legitimacy (Suchman 1995).   
Critical assumption within institutional theory is that all social actors are seeking legitimacy, 
and/or reinventing legitimacy norms, within the institutional environment (Doglas 1990). 
Although this is widespread in environmental and social disclosure, a number of corporate 
governance studies conclude that legitimacy theory was inadequate to fully explain social 
reporting behaviour (Guthrie and Parker 1989; O`Dwyer 2002; as cited in Ghazali 2004). In 
addition, it could be difficult to measure or qualify the concepts of society’s values and ethics 
when developing the research hypotheses. However, the social values in which a firm exists 
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affect the manner used by the firm to operate and report its performance (Gray et al. 1995). 
Furthermore, Adams et al. (1998) indicated that it is assumed that considering the social and 
political environment may be helpful to address the motivation for corporate social choices 
(Adams et al. 1998). 
Legitimacy theory is based on the concept that business firms have a social agreement with 
the society as a whole, whereas it agrees to work in consistence with the desirable and 
acceptable actions (Guthrie and Parker, 1989). Under legitimacy theory, a firm’s behaviour 
are monitored and assessed regularly by the public, due to that, firms working to acquire 
social approval. Furthermore, business firms are affected by many environmental factors. 
Based on the legitimacy theory, organizations can continue in their existence if the society 
assured that they working and acting within the acceptable system (Rizk 2006). 
To legitimize their actions, all firms have four strategies they need to apply: (Lindblom 
1994 as cited in Rizk 2006)  
1. Firms should educate and inform their relevant stakeholders about changes in the firm’s 
performance, 
2. Change the perceptions of the relevant stakeholders but not change its actual behaviour, 
3. Manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the issues of concern to other related 
issues through an appeal, 
4. Change the external expectations of its performance. 
2.4.3 Evaluation of political economic approach 
As per the discussion, it can be observed that the stakeholder theory and legitimacy theory 
provide an explanation to corporate governance, but both of them also suffer from some 
limitations. It can be noted that legitimacy theory explains and predicts that organizations will 
enhance their corporate governance and disclosure mechanisms to legitimize their business; 
it is insufficient to fully explain the practices. On the other hand, stakeholder theory assumes 
that managers determine the importance of stakeholders based on their powerful.  
Deegan (2002) highlights the links between legitimacy theory and other theories such as 
stakeholder theory and institutional theory. Moreover, he points out the benefits of employing 
more than one theory. 
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The idea of legitimacy is also central to institutional theory due to the overlapping of many 
theories (Rizk 2006). Under legitimacy theory, organizations need to change their structure 
or operations to conform to external expectations about what structures or forms are 
legitimate. In contradiction to legitimacy theory, Deegan (2002) indicated that there is 
perceived to be an ability of managers to alter perceptions of legitimacy. Under institutional 
theory, managers are expected to conform with “norms” that are largely imposed upon them. 
2.5 Summary and conclusion 
This chapter showed the approaches and theories that have been used heavily in the area of 
corporate governance, risk management and bank performance literature. The results of this 
study will help in answering the questions and accept/refuse the predefined hypotheses. From 
the above discussion there is no one theory can stand alone fully explain the association 
between CG, RM and BP in GCC banking sector. Furthermore, it was observed that there is 
an obvious overlap between those theories such as signalling theory, agency theory, and 
capital market theory which are all complementary to each other.   
In addition to the above, by reviewing these theories it can be noted that each theory interacts 
with corporate governance from a different perspective. It can be observed that there is an 
overlap between regulatory approach and legitimacy theory on one side, and other approaches 
on the other side. Interestingly, the economic approach focuses on parties related closely with 
economic activities (managers, shareholders, employees, …, and other stakeholders) and 
assumes that individuals are highly motivated by economic self-interest only, while the 
political economic approach focuses on other parties in addition to governmental agencies, 
and assumes that people are motivated by power and economic self-interest.  
This study addresses the relationship between corporate governance and risk management 
mechanisms, and how they affect bank performance. Therefore, there are many stakeholders 
such as; managers, shareholders, government, investors, creditors, investors and regulators. 
Consequently, the agency theory that is focused more on shareholders and managers is still 
relevant but for limited extent for this study. In addition, this study assesses several elements 
of corporate governance such as board composition, CEO-turnover, financial ratios, and the 
existence of main board committees. Consequently, the regulatory approach that is related 
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more to government regulations is also limited to explain the full relationship between the 
three constructs.   
Furthermore, the economic approach that focuses on assumptions of efficient market, profit 
maximization and self-interest is considered to be relevant to some extent but cannot explain 
alone the three constructs. Therefore, this study will use the political economic approach as 
the appropriate and relevant theoretical base for the current study because it is cove so many 
aspects which is not included in the other theories. This approach is relevant to explain the 
corporate governance and risk management and bank performance.  However, choosing these 
theories does not mean that they have some absolute superiority over others. So the selected 
theoretical framework is relevant and can support this study in order to develop the research 
hypotheses. The next chapter presents the literature review and research hypotheses. 
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Chapter Three: Literature Review and Hypotheses 
Development 
3.1 Introduction 
Before present the methodologies and samples that will be used (chapter 4) and determine the 
theoretical framework (chapter 2), this chapter will provide review of previous literature that 
have been done in the area of CG, RM and BP. This chapter has been structured as follows: 
Section 3.2 reviews previous literature related to corporate governance and bank 
performance. Section 3.3 reviews literature of risk management and bank performance. The 
review of empirical literature on the effect of corporate governance on risk management will 
be presented in section 3.4. Section 3.5 reviews literature of corporate governance and risk 
management, and the effect on bank performance. Section 3.6 reviews the control variables 
and the implications on bank performance. Section 3.7 provides a summary. 
Scandals and collapses such as Enron and WorldCom mainly highlighted the importance for 
new developments in the accounting and governance system. Furthermore, the financial crisis 
following the subprime meltdown in USA has led to extra awareness and needs for 
appropriate corporate governance and risk management techniques and structures, especially 
in the banking sector which considered vital in the global financial system. This has prompted 
many researchers to investigate the relationship between corporate governance, risk 
management and their implications on bank performance. Corporate governance has been 
studied and defined by different scholars and practitioners. However, they have come to the 
same conclusion, hence giving more of a consensus in the definition. For example, Coleman 
and Biekpe (2006) defined corporate governance as the relationship of the enterprise to 
shareholders, or in a wider sense as the relationship of the enterprise to the society as a whole. 
In addition, the corporate governance has many components such as; processes, structures, 
people, business environment and information and communication. The corporate 
governance is a system based on which firms are managed through this system which help 
organise the relationship and determine the roles and responsibilities for all concerned 
stakeholders such as (board of directors, supervisory board, management, shareholders and 
employees). This system should have the main component of corporate governance; 
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accountability, responsibility, fairness and transparency. In addition this system should 
formulate rules, policies and procedures for adopting decisions on corporate matters 
(Goodhart, 2011). 
Similarly, Arun and Turner (2002) indicated that the corporate governance is a system and 
approach, whereas the owners see the subject as a mechanism in which the managers will act 
in the benefit and interests of the owners. Macey and O’Hara (2001) indicated that the 
corporate governance should be adopted in the banking sector, because of the peculiar 
contractual form of banks which required that the corporate governance mechanisms should 
encapsulate depositors as well as shareholders. In the same line, Arun and Turner (2002) 
referred to the special characteristics of banking sector which require not only broader view 
of corporate governance, but also the  government has very important role in preventing the 
undesirable behaviour of some banks.   
In relation to one of the very important questions which is; the corporate governance has an 
impact on the risk management? And there are different answers from researchers. For 
example, Jansen, 1993; Greuning and Bratanovic (2004) indicated that the stakeholders 
themselves in the corporate governance system have an impact on both of risks and 
performance. In contradiction with this conclusion, Simpson and Gleason (1999) and Prowse 
(1997) indicated that the stakeholders do not have significant impact on both of performance 
and risks.  
This literature review presents many studies dealing with a single component of corporate 
governance such as (bank ownership, board of director’s size and composition, audit 
committee independence (outside members), role duality and CEO-turnover) and examine its 
implications on bank performance. But in this study we will measure the existence of the 
audit committee not the independency.    
In addition to the above, in the area of risk management (as a quantitative technique), 
researchers and practitioners are focusing on the methods of the quantitative measurement 
and how to enhance the management of special kinds of risks such as market risk, liquidity 
risk, capital risk and credit risk. From structural prospective, there is a current issue which is 
still being addressed in how to integrate all kinds of risks into one single report to the board 
and top management.   
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Number of literature on risk management are focusing on single type of risk, however 
ignoring the interdependence of other risks (Miller, 1992). In addition, in the 1990’s, the 
researchers started to focus on the integration and association between risk management and 
bank performance (e.g., Nocco and Stulz (2006); Cumming and Mirtle (2001); Miccolis and 
Shaw (2000); Miller, 1992 and Sabato 2010). 
3.2 Review of the empirical literature on corporate governance and bank performance 
This section will review the main empirical literature on the banking sector’s corporate 
governance and bank performance. Those literature focused on the main components of 
corporate governance, such as; bank ownership, board size and composition, and audit 
committee independence. However, the corporations are advised to take governance as a 
necessity and not as a duty before authorities. Furthermore, private and public sectors need to 
work cooperatively to establish governance mechanisms, ensuring the best banking 
performance (Al-Hawary, 2011). Quaresma et al. (2014) find that there is a significant 
relation between application of the best corporate governance practices and financial 
performance of the studied banks. 
Nobanee and Ellili (2016) investigated the degree of the corporate sustainability disclosure, 
using annual data for listed banks in the UAE during the period (2003–2013). The results 
show that the overall level of sustainability disclosure based on sustainability reporting for 
banks in UAE is at a low level including the degree of the corporate sustainability disclosure 
of the conventional banks which is higher than the Islamic banks. In addition, the empirical 
results reveal that the sustainability disclosure affects the banking performance of the 
conventional banks significantly and positively, while no significant effect on the Islamic 
banks’ performance is observed.  
Mulyadi and Anwar (2015) concluded significant association between corporate governance 
and profitability management. In addition, (Mollah and Zaman 2015) referred to that the 
board of director role and good corporate governance is still continue to be a matter of 
concern. 
Sarbah (2015) examined the state of the corporate governance environment, and the nature of 
the governance system employed by family businesses using Ghanaian family businesses. 
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This paper underlines the importance for family businesses to adopt good corporate 
governance structures. Furthermore, this study proves that the issues of family business 
corporate governance come to the fore when the business owners consider major transitions, 
such as the sale of the business or succession planning. 
Lai and Choi (2014) conclude that there is a statistically significant relationship between both 
capital adequacy ratio and profitability with corporate governance. Non-performing loan and 
return on assets are not a statistically significant relationship within corporate governance. 
There is also a statistically significant relationship between capital adequacy ratio and board 
size. Non-performing loan and return on assets are not a statistically significant relationship 
between board sizes. Besides, there is a significant relationship between the return on assets 
and board meetings. Capital adequacy ratio and non-performing loan are not significant with 
board meetings. 
Quaresma (2014) analysed the relationship between the quality of corporate governance 
practices and the financial performance of internationally listed banks. This research 
concluded that there is a significant relationship between the best corporate governance 
practices and the financial performance of the studied banks.  
In relation to corporate governance and in terms of inside and outside directors in the board, 
there are number of literature that focus on such as; Hermalin and Weisbach (1988); Linck et 
al. (2008). Regarding the CEO-turnover (Weisbach 1988). For the board size (e.g., Boone et 
al. 2007). In area of board’s composition (Harris and Raviv 2008). Regarding the ownership 
structure (Denis and Sarin 1999). Recent studies relate board diversity in terms of gender to 
performance (Farrell and Hersch (2005); Adams and Ferreira (2009); Huang and Kisgen 
(2013); Faccio et al. (2001); Ahern and Dittmar 2012).    
3.2.1 Role duality and bank performance 
The expression of role duality is used when the chairperson of the board is the chief executive 
officer at the same time. Researchers who agree with this duality, assume that due to the better 
knowledge of the chairperson about the bank, he/she will be in a better position to make good 
and suitable decisions regarding the performance and risks. In addition, role duality enables 
the CEO to interact quickly regarding any difficult situation and may provide strong 
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leadership style (Brickley et al. 1997). Furthermore, role duality creates a strong individual 
power base, which could affect the effective control exercised by the board (e.g. Donaldson 
and Davis 1991; Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen (1983); Whittington, 1993). 
Separation between Chairman and CEO does not have a statistically significant effect on 
financial performance (Durgavanshi, 2014). Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) concluded that 
there is role duality in 49% of the sample, and they did not find that duality destroys value to 
the board, and furthermore the duality is not significant for the stock market return 
regressions. Mollah and Zaman (2015) indicated that in Islamic banks there is negative 
association between bank’s performance and role duality.   
In contradiction with the above study, Al-Hawary (2011) concluded that the combination 
between the two positions of Chairman and CEO by one person had a positive effect on bank 
performance; role duality can be attributed to family ownership, which characterizes 
Jordanian banks.  
This study tests the association between role duality and bank performance measured by ROE 
and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.1 There is a significant association between role duality and bank performance  
3.2.2 Non-executive board member and bank performance 
The independent directors are directors without any relationship with the firm except for their 
board membership. Aebi et al. (2011) classified directors with prior executive function, with 
a family relationship with an executive officer of the bank, or with any other business ties, 
such as for example lawyers or consultants doing other work for the bank, as non-independent 
(or “gray”) directors.  
Al-Hawary (2011) investigated the effect of non-executive directors on the bank performance 
as measured by Tobin’s Q. He found that percentage of non-executive directors had a 
statistically significant, positive effect on performance; whereas leverage had a statistically 
significant negative effect on performance. In harmony with Al-Hawary (2011), firms with 
independent board members are significantly associated with better bank performance, 
measured by returns on equity (Brown and Caylor 2004).   
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Another important issue concerns the relationship between the board composition and 
performance: in theory, a wide number or a majority of outside directors could be associated 
with better performance, since it should reduce agency problems between shareholders and 
management. As concerns the presence of executive directors in the board, two opposite 
effects have been identified. On the one hand, executive directors could positively affect 
performance since they provide a more in-depth understanding of the company, and greater 
and better information on which the board may base its decisions. According to this approach, 
more executive directors may positively affect the quality of information that reaches the 
board (Adams and Ferreira 2007). On the other hand, the presence of executives may limit 
the board’s effectiveness in controlling and disciplining top management. 
Busta (2007) indicated in his study which was in European that, there is positive and 
significant association between the present non-executives and bank performance in 
Continental Europe (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), this association was negative in UK.  
Coleman and Biekpe (2006) examined how corporate governance indicators such as board 
size, board composition and CEO duality affected the financing decisions of 47 firms listed 
on the Nairobi Stock Exchange. They found that firms with larger board sizes employed more 
debt and the independence of a board correlated negatively and significantly with short-term 
debts. 
Adams (2012) shows that banks with board members that are more independent performed 
worse during the crisis; this finding is consistent with Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For non-
banks, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and Black (2002) find no significant 
relation between the percentage of outside directors and firm value.  
Similarly (2012) using system generalized method of moments (System GMM) find that the 
independent directors decrease bank performance. This conclusion comes in conformity with 
Hoque and Muradoglu (2013),who found that the percentage of independent directors in the 
board has a negative and significant coefficient with performance, measured by (annual stock 
market return and ROA), which means that independent directors do not help banks perform 
better. 
Mollah and Zaman (2015) indicated that in Islamic banks the association between board 
structure (board size and board independence) and bank performance is significant with 
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negative direction. In addition, they provide empirical evidence for the positive contribution 
of Shari’ah supervision boards. They also emphasized that this board need a very strong for 
enforcement and regulatory mechanisms to affect the performance positively.   
In contrast to Beltratti and Stulz (2012); Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) indicated that the more 
independent boards is associated with performance sensitivity, and the high insider ownership 
is associated positively with banks’ crisis performance.  
Lunck et al. (2008) found that the outside directors are less informed than directors from 
inside, however the outside directors are associated with more effective control and enhanced 
bank performance because they come from outside with different skills, experience and 
qualifications which may be needed for banks. In general and similar to this conclusion,   
Erkens et al. (2012) through the international sample of 296 financial firms from 30 countries 
during the credit crisis of 2007/2008, they investigated the association between corporate 
governance and bank performance. They concluded that the independent boards and higher 
institutional ownership experienced is associated negatively with the stock returns during the 
crisis. Moreover, the independent boards raised more equity capital during the crisis, which 
led to a wealth transfer from existing shareholders to debt holders. 
Empirical investigations of the relationship between board composition and performance do 
not lead to conclusive results: certain studies find that the presence of independent directors 
is positively associated with performance, whereas, Staikouras et al. (2006) found that the 
percentage of independent directors seems to be positively correlated with performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q.   
This study tests the association between non-executive board member and bank performance 
measured by ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following 
hypothesis:  
H1.2 There is an insignificant association between Non-executive board member and 
bank performance  
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3.2.3 Gender diversity of board and its relationship to bank performance 
As per the review of previous literature, different results can be noted about the participation 
of female directors in the board, whereas a number of researchers found a positive relationship 
with bank performance, and other researchers found that this relationship is negative. 
Low et al. (2015) concluded that the existence of increasing number of female on the board 
is associated positively with performance measured by ROE.  Consistent with the same result, 
Gulamhussena and Santa (2015) who investigated the role of female in the board through a 
sample of 461 large size banks in OECD countries, and they noted that the existence of female 
directors in the board is associated significantly and positively with performance. In addition, 
they noted that there is a negative relation between the presence of women in board and risk-
taking.  
García-Mecaa et al. (2015) investigated the effect of board diversity (gender and nationality) 
on performance in banks, making use of a sample of 159 banks in nine countries during the 
period 2004–2010. They found that gender diversity increases bank performance, while 
national diversity inhibits it.  
There is a negative relationship between the presence of females on the board and profitability 
(Adams and Ferreira (2009); Ahern and Dittmar (2012)). The interpretation of this result 
suggests that female directors engage in excessive monitoring that decreases shareholder 
value (Almazan and Suarez (2003) and Adams and Ferreira (2007)). In relation to investment, 
females make poorer decisions as they face higher obstacles than males in obtaining 
information about investment projects (Bharat et al. (2009)). 
Berger et al. (2014) concluded that female executives self-select into stable and well-
capitalized banks. However, in the three years following the increase in female board 
representation, risk taking increases, although the change is economically marginal. In 
contrast with that, Wachudi and Mboya (2012) concluded that board gender diversity has no 
significant effect on the performance of banks; this is shown by a statistically insignificant 
relationship between board gender diversity and bank performance. 
Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) concluded that the gender diversity (the existence of female 
directors) does not add any value to the board. In contrast to this result, Stepanova et al. (2012) 
Page 53 of 272 
 
concluded that there is a positive relationship between gender diversity and performance, 
which  is due to female directors providing banks with better monitoring, resulting in  better 
performance. Similar to Stepanova et al. (2012), Smith et al. (2006) concluded that the 
existence of female director in the board will enhance and improve the competitive advantage 
and improve the image of the firm as this has a positive implication on customers’ satisfaction 
and consequently the performance. 
This study tests the association between gender diversity and bank performance measured by 
ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.3 There is an insignificant association between gender diversity and bank 
performance  
3.2.4 Board size and bank performance 
A certain group of studies reports a negative correlation between board size and performance, 
such as Uwuigbe, 2012; Hermalin and Weisbach (2001). However, Denis and McConnell 
(2003); de Andres et al. (2005); Bohren and Strom (2007) report no relation between 
independent directors and performance, and there is a negative correlation between board size 
and value of the company using a sample of international companies, excluding financial 
institutions.  
Bennedsen et al. (2004) used the sample of 500 Danish firms to investigate the relationship 
between board size and performance, and they concluded that the association is significant 
and negative between both of them. However, they also observed that board size below six 
has no effect on performance. It is viable for only large size board (more than seven). Dwivedi 
and Jain (2005) conducted a study on 340 large, listed Indian firms for the period (1997- 
2001), and found a weak positive relation between board size and performance of the firm. 
Adams and Mehran (2005) accessed the relationship between banking firm’s performance 
(represented by Tobin’s Q) and board size, and found a non-negative relationship between 
board size and Tobin’s Q. 
In the same line, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that large boards could be less effective 
than small boards. Increase in board’s size brings about increase in agency problems (such as 
director free-riding) within the board, and the board becomes less effective. Furthermore, 
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Jensen, 1993 supported the theory of Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and added that the decision-
making power of the board becomes slower with large board size. 
In harmony of the above, Fanta et al. (2013) concluded that the board size is associated 
significantly and negatively with bank performance. Oluwafemi et al. (2013) examined the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance in Nigeria’s banking sector, and 
concluded that the improved performance of the banking sector is not dependent on increasing 
the number of executive directors and board composition. In addition, the need for increase 
in board size and decrease in board composition is measured by the ratio of outside directors 
to the total number of directors in order to increase the bank performance. Hoque and 
Muradoglu (2013) found that the board size is negatively related to return during the crisis 
period, however, it is positively related during non-crisis periods.  
In Ghana, Coleman and Biekpe (2006) identified that boards with small number of directors 
is associated with better performance of Micro Finance Institutions. Mak and Kusnadi (2005) 
through the sample of listed firms in Singapore and Malaysia, they indicated that when the 
board of director consist of five directors then the firm valuation will be in high level, and 
interestingly, this number of directors on the board is considered small in such countries. 
Sanda et al. (2003) in Nigeria indicated that the performance is associated significantly and 
positively with small number of directors in boards.   
Coleman and Biekpe (2006) through the sample of 47 listed firms in Stock Exchange of 
Nairobi, they investigated the association between corporate governance elements such as; 
board (size and composition) and CEO duality and performance, and they found that the 
larger board sizes associated with more debts, and the independence of the board associated 
negatively and significantly with short-term debts. 
There are studies in the US which do not find any significant relation between board size and 
composition and performance (Belkhir, 2006). Adams and Mehran (2005) indicated that the 
board size is positively associated with performance measured by Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, 
the association between the presence of independent members and performance is significant, 
in addition, companies with boards dominated by outside members highly associated with 
better performance.  
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Staikouras et al. (2006) through a sample of European banks, indicated that there is negative 
and significant association between the size of the board and performance. Brogi (2008) 
concluded that there is no empirical evidence on the ideal board size and composition whereas 
no one board size and composition can fit all banks.   
Yung (2009) concluded that banks with a larger size of board of directors and with a lower 
level of related-party loans tend to perform well. Similarly, Stepanova et al. (2012) concluded 
that the relationship between bank performance and board size is negative. A larger board is 
expected to negatively affect the return on equity ROE (Durgavanshi, 2014). 
Rachdi and Ameur (2011) investigate the relationship between board characteristics; 
performance Return on Assets and Return on Equity and bank risk taking (Z-score). This 
study concluded that a small bank board is associated with more performance and with more 
bank risk-taking. The presence of independent directors within the board of directors affects 
negatively the performance, but has no significant effect on the risk-taking. 
In contradiction with the above studies, (Belkhir, 2009) who studied 174 US bank and savings 
institutions, found no effect between board size and firm performance. However, this study 
did not report any positive relationship between board size and performance. Similarly, 
Zulkafli and Samad (2007) examined 107 banks in 9 Asian markets in 2004. Their findings 
suggest no significant relationship between the board size and performance measures (e.g. 
return on assets and Tobin’s Q). 
This study tests the association between board size and bank performance measured by 
ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.4 There is a significant association between board size and bank performance  
3.2.5 CEO-turnover and bank performance 
As per the review of the previous literature, there is a consensus that the probability of CEO-
turnover negatively affects the bank performance. The board replaces a poorly performing 
CEO to enhance and develop the firm’s performance, Huson et al. (2001) and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2001). The improvements of shareholders’ wealth and business operations follow 
CEO-turnover (Denis and Denis (1995); Huson et al. (2004)). 
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Bornemann et al. (2015), this study was in German over the period 1993–2012 and 
investigated the relationship between CEO-turnover and saving banks performance. They 
concluded that the incoming CEOs increase discretionary expenses, this increase from outside 
CEOs is stronger than CEOs from outside.  There is another group of literature which found 
that there were significant positive changes in firm performance when CEO departures were 
followed by the appointment of a new CEO from outside the firm, Borokhovich et al. (1996), 
Farrell and Whidbee (2003) and Huson et al. (2004). 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001); Huson et al. (2004) concluded that the CEO’s departure from 
his position might be due to retirement or movement to an external position. As a result, the 
departures are not a flag of poor performance, and consequently, firms’ future performance 
is expected to show smaller variations when compared with unexpected departures. In 
addition, not identifying the type of departure only increases the signs that the proxy measure 
of executive turnover is not pure, which could lead to a downward biased estimate of 
performance changes. 
This study tests the association between CEO-turnover and bank performance measured by 
ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.5 There is a significant association between CEO-turnover and bank 
performance  
3.2.6 Audit committee and bank performance 
The audit committee is a committee belongs to board of director, in addition this committee 
has very important role in overseeing and monitoring the areas of internal controls and risks. 
The primary role of the audit committee is to oversight the financial performance and ensure 
the adherence to rules, policies, procedures and laws additional to the reliability of the 
financial reporting mechanism. The audit committee should be allowed to work 
independently without any intervention from top management and board of director. The 
committee should have regular review to all matters related to internal control, risk 
management and corporate governance. In addition to the above, the committee should 
coordinate the all works related to audit. 
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Chen et al. (2015) investigate whether firms adopting the audit committee system can improve 
earnings quality. They found that improvements in earnings quality cannot be achieved by 
merely adopting the audit committee, but are more beneficial by firms that focus on audit 
committee with substance. In addition, they indicated that many Japanese firms may adopt 
audit committee as a fashionable “label” without embracing shareholder primacy. 
(Durgavanshi, 2014) found that there is no significant relationship between the existence of 
audit committee and both Return on Equity ROE and Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS).    
Fanta et al. (2013) found that the existence of an audit committee in the board had a 
statistically significant negative effect on bank performance. In agreement with this 
conclusion, (Klein, 2002) reports a negative correlation between earnings management and 
audit committee independence. 
Anderson et al. (2004) found that the independent audit committees are highly associated with 
significant lower financing cost of debts. Also, yield spreads are negatively correlated to audit 
committee size and the number of their meetings. In contrast, (Kajola, 2008) concluded that 
the audit committees occupied by a majority of outside members have no influence on the 
firm’s performance. This is because (Kajola, 2008) shows that the relationship between the 
audit committee and the two performance measures is not statistically significant. 
Agrawal and Chadha (2005) showed that firms with audit committees that have an 
independent director with a background in accounting or finance are significantly associated 
negatively with lower returns and earnings. However, Abbott et al. (2002) indicated that audit 
committees that have no experience in finance and risk management are significantly 
associated with high probability of financial errors and mistakes. DeFond et al. (2005); 
Davidson et al. (2004) report a positive market response when the audit committee consist of 
directors with auditing and accounting experience.  
Hayes et al. (2004) showed that the market to book ratio as a proxy variable of performance 
is not associated with the fraction of outside directors on the audit committee. Beasley (1996) 
indicated that there is no significant association between the audit committee and its 
composition and financial fraud. Likewise et al. (2005) found that there is no significant 
association between the independence of the audit committee and probability of earnings. 
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Carcello and Neal (2000) they found empirical evidence that the independence of the audit 
committee members provides no superior benefit to the firm.  
This study tests the association between audit committee and bank performance measured 
by ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.6 There is an insignificant association between audit committee and bank 
performance  
3.2.7 Risk committee and bank performance 
As mentioned by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) 2002, financial expertise is highly 
considered to play an important role in a firm. Furthermore, another measure is to involve 
either creation of a specialized risk committee or designating of a CRO who oversees all 
relevant risks within the institution, e.g. (Brancato et al. (2006); Sabato, 2010). 
Battaglia et al. (2015) through a sample of Chinese and Indian listed banks during the 
financial crisis of 2008, they investigated the association between boards of directors and risk 
management and bank performance, and they noted that there is positive relationship between 
the risk committee size and bank performance measured by ROE and ROA.  
Mongiardino and Plath (2010) concluded that only few number of banks are follow the best 
practices in 2007. They found that the better risk governance needs to have a dedicated risk 
committee which should be independent. In addition, risk governance in large banks seems 
to be developed and improved despite the pressure of the financial crisis. Merely having a 
risk committee does not necessarily help banks’ crisis performance. However, having a more 
dedicated committee that meets more frequently and is larger seems to positively affect the 
banks’ performance in the crisis (Aebi et al. 2011).  
This study tests the association between risk committee and bank performance measured by 
ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.7 There is significant association between risk committee and bank performance  
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3.2.8 Credit and investment committee and bank performance 
As per the review of the annual reports of GCC banks, it was noted that the majority of GCC 
banks in recent years established credit and investment committees in order to work as a 
control tool for one or more of the followings:  
• approving extension or renewal of credit facilities,  
• granting temporary excesses to customers with credit facilities approved by the board, 
• approving early repayments of facilities,  
• monitoring the performance and quality of the Group’s credit portfolio and overseeing 
the administration and effectiveness of and compliance with the credit policies 
through the review of such processes,  
• reporting other information as it deems appropriate. 
From the review of the previous literature, minor number of studies investigated the 
association between the existence of this committee, and performance and risk management. 
Therefore, this study will use the credit and investment committee as a proxy for corporate 
governance. In addition, this study tests the association between credit and investment 
committee; and bank performance measured by ROE and ROA.  
H1.8 There is a significant association between credit and investment committee and 
bank performance  
3.2.9 Capital ratio and bank performance 
The capital ratio represents better obedience towards the central bank’s regulation. Capital 
ratio is equal to loan loss provision (LLP) plus equity divided by total loan. The CR has been 
used in many previous literature as a proxy variable of corporate governance by (Tandelilin 
et al. (2007); Kim et al. (2012)). 
This study tests the association between capital ratio and bank performance measured by ROE 
and ROA. 
H1.9 There is a significant association between capital ratio and bank performance  
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3.2.10 Loan to deposit ratio and bank performance 
This ratio represents the proportion of depositors’ contribution as a source of capital to finance 
the banks’ loans. Smaller LDR indicates that the depositors are financing a large proportion 
of banks’ loans. On the other hand, if the LDR ratio is too much high, it means that banks 
might not have enough liquidity to meet any unforeseen financial obligation or fund 
requirements. In addition, if the LDR ratio is too low, it means that banks have a big liquidity 
and they have no ability to create investment and recognize the targeted returns.  
Tandelilin et al. (2007), concluded that the LDR had a significant and negative effect on CAR 
at 1% confidence level. In addition, the joint-venture-owned banks had mean LDR of 109%, 
higher than the maximum level of 85% determined by the Central Bank. Foreign-owned 
banks had mean LDR of 60%, higher than domestic-owned banks’ LDR. However, Fanta et 
al. (2013) concluded that the loan to deposits ratio did not have a statistically significant effect 
on performance.  
This study tests the association between LDR; and bank performance measured by ROE and 
ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H1.10 There is a significant association between loan to deposit ratio and bank 
performance  
3.3 Review of the empirical literature of risk management and bank performance 
The banking sector has many types of related risks that could be differ by number of factors 
such as; market, service rendered, regulations and business environment. Furthermore, there 
are many types of risks that can be classified to six groups; legal risks, operational risk, 
counterparty risk, market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. This section will discuss those 
types of risks and how the board of director and management can deal with them and discuss 
their implications on bank performance.  
Mokni et al. (2015) through the survey that have been done for 47 banks; 23 Islamic banks 
and 24 conventional banks in MENA region, they investigated the association between risk 
management and bank performance in Islamic and conventional banks. They concluded that 
in MENA region there is effective risk management frameworks and efficient risk strategies 
in banking sector. Furthermore, they considered the credit risk and liquidity risk are the most 
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important risks in both conventional and Islamic banks. In addition, the traditional credit risk 
mitigation tools still be used substantially by Islamic banks.   
As per review to the previous literature, there are many literature in the area of risk 
management and bank performance and most of them are conceptual, these literature have 
drawn the theoretical relationship between the best practice of risk management and better 
bank performance. In addition, there several studies investigated the association between risk 
and bank performance, number of these studies tried to discussed in details the risk 
measurement and its implication on performance (e.g. Hughes and Mester (1998); Altunbas 
et al. (2000); Park and Weber (2006); Banker et al. (2010); Hsiao et al. (2010); Barros et al. 
(2012)). 
(Gordon et al. (2009); Nocco and Stulz (2006); Schroeck (2002)) stress the importance of 
good risk management practices to maximize firms’ value. In this context, Nocco and Stulz 
(2006) suggest that effective enterprise risk management (ERM) provides a long-run 
competitive advantage to banks, compared to those that manage and monitor risks 
individually. In addition, it is suggested that companies manage risks strategically by viewing 
all the risks together within a coordinated manner. In the same context, (Stulz, 1996) 
associates good risk management practices with the elimination of costly lower-tail outcomes 
by proposing full coverage of risk management as compared to selective risk management. 
The study suggests that prudent risk management is important in mitigating and reducing 
bankruptcy costs. Moreover, in the case of the US, there are potential benefits, for example, 
that risk management could also reduce taxes.  
Other group of studies highlighted the association between effective risk management in 
practices with better bank performances such as (Smith, 1995; Schroeck; 2002). Those couple 
of studies concluded that the effective risk management practically mitigate the volatility in 
financial performance; earnings, operating income, firm’s market value and returns in 
general. In addition, Schroeck (2002) indicated that as per the best practice, the effective risk 
management is highly associated with increased earnings.  
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As per literature review, and in relation to the empirical evidence for the relationship between, 
it could be noted that minor number of studies are there. Among these studies, (Drzik, 2005) 
who concluded that the huge investment in risk management during the 1990s aimed to 
mitigate profit and loss volatility during the recession of 2001. Consistently with this 
conclusion, Pagach and Warr (2007) who tested the factors that influence the ERM, and they 
concluded that more leveraged the firms are, the more volatile their earnings are. This study 
reports that firms that are more levered, more volatile earnings, and poorer stock 
performances, are more likely to adopt ERM.  
Angbazo (1997) in his study presented a new horizon in investigating the association between 
risk management and bank performance by testing the relationship between different types of 
risk factors and banks’ profitability. This study found that the default risk is a determinant of 
bank performance; net interest margin (NIM), and the regional banks are more sensitive to 
interest risk same like default risk.  
There is another study of Saunders and Schumacher (2000) who investigated the determinants 
of NIM in 614 banks in 6 European countries and US during the period from (1988 to 1995), 
this study provides empirical evidence on the importance of controlling risks to financial 
performance and the interest rate volatility is associated significantly and positively with bank 
profitability. Kim et al. (2012) concluded that banks need to make corporate changes in order 
to meet global standards and to be able to compete for stability and profitability of the banking 
sector. 
Ariffin and Kassim (2011) investigated the relationship between risk management and bank 
performance, and found that board of directors’ approval of the overall policies and ensuring 
that management takes necessary actions to manage the risks is important. This indicates that 
the governance structure must be in place to cater to these needs, and the overall objectives 
of the bank should be communicated throughout the bank. 
3.3.1 Non-performing loan and bank performance 
Zhang et al. (2016) during the period from (2006–2012) investigated the implication of NPL 
on banks behaviour in China using a sample of 60 city commercial banks, 16 state banks and 
joint-stock banks, and 11 rural commercial banks. They concluded that an increase in the NPL 
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ratio is associated with higher riskier lending, and this high percentage of NPL will badly 
affect the performance, loan quality and financial system instability as a whole. 
Micco et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive analysis of bank ownership and performance, 
and conclude that state banks in developing countries tend to have lower profits, higher costs, 
and larger non-performing loans relative to private banks. Non-performing loans NPL 
negatively affect the efficiency and return on assets, Epure and Lafuente (2015). The NPL 
have a positive significant effect on VAR at 1% level of alpha (Tandelilin et al. 2007). 
As per review of previous literature, it can be noted that several studies discussed the risk 
variables and their association with efficiency measures. Most of them used the parametric 
analyses under cost function approaches; McAllister and McManus (1993); Berger and 
DeYoung (1997); Hughes and Mester (1998); Altunbas et al. (2000).  
Altunbas et al. (2000) discussed the loan portfolio quality by investigating the ratio of non-
performing loans NPL, they concluded that this percentage is one of the most important 
variables in measuring risks. According to Berger and DeYoung (1997) the non-performing 
loan is considered a very important variable in addressing the quality over loan portfolios.  
This study tests the association between NPL and bank performance measured by ROE and 
ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H2.1 There is a significant association between Non-performing loan and bank 
performance  
3.3.2 Capital adequacy ratio and bank performance 
Aspal and Nazneen (2014) investigated the association between capital adequacy ratio and 
performance and they concluded that the capital adequacy ratio is significantly and negatively 
associated with lending (loans), asset quality and management efficiency. In addition, this 
association was significant and positive with liquidity and sensitivity. The regression results 
have revealed that Loans, Management Efficiency, Liquidity and Sensitivity have statistically 
significant influence on the capital adequacy of private sector banks. Generally, this 
conclusion is in agreement with (Navapan and Tripe, 2003) who found a negative relationship 
between CAR and ROE. 
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Hassan et al. (2016) investigated the changes in banks' capital adequacy ratio (CAR) and 
examine the results of both of conventional and participation banks in Turkey. This study 
concluded that the CAR declines substantially. Furthermore, the participation banks suffer 
more in declined CAR compared to conventional banks. In addition to the above they noted 
that participation banks in Turkey are more sensitive to sudden changes in exchange rates and 
increased NPL.  
Furthermore, Bateni et al. (2014) found that there is a positive and significant association 
between return on equity ROE and capital adequacy ratio. Inconsistent with this, 
Büyükşalvarcı and Abdioğlu (2011) investigated the determinants of Turkish banks' capital 
adequacy ratio and its effects on the financial positions of banks covered by the study for the 
period (2006 – 2010), and found that the return on equity had a negative and significant effect 
on CAR.   
Epure and Lafuente (2015) found that capital adequacy ratio positively affects the net interest 
margin, which supports that incurring monitoring costs and having higher levels of 
capitalization may enhance performance. All banks should maintain a capital adequacy ratio 
higher than the minimum ratio set by the central banks. Capital included in the CAR 
comprises main capital and secondary capital. Currently, the Basel Committee proposed a 
minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8%. CAR is considered a very good banking tool to 
measure the bank’s ability to pay its liabilities and meet any risks that may be incurred in the 
future.  
Hakim and Neamie (2001) concluded that there is strong link between capital adequacy ratio 
and commercial bank return, with high capitalization being the limitation to return. The study 
concludes that the capital is a sunk cost, with large banks realizing high profits in absolute 
but not in percentage terms. 
Mili et al. (2016) investigate the influencing factors that could affect the capital adequacy 
ratio in foreign banks, they used a sample from 310 subsidiaries and 265 branches to examine 
the implication of the parent banks on the capital adequacy ratio of subsidiaries and branches. 
Furthermore they investigated whether the same influencing factors have the same effect on 
CAR of subsidiaries and branches in developed and developing countries. This study have 
empirical evidence that CAR of subsidiaries and branches in developing and developed 
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countries is not depend on the same influencing factors. They also noted that the regulatory 
framework of a parent bank's home country affects the capitalization of its foreign 
subsidiaries in the host countries.  
This study tests the association between capital adequacy ratio and bank performance 
measured by ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following 
hypothesis:  
H2.2 There is significant association between capital adequacy ratio and bank 
performance  
3.3.3 Credit risk and bank performance 
Hakim and Neamie (2001) Used banking data from two countries; Egypt and Lebanon over 
the period from (1993 to 1999) to investigate the relationship between credit risk and bank 
performance in the 1990s. This study estimates a fixed effects model of bank return with 
varying intercepts and coefficients. The findings show that the credit variable is positively 
related to profitability.  
Furthermore, Aduda and Gitonga (2011) examined the association between credit risk and 
profitability as a proxy for bank performance, for this purposes they used both of qualitative 
and quantitative methods in order to achieve this study objectives, in addition they used the 
regression statistics technique to test the relationship. The main result of this study show that 
there is an association at reasonable level between credit risk management and profitability 
in all commercial banks analysed. In contrast, (Sayedi, 2014) found that there is insignificant 
and negative association between credit risk and profitability. In addition, banks should 
ensure that they continue to maintain a low level of credit risk in order to increase the 
profitability; this is because the insignificant decline in credit risk has a negative effect on the 
profitability of banks. 
Miller and Noulas (1997) investigated the relationship between credit risk and bank 
profitability as a proxy of bank performance, and they concluded that there is significant and 
negative between both of them which can be explained that the effective risk management is 
related to the better bank performance. In addition any kind of loans is associated with risks, 
accordingly, banks will face a big difficulties in maximizing the profitability.  
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In relation to credit risk, it is defined as the probability that a bank’s assets, especially loans, 
will decline in value and it may become worthless. The banks need to make provisions for 
loan losses. Higher provision becomes relative to the size of total loans and is an indicator for 
high risk. Thus, management of credit risk is very important to the health of the entire 
financial system (Tsorhe et al. 2011). 
Credit risk has a negative relationship with financial performance. This is in harmony with 
extant finance literature, which highlights that, it is probable that when risky lending increases 
the payback declines. This in turn negatively affects commercial banks’ earnings (Rogers 
2008). Similarly, the coefficient on credit risk is significant at a level of 10 percent, indicating 
that banks with higher credit risk are less efficient (Jiang et al. 2012).  
Tsorhe et al. (2011) Board strength does not have a significant impact on credit risk. This 
conclusion is consistent with Aboagye and Otieku (2010) who found that an index that 
captures the state of corporate governance, outreach to clients, dependence on subsidies and 
use of technology is not statistically associated with their financial performance. 
This study tests the association between credit risk and bank performance measured by ROE 
and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H2.3 There is significant association between credit risk and bank performance  
 
3.3.4 Capital risk and bank performance 
Furthermore, Tsorhe et al. (2011), found that the power of board of director as a proxy for 
corporate governance does not have any significant relationship with capital risk. 
Hassan et al. (2016) investigated the changes in banks' capital risk and examine the results of 
both of conventional and participation banks in Turkey. This study concluded that the capital 
risk declined compared to conventional banks. Furthermore, Bateni et al. (2014) found that 
there is a positive and significant association between return on equity ROE and capital 
adequacy ratio. Inconsistent with this, Büyükşalvarcı and Abdioğlu (2011) investigated the 
determinants of Turkish banks' capital adequacy ratio and its effects on the financial positions 
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of banks covered by the study for the period (2006 – 2010), and found that the return on equity 
had a negative and significant effect on CAR.   
Tsorhe et al. (2011) used a sample from Ghanaian banks, this study focused on the financial 
health of banking sector in Ghana. They investigated whether the corporate governance is 
associated with three measures of bank risks; capital risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. This 
study concluded that the power of board of director is insignificantly associated with (credit, 
capital and liquidity) risk. 
Epure and Lafuente (2015) found that capital adequacy ratio positively affects the net interest 
margin, which supports that incurring monitoring costs and having higher levels of 
capitalization may enhance performance. Hakim and Neamie (2001) concluded that there is 
strong link between capital adequacy ratio and commercial bank return, with high 
capitalization being the limitation to return.  
This study tests the association between capital risk and bank performance measured by ROE 
and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H2.4 There is insignificant association between capital adequacy ratio and bank 
performance  
 
3.3.5 Liquidity risk and bank performance 
Bank liquidity is the bank ability to have enough liquid assets that can be easily liquid in order 
to make new invest or pay any kind of financial or contractual obligation. Banks will be 
exposed to liquidity risk when they do not have enough liquid assets that can be used to 
compensate any expected and unexpected obligation. Based on that, the liquidity risk is 
considered one of the most important type of risks that banks’ management should be 
concerned about.  
In the banking sector, liquidity risk has an opposite effect on profitability. Some studies such 
as (Molyneux and Thornton (1992); Barth et al. (2003)) supported the positive effect of 
liquidity risk on the profitability; while some studies such as (Bourke, 1989; Kosmidou et al. 
(2005)) believed in its negative effect.  
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(Tsorhe et al. (2011); Cornett et al. (2005); Jiang et al. (2012)) used this variable as a proxy 
for risk management. Furthermore, Tabari et al. (2013) found that there is a negative and 
significant association between liquidity risk and bank performance, which means that the 
liquidity risk will cause the performance of the bank to weaken. 
Jiang et al. (2012) concluded that there is a positive and significant coefficient on liquidity 
risk, which suggests that a bank facing higher liquidity risk suffers efficiency losses despite 
the trade-off between liquidity and profitability. In contradiction with this, Hakim and Neamie 
(2001) concluded that the liquidity variable is insignificant across all banks and has no impact 
on profitability.  
Tsorhe et al. (2011) focused in their study on the financial health of banks in Ghana. It also 
investigated whether the state of corporate governance in the Ghanaian banking industry 
impacts three measures of bank risks – capital risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. The main 
conclusion of Tsorhe et al. (2011) is that the board strength does not have a significant impact 
on liquidity risk.  
This study tests the association between liquidity risk and bank performance measured by 
ROE and ROA. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypothesis:  
H2.5 There is significant association between liquidity risk and bank performance  
 
3.4 Review of the empirical literature that focus on the effect of corporate governance 
on risk management. 
Generally, there are not many studies investigating the association between the corporate 
governance independent variables and non-performing loan as a measure of risk management. 
The results of this study could be used in the future research for benchmarking purposes. 
However, the results of the few studies available in this field were as follows; 
(Surifah, 2013) investigated the relationship between board size and risk management 
measured by NPL and found that there is negative and significant association between board 
size and NPL, which means the larger board size the lower NPL and better risk management. 
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Likewise, Poudel and Hovey (2013) found that the association between board size and NPL 
is negative and significant, in other words bigger board size leads to lower NPL which means 
better efficiency in the commercial banks.  
Wang et al. (2015) used data for Taiwanese firms from 2002 to 2012 to investigate the relation 
between corporate governance and downside risk. This study concluded that good corporate 
governance reduces downside risk while increasing firm value.  
Iqbal et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between corporate governance and the 
systemic risk of financial institutions. They used a sample of large U.S. financial institutions 
from (2005 to 2010) and examined whether the strength of corporate governance mechanisms 
could explain the cross-sectional variation in systemic risk around the recent financial crisis. 
They concluded that financial institutions with stronger and more shareholder-focused 
corporate governance structures and boards of directors are associated with higher levels of 
systemic risk. Thus, the results suggest that good corporate governance may encourage rather 
than constrain excessive risk-taking in the financial industry. 
Huang and Wang (2015) concluded that firms with smaller boards experience are more 
associated with higher executive pay-to-performance sensitivity, tend to pursue riskier 
investment policies, and engage more in earnings management and larger variability in future 
firm performance. However, Chinese firms who have smaller board size are found to be more 
conservative in dealing with debt financing.  
Zagorcheva and Gao (2015) used a sample from US to examine how the corporate governance 
associated with financial institutions’ risk management during the period from (2002 to 
2009). This study found that better governance is negatively associated with excessive risk-
taking, and the association was significant and positive with US financial institutions’ 
performance. Second, they noted that the good corporate governance is associated with higher 
provisions and reserves for loan/asset losses of financial institutions. Furthermore the 
corporate governance practically are associated with less total non-performing assets, less 
real estate non-performing assets, and higher Tobin’s Q.  
Nyor and Mejabi (2013) through s sample of deposit money banks in Nigeria, have examined 
the association between board size as a proxy variable of corporate governance and non-
performing loans as a proxy variable for risk management, and they noted that the association 
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between the two variables are insignificant, in addition, they concluded that the agency theory 
assumes that a smaller size of boards is recommended to minimize the agency cost, by 
exerting more efforts in maintaining effective internal control system over banks. 
Furthermore, the larger size of boards is related to more interactions between members which 
may be result in more conflicts (Yoshikawa and Phan (2003)). Furthermore, Lai and Choi 
(2014) found that the non-performing loans NPL is statistically significant with board sizes. 
Furthermore, Poudel and Hovey (2013) used a sample of 29 conventional banks during the 
period from (2005 to 2011) in Nepalese, this sample is used to investigate the association 
between corporate governance variables and the efficiency of commercial banks. This study 
used the number of corporate governance variables and used the non-performing loan variable 
is used for bank’s efficiency. The board size, board independence, Audit Committee size and 
ownership structure as a proxy variables for corporate governance, they used the regression 
analysis and found that bigger size of the board, the number of directors on the audit 
committee, lower number of board meetings and lower proportion of bank ownership are 
associated with better efficiency i.e. lower NPL.  
Salas and Saurina (2002) investigated the association between the bank size and risk 
management measured by NPL, and found that bank size is significantly associated with non-
performing loans. (Hu et al. (2004); Rajan and Dhal (2003)) report similar empirical evidence. 
In Hong Kong, Yung (2009) this literature investigated the association between corporate 
governance and the quality of loans. This study concluded that banks with larger size of board 
of directors and with a lower level of related-party loans tend to have better performance. The 
extent of related-party loans is a key consideration for effective corporate governance 
practices. Whenever the level of lending to related-party is very high, it may send signals to 
the market that the corporate governance system is not effective which may adversely affect 
and damage the reputation and performance of banks. 
Lai and Choi (2014) concluded that there is a statistically significant relationship between 
CAR, PTC and corporate governance. TA, NPL, ROA do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with corporate governance. There is also a statistically significant relationship 
between CAR, PTC and board size. TA, NPL and ROA do not have a statistically significant 
relationship with board sizes. Besides, a statistically significant relationship was shown 
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between PTC, TA, ROA and board meeting. CAR and NPL do not have a statistically 
significant relationship with board meetings. 
Kumah et al. (2014) examined the degree to which banks in Ghana use risk management 
practices and corporate governance in dealing with different types of risk. This study 
concluded that board of directors, senior management are practically involved in risk 
management. The most common types of risks related to banking sector are credit risk, 
interest risk, operating risk, liquidity risk and solvency risk. In addition they noted that banks 
involved in the sample are efficient in dealing with risk management. 
Cheung (2010) investigated the association between corporate governance and performance 
and risks, he concluded that the corporate governance is highly significant with returns and 
risks. Furthermore, he concluded that the good corporate governance is significantly 
associated with higher stock returns as a proxy for performance, and with lower unsystematic 
risk as a proxy for risk management. However, Tsorhe et al. (2011) concluded that board 
strength does not have a significant impact on capital risk, credit risk nor liquidity risk. They 
report that there is no statistical difference between the strengths of bank boards in Ghana, 
and that board strength does not have a significant impact on capital risk, credit risk nor 
liquidity risk. 
Rachdi and Ameur (2011) investigate the relationship between board characteristics; 
performance (Return on Assets and Return on Equity) and bank risk taking (Z-score) in 
Tunisian banks. They conclude that the small board size is associated with better bank 
performance, and also associated with high level of risk-taking.  Furthermore, the existence 
of independent board members is significantly and negatively associated with performance, 
but has no significant effect on the risk-taking, and a lower CEO ownership is associated with 
lower performance. Aebi et al. (2012) argue that banks have to significantly improve the 
quality and profile of their corporate governance and risk management function in order to be 
well prepared to face a financial crisis. 
Tarraf and Majeske (2011) investigated the association between corporate governance, risk 
taking and financial performance at bank holding companies (BHCs) during the financial 
crisis of 2008. This study concluded that the association between corporate governance and 
risk-taking level is insignificant. In addition, this study indicated that the BHCs with lower 
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level of risk is associated with better performance than BHCs with higher level of risks during 
the financial crisis. Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012) reported a negative relationship between 
board size and bank financial performance in Nigeria. Moreover, larger boards were found to 
be less effective than smaller boards, as increase in board’s size occurs with increase in 
agency problems.  The authors recommended a smaller board size (6 and 8) for better 
financial performance of banks in Nigeria.  
Minton et al. (2012) indicate that the independent directors with financial expertise in U.S. 
banks is associated positively with risks. However, the board of directors with financial 
expertise is not strongly associated with better performance before 2008, but it was strongly 
related to lower performance during the financial crisis. Overall, the results are consistent 
with independent directors with financial expertise supporting increased risk-taking prior to 
the crisis.  
Ismail (2012) explores the perceptions and role of internal auditors in the audit of risk 
management in Egyptian banks. The study concludes that the majority of Egyptian 
conventional banks are employing a framework of risk management to identify and properly 
manage the various risks. Moreover, he provides evidence of a strong association between 
the type of bank ownership and the quality of the risk-based audit procedures; private and 
joint-venture banks have higher quality. Internal auditors look at themselves as they are 
capable to play a larger role in the area of risk management, corporate governance and internal 
control system. If outsourcing is employed, internal auditors prefer an independent risk 
management consulting firm to audit risk management in banks.  
Hassan (2013) uses a sample of 84 Islamic and conventional banks in Bangladesh, Bahrain, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, UAE, and the United Kingdom over the period from (2006 
to 2009) to investigate the association between corporate governance and risk-taking. He 
concludes that the corporate governance and financial disclosure indices emerged as the key 
driving forces for risk-taking for Islamic banks.  
Abdul Rahman et al. (2013) examine the effects of governance on both risk management 
process and risk management practices in addition to the impact of risk management process 
on the risk management practices of Islamic banks in emerging economies. They indicate that 
banks may lack experience in the effective application of risk management. Furthermore, 
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Stulz (2014) concludes that the effective risk management practically depends on the good 
corporate environment, however, the effective risk management should lead to better risk-
taking.  
This study tests the association between corporate governance and risk management 
measured by NPL. From the above discussion, this study tests the following hypotheses:  
H3.1 There is significant association between board size and risk management  
H3.2 There is significant association between non-executive board member and risk 
management  
H3.3 There is significant association between gender diversity and risk management  
H3.4 There is significant association between CEO-turnover and risk management  
H3.5 There is significant association between role duality and risk management  
H3.6 There is significant association between audit committee and risk management  
H3.7 There is significant association between credit and investment committee and 
risk management  
H3.8 There is significant association between capital ratio and risk management  
H3.9 There is significant association between loan to deposit ratio and risk 
management  
H3.10 There is significant association between risk committee and risk management  
3.5 Review of literature on the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management and the effect on bank performance 
As per the review of the previous literature, it was observed that there are several studies 
investigating the association between corporate governance and performance. On the other 
hand, another group of studies investigated the association between risk management and 
bank performance in the banking sector. In actuality, it was noted that there are few number 
of literature investigated the relationship between both corporate governance and risk 
management, and their implications on bank performance. The main conclusion of these 
studies highlighted the importance of good corporate governance and effective risk 
management, and their effect on bank performance. Aebi et al. (2012) concluded that for the 
banks to be better prepared to face financial crisis, they have to significantly improve the 
quality and profile of their corporate governance and risk management functions. 
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Battaglia and Gallo (2015) used a sample of Chinese and Indian listed banks during the 
financial crisis of 2007/2008 to investigate the association between board of director and risk 
management and bank performance. The bank performance was measured by Tobin's Q, 
price–earnings ratio (P/E), return on asset ROA and return on equity ROE. They noted that 
banks with larger risk committee is significantly and positively associated with profitability 
as a proxy for better performance. Moreover, the association between the existence of risk 
committee and returns are significant and positive.  
Tsorhe et al. (2011) used a sample from Ghanaian banks, this study focused on the financial 
health of banking sector in Ghana. They investigated whether the corporate governance is 
associated with three measures of bank risks; capital risk, credit risk and liquidity risk. This 
study concluded that the power of board of director is insignificantly associated with (credit, 
capital and liquidity) risk. 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) used a sample of 98 international banks during the financial crisis 
of 2008 to investigate the association between corporate governance and bank performance. 
They concluded that when the shareholders of the bank nominate a friendly board of director 
(this variable measured by Corporate Governance Quotient CGQ), the performance will be 
worse during the financial crisis. In addition, the concept of “good corporate governance” is 
not necessarily to be related to the interests of shareholders. 
Sarens and Christopher (2010) through a sample of Belgian firms, they investigated the 
association between corporate governance framework and risk management and control 
system. The main conclusion of this study is that the ineffective corporate governance in risk 
management and internal control system is highly associated with less enhanced risk 
management and internal control in Belgian firms compared to Australian firms. In the same 
line with the abovementioned result, Cheung et al. (2010) concluded that the good corporate 
governance mechanism represented by the level of the scores in the CGI is associated with 
significantly with the future higher stock returns and lower risk. Kleffner et al. (2003) was in 
agreement with the above, whereas they got empirical evidence from Canadian firms that the 
use of ERM is impacting the TSE guidelines in firms’ strategies related to risk management. 
Furthermore, in 2003 the practice of ERM was still not widely used, the firms that stared to 
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apply the concept of ERM are adopting a more integrated approach in risk management than 
before.  
Tandelilin et al. (2007) concluded that ownership structure has no significant effect on 
corporate governance, and there is a significant negative inter-relationship between risk 
management and bank performance, and corporate governance has a significant and negative 
effect on risk management, and the relationship between corporate governance and risk 
management is sensitive to type of bank ownership. The results are statistically robust for all 
types of bank ownership, except state-owned banks.  
The same focus on bank ownership and its effect on the risk taking and performance has been 
examined by (Laeven 2006) in USA who concluded that large owners with substantial cash-
flow rights tend to induce banks to increase risk. In addition, the association between 
ownership structure and risk taking are based on the; owner interest, laws and regulation, 
investors, boards and management.   
Minton (2010) investigated how risk taking and U.S. banks’ performance in the crisis are 
related to board independence and financial expertise of the board. The results show that 
financial expertise of the board is positively related to risk taking and bank performance 
before the crisis, but is negatively related to bank performance in the crisis. Cornett et al. 
(2010) used a sample of 300 publicly traded U.S. banks during the financial crisis of 2008 to 
investigate the relationship between various corporate governance variables and bank 
performance. Furthermore, Beltratti and Stulz (2012); Erkens et al. (2012); Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2010) investigated the same association and concluded that better corporate 
governance; independent boards, higher pay-for-performance sensitivity and an increase in 
insider ownership to be significantly and positively associated with bank performance during 
the financial crisis. 
The recent financial crisis that followed the U.S. subprime meltdown has increased the 
awareness of enterprise risk management and the need to improve the structures and 
techniques of risk management in financial institutions. Previously, monitoring and 
controlling systems within banks was based on using quantitative risk management and 
improving the measurement and management of specific risks (Miller1992). Most recently, 
an integrated view to risk management has been the focus of control systems at the bank’s 
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structural level. Therefore, this issue has attracted high amounts of research. Researchers 
previously focused on single types of risk in their studies, and missed out the interdependence 
to other risks (Miller1992). In the 1990’s, the ERM concept became the interest of many 
researchers (e.g., Miller, 1992; Cumming and Mirtle (2001); Nocco and Stulz (2006); Sabato, 
2010). It was concluded that the effective enterprise risk management set more standards and 
approaches for a corporate culture that should lead to better performance and in agreement 
with the authority decisions related to accountability and responsibility (Nocco and Stulz 
(2006)). 
In relation to the gender diversity and its correlation to risk, Adams and Funk (2011) show 
that female directors are more prone to taking risks than male. On the other hand, there are 
more studies concluded that women are more risk averse in financial decision making, such 
as (Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998); Sundén and Surette (1998); Agnew et al. (2003); Barsky 
et al. (1997)). The relationship between risk-taking behaviour with respect to investment 
decisions and gender differences has been investigated by Sundén and Surette (1998); Barsky 
et al. (1997); Jianakoplos and Bernasek (1998); Agnew et al. (2003). 
3.6 Control variables and the implication on overall bank performance 
3.6.1 Bank type (Islamic-conventional) and bank performance 
Islamic banks, which tend to be (in terms of size) smaller than conventional banks, are likely 
to be less efficient as technical efficiency tends to increase with the size of the bank 
(Bhattacharyya et al. 1997). 
Kolsi and Zehri (2014) found that during the crisis, Islamic banks were more profitable, less 
efficient and less risky than conventional ones. In addition, Islamic banks are more stable and 
immunized against the crisis (2007-2008) due to the requirements of the Shariaa law. 
Siraj and Pillai (2012) used a sample of 6 Islamic banks and 6 conventional banks in GCC 
banking sector to investigate the association between growth of performance indicators in 
conventional banks and Islamic banks in GCC region using financial ratio analysis. They 
concluded that Islamic banks are more equity financed than conventional banks. In addition, 
Conventional banks had growth in revenue during the period, but could not achieve improved 
profitability due to higher provisions towards credit losses and impairment losses. 
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Abdullah et al. (2015) used a sample of 67 Islamic banks in the Southeast Asian and GCC 
regions to investigate the determinants of voluntary disclosure of corporate governance. This 
study have empirical evidence that stronger corporate governance is associated with a higher 
level of voluntary disclosure. In addition, the size of Islamic banks is influencing the 
voluntary governance disclosures. In addition, there is a need for effective corporate 
governance in Islamic banks by providing more insights by management in encouraging 
disclosures in Islamic banks’ annual reports. 
Shahid et al. (2010) investigated the efficiency comparison between conventional and Islamic 
Banks in Pakistan, and used a sample of five Islamic and five conventional banks during the 
period (2005 – 2009). They found that the technical efficiency of conventional banks is better 
than that of Islamic banks. Furthermore, the allocative efficiency (AE) and Cost Efficiency 
(CE) in both sectors are healthy. The t-statistics show that there is no significant difference in 
mean efficiency scores of conventional and Islamic banks except in the year 2008. 
Ryu et al. (2012) concluded that the Islamic system is less risky and more profitable than the 
conventional system. In practice, (Waseem, 2008) submits that its costs of funding are almost 
the same as those of conventional banks, since interest rates in lieu of administrative costs 
and share of profit are also as relevant to Islamic banks as they are to conventional banks. 
Johnes et al. (2014) used data envelopment analysis (DEA) during the period from 2004 to 
2009 (before, during and after financial crisis to compare the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks. they found that there is insignificant difference in the efficiency between 
conventional and Islamic banks, the efficiency was measured by common frontier. The use 
of the Meta-Frontier analysis (MFA) assume that the efficiency in Islamic bank is less than 
conventional bank.  
Furthermore in the area of Islamic Banking, Bashir (2000) assessed the performance of 
Islamic banks using profitability measures (Net Interest Margin (NIM), Before Tax Profit 
(BTP), Return on Assets ROA, and Return on Equity ROE), controlling economic and 
financial structure measures in eight Middle East countries, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Sudan, Egypt, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates  during (1993-1998). The other internal 
variables were (bank size, leverage, loans, short-term funding, overhead and ownership); 
external variables (macroeconomic environment, regulation, and financial market) were used. 
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His study confirms previous findings that profitability of Islamic banks is positively related 
to equity and loans.  
Hassan and Bashir (2003) studied the determinants of Islamic banking profitability for 43 
Islamic Banks for the period from (1994 – 2001) in 21 countries, and observed that Islamic 
banks are well capitalized. Results obtained by Hassan and Bashir (2003), were similar to the 
(Bashir, 2000) results, confirming that i) a positive relationship between capital and 
profitability, ii) a negative relationship between loans and profitability and iii) a negative 
relationship between total assets with profitability. 
Hassoune (2002) used a sample from three GCC regions, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar to 
compare the ROE and ROA Volatility in both of Islamic and conventional banks. He found 
that Islamic banks is based on profit and loss, and the managements have a very important 
role in creating high volumes of returns and maximize the wealth of investors. 
The study of Charles et al. (2015) examined whether the Islamic indexes are more risky than 
the conventional indexes using different risk measures and analysed the performance of both 
indexes from various risk-adjusted performance measures. They noted that Islamic indexes 
seem to be more risky than their conventional counterparts as well as exhibiting a higher 
performance on the full period (1996–2013). The results also show that both indexes have 
been affected by variance changes, in addition most of the Islamic indexes have a higher level 
of risk than the conventional indexes, whatever the sub-periods. Consequently, this finding 
means that the Islamic indexes are riskier than the conventional indexes. In most cases of the 
Islamic indexes, they noted that they either outperform the conventional indexes or there is 
no significant difference in performance between both indexes. 
3.6.2 Ownership structure and bank performance 
The empirical literature on bank ownership and performance can be classified into three main 
groups. The first group investigate the financial performance of individual banks and other 
bank-level characteristics such as; size and balance sheet structures. The second group of 
empirical studies investigate whether government banks contribute positively to financial 
development and economic growth, the third group of studies examines the interactions 
between the actions of government banks and the political cycle, and to assess the level of 
political intervention in these institutions. 
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One of the important objectives of the first group of literature is to investigate the association 
between bank ownership and bank performance measured by profitability, margins, costs, 
and loans’ quality.  
Demirgüç and Huizinga (2000); Kim and Rasiah (2010) investigated the ownership (foreign 
banks) in banking sector. And they concluded that foreign banks especially in developing 
countries is associated with higher volume of interest margins, returns and profits.  
Micco et al. (2004) provide a comprehensive analysis of bank ownership and performance, 
and conclude that state banks in developing countries tend to have lower profits, higher costs, 
and larger non-performing loans relative to private banks. Foreign banks on the other hand 
are more profitable and have lower costs. However, Levy-Yeyati et al. (2007); Farazi et al. 
(2011)  they got conclusion from the poor financial performance of government banks as it 
may not only reflect lager extensive political interference and operational inefficiencies but 
also it reflects their development and enhanced mandates. Moreover, in industrial countries, 
state banks have been able to operate with clearer mandates and sounder governance 
structures.  
Farazi et al. (2011) show that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower 
subsequent financial development and GDP growth. Barth et al. (2007) find similar results in 
a study focused on banking regulation.  However, Levy-Yeiati et al. (2007) revisit La Porta 
et al. (2002) and used extra recent data, better statistical techniques and more controls, and 
they got an empirical evidence that state banks are associated with lower growth and no strong 
financial development.   
Two recent papers (Korner and Schnabel (2010); Andrianova et al. (2008)) reach similar 
conclusions. They find a negative relationship between a high fraction of public ownership in 
the banking system and growth when financial development and the quality of political 
institutions are low, conditions that tend to prevail in developing countries. However, similar 
to Levy-Yeyati et al. (2007), they do not find a negative impact of public ownership and 
growth in developed countries. They stress that the quality of institutions and governance are 
important in studying the impact of public ownership on growth.  
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The third group of literature examines the interactions between credit decisions of state banks 
and the political cycle. Dinc (2005) uses a large sample from cross-country, and he found that 
during the selected years, the credit decisions in private banks are slow, however the growth 
in credit in state banks remains constant. Mian and Khwaja (2004) in Pakistan banking sector, 
the politically-connected firms’ borrowing are in high level from state banks with higher 
default rates. Sapienza (2004) indicated that the Italian state banks charge lower interest rates 
in the provinces whereas the chairman of the board is stronger.  In the same line, Micco et al. 
(2007) found that state banks are associated with lower performance measured by 
profitability, and higher costs than commercial banks.  
There is group of literature have concluded that concentrated ownership is associated with 
more active monitoring activities which lead to good corporate governance. The monitoring 
activities effectively reduces the probability of expropriating of management owners’ wealth. 
In addition, there is a nonlinear relation between insider (Hill and Snell (1988); Weiss and 
Nikitin (2004); Morck et al. (1988); McConnell and Servaes (1990)) ownership and firm 
value. They find that the alignment effects of inside ownership dominate the entrenchment 
effects over low ranges of managerial ownership, but the opposite is true at higher ranges. In 
contrast, Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest that managerial ownership and firm performance 
are determined by a common set of characteristics, and question the causal relationship from 
ownership to performance.  
Similarly, Bhagat et al. (2004) do not find supporting evidence regarding the positive 
association between ownership concentration and firm performance. Generally, the state 
banks have an important role in developing countries. Extensive political interference in 
credit and employment decisions, blurred mandates, poor governance structures, and severe 
operational deficiencies may eventually outweigh the potential for these banks to address 
their development mandates and contribute to financial and economic progress.  
Pan (2013) used a sample of 74 banks in Europe during the crisis period of (2007-2008) to 
investigate the association between corporate governance and bank performance. This study 
concluded that the ownership concentration and independence of board are significantly and 
negatively associated with bank performance during the financial crisis. The existence of 
CRO in the board is significantly and positive affect the bank performance during the crisis. 
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Overall, this paper have empirical evidence that the association between CG and BP is very 
strong during the financial crisis.  
Jiang et al. (2012) concluded that there was no significant difference in performance for banks 
with or without foreign minority ownership, and there is weak evidence that foreign banks 
(with majority foreign ownership) are more efficient than domestic banks. Furthermore, the 
majority state ownership is associated with a rather low efficiency, and SOCBs are the most 
unprofitable banks. In addition, they noted that banks with a more dispersed ownership 
structure are more efficient. 
3.6.3 Bank size and bank performance 
As indicated in chapter three, bank size is the most common variable in corporate governance 
and risk management literature, and measured as a natural logarithm of total assets. The 
majority of these studies indicate that bank size has a significant positive association with 
performance. 
Fanta et al. (2013) found that the bank size had a statistical significant positive effect on bank 
performance measured using ROE, implying that large banks enjoy better profits than smaller 
banks. This benefit is likely to be due to economies of scale and larger market share possessed 
by the larger banks; this is consistent with the findings of (Tomar et al. 2012). Similar to the 
above, Bertay et al. (2013), found the same, that banks with large absolute size tend to be 
more profitable as indicated by the return on assets.  
In contrast with the above conclusions, (Al-Hawary, 2011) used the bank size as a control 
variable and he found that no statistically significant effect in Tobin's Q (p =0.796) and in 
addition the calculated value of (t-0.260) was lower than the scheduled t-value. 
3.6.4 Financial crisis (before crisis - after crisis) and bank Performance 
In order for banks to be better prepared to face the financial crisis, they have to significantly 
improve the quality and profile of their corporate governance and risk management function 
(Aebi et al. 2011). Pan (2014) investigates the association between the implication of 
corporate governance on bank performance before and during the financial crisis in Europe. 
In addition, this study concluded that the ownership concentration and board independence 
have negative effects on bank performance during the crisis. Furthermore, the existence of 
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CRO on the board of director is significantly and positive affect the bank performance during 
the crisis.  
Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) concluded that board size is negatively related to return during 
the crisis period; however, it is positively related during non-crisis periods. Regarding the 
gender diversity, it does not add any value to the board. In addition, they concluded that 
independence is negatively related to the non-crisis period; however, it is not significant 
during the crisis period.  
In the same context, financial expertise of the board is positively related to risk taking and 
bank performance before the crisis but is negatively related to bank performance during the 
crisis (Minton, 2010).  
3.7 Summary 
The current chapter additional to methodology chapter help get a link between the theoretical 
framework chapter and empirical chapter. Furthermore, the literature review and hypotheses 
chapter in the current study have been presented. Moreover, the predefined hypotheses will 
be investigated in chapter five which will aim to answer the research questions in order to 
achieve the research objectives.  As presented in this chapter there are variety in conclusions 
which means sometimes there is agreement between researchers and sometimes there is 
disagreement. Furthermore and as mentioned in this chapter there is research gap in the area 
of combining the three constructs in one thesis, one of the contribution of this study to fill this 
gap in literature by investigating and analysing the relationship between the above mentioned 
constructs, and providing new empirical evidence from the GCC region. 
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Chapter Four: Research Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
The methodology in research sphere is as a systematic approach and theoretical analysis of 
the methods adopted and applied in the thesis. It comprises the theoretical analysis of the 
methods and principles related to the knowledge. In different words, the methodology is an 
explanation and justification for the methods used in the research. This chapter introduces the 
various research philosophies discussed in the different research areas. Further, different 
types of paradigms and approaches are compared to justify clearly the best methodology for 
the current study. 
In addition, the chapter outlines the design of the current study and highlights the best 
methods for collecting and analysing data according to the methodology chosen by the current 
study. Therefore, the main aim of this chapter is to determine the suitable methodology of the 
current study that will be followed to answer its questions, and achieve the proposed 
objectives. 
The chapter is organized as follows: The chosen methodology is presented in section 4.2. 
Research design is discussed in section 4.3. Section 4.4 shows the research variables and 
measurement. Section 4.5 provides this research models. 
4.2 The chosen methodology 
Choosing a suitable methodology for this study is consistent with research questions and 
objectives. Based on both of them (questions and objectives), there are important points which 
assist in selecting the research methodology. These points are as follows; 
a) This study is considered as an empirical study, as it is intended to present a good 
understanding about the importance of having and applying effective and efficient 
corporate governance and risk management, and test their implications on GCC 
banking sector performance. At the same time, this study presents a comparison 
between the results of Islamic banks and conventional banks.   
Therefore, in this research, empirical evidence is used to find answers to the predefined 
questions and achieve the research objectives. 
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b) The most suitable philosophy for this research is positivism, as it relies on empirical 
evidence rather than the opinions of individuals or groups in a society to explain to 
what extent the applying of good corporate governance and effective risk management 
may positively affect the banking performance.   
c) The appropriate paradigm for this research is quantitative, as it seeks to collect and 
analyse numerical data to interpret and test the relationship between the dependent 
variables and the independent variables. 
d) Deduction approach is used in this research whereas the research questions are 
developed based on the theoretical framework, as discussed in the theoretical 
framework chapter. Then this research develops various hypotheses to investigate the 
relationship between corporate governance and risk management and bank 
performance. Finally, it uses the appropriate statistical techniques to test these 
hypotheses, which leads to either accepting or rejecting this relationship according to 
the chosen theories. 
Determining the suitable philosophy, paradigm and approach will help in determining a 
suitable plan for this study. The next section discusses in details this research design. 
4.3 Research design 
Saunders et al. (2007, p.136) state that research design is "the general plan of how you will 
go about answering your research questions". In addition, Research design is "the science of 
planning procedures for conducting studies so as to get the most valid findings" (Vogt, 1993 
as cited in Collis and Hussey (2003)). Consequently, research design deals with issues such 
as purpose of the study, research strategy, unit of analysis, population and sample, sources of 
collecting data, and the time framework over which the research is undertaken. Each issue 
will be discussed briefly as follows; 
4.3.1 The purpose of the research 
In general, there are three types of research based on its purpose. First; descriptive research 
which is designed to obtain data that describes or portrays the characteristics of particular 
phenomena, topics, events or situations (Hair et al. (2007); Saunders et al. (2007)). 
Descriptive research relies on depicting the trend of a particular topic, and seeks to count the 
frequencies of this trend. 
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Second; exploratory research, which is designed to discover new insights, relationship, ideas 
and patterns Hair et al. (2007). Exploratory research relies heavily upon qualitative 
techniques, although it may be used with quantitative techniques (ibid); 
Finally, explanatory (causal) research is designed to investigate the relationship between 
variables related to a particular phenomenon or problem (Saunders et al. 2007). The causality 
refers to the dependency of one event or variable (the effect or dependent variables) on 
another event or variable (the cause or independent variables) (Hair et al., 2007). 
Based on the predefined research questions and the objectives, the purpose of this research is 
descriptive (to show the extent of good corporate governance and effective risk management), 
and explanatory (to test the relationship between the selected variables of corporate 
governance and risk management, and their effect on bank performance). 
4.3.2 The research strategies and data collection 
Research strategy is a tool that helps the researcher to investigate the research issue. 
Furthermore, Research strategy is a plan that help in answering the research questions. The 
effective strategy should contains; research questions, clear objectives, data collection 
resources, limitation that may affect the research such as limitation in; time, access, location 
Saunders (2003). 
In this study, the data collection method for this test depends on the secondary data, and is 
basically a cross-sectional perspective on GCC countries. Originally, 102 banks from the 
GCC banking sector were selected to be tested, and due to the following, 12 banks have been 
excluded. Finally, 90 banks were selected to be tested. (See Appendix 4-1: List of Banks) 
1. GCC’s central banks (6 banks) have been excluded. 
2. Due to merging and acquisition in UAE and Bahrain (3banks) have been 
excluded. 
3. Another (3 banks) excluded due to unavailability of required data. 
Data related to the selected variables will be examined and analysed to explore the 
relationship between those variables for the period from 2003 to 2012 (10 years). The sources 
of this study’s data will be primarily the annual approved reports issued by banks of the 
selected listed GCC banks and published on their web sites under the supervision of GCC 
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central banks, and secondly “Bank Scope” which is the most comprehensive, global database 
of banks’ financial statements, ratings and intelligence. As per the literature review many 
literature were relying on the data of bank scope (bankscope.bvdinfo.com). In addition to the 
above we noted some variation in the results such as; Capital ratio, capital adequacy ratio and 
loan to deposit ratio which could be justified that there is variation in calculation of the 
variable based on the different bank magnitudes.  
4.4 Research variables and measurement 
As per the review of the variables used in previous literature, table 4.1, this section will outline 
the selected variables of the three constructs; CG, RM and BP, table 4.2, as follows; 
4.4.1 Proxy variables for corporate governance 
Corporate governance consists of external corporate governance and internal corporate 
governance that serve the public’s interest, employee’s interest, and owner’s interest. External 
CG is defined as a mechanism which enforces the government responsibility to control the 
operations of a bank through prevailing bank regulations. Roles, policies, procedures, and 
committees that help and assist the board and senior management to control and monitor the 
overall bank performance represent the internal CG. This study uses a number of variables 
for corporate governance as follows; 
Board of Directors’ Size (Bsize); is the total number of directors on the board. This study 
will examine the association between board size and both of risk management and bank 
performance. Furthermore, this study will use the board size as a proxy for corporate 
governance by (Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012); Aebi et al. (2012); Lai and Choi (2014); 
Durgavanshi, 2014; Hoque and Muradoglu (2013); Fanta et al. (2013); Oluwafemi et al. 
(2013); Rachdi and Ameur (2011)). 
Non-Executive Board Members (Nexc); this variable will be measured by the percentage of 
the existence of non-executive board members to total number of directors. According to 
(Pathan, 2009), the non-executive board member only has a business relationship with the 
bank directorship, i.e. those directors are not an existing or former employee in the bank or 
its immediate family members, and does not have any significant business ties with the bank. 
This variable was used as a proxy for corporate governance by (Aebi et al. (2012); 
Durgavanshi (2014); Hoque and Muradoglu (2013); Pan, 2014; Rachdi and Ameur (2011)).  
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Gender Diversity (Gender); This is used in this study to check the effect of female members 
in the board on both risk management and performance, and whether it is beneficial to the 
business, especially in the culture of the GCC. Gender diversity is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one, if one or more from the board members are female, and zero otherwise. 
Gender diversity was used as a proxy variable by (Berger et al. (2014); Hoque and Muradoglu 
(2013); Stepanova et al. (2012)). 
CEO-Turnover (CEOturn); CEO turnover is a control mechanism in relation to the 
monitoring task of the board (Laux, 2010). CEO replacement is crucial, as they are often 
linked to the monitoring task of the board. There is a consensus that the probability of CEO 
turnover is negatively related to performance (Huson et al. 2001; Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2001)). In this study, the CEO turnover is a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the 
CEO was replaced, and zero otherwise. CEO turnover was used as a proxy for corporate 
governance by (Epure, Lafuente (2015); Huson et al. (2001); Hermalin and Weisbach (2001); 
Laux, 2010). 
Role Duality (Rdual); this expression is used when one person combine two positions of 
chairman and CEO at the same time. Role duality is a dummy variable whereas (1) means 
that there is duality between the two roles of (chairman and CEO), and (zero) otherwise. Role 
duality is used as a proxy variable by (Hoque and Muradoglu (2013); Al-Hawary, 2011; 
Coleman and Biekpe (2006). 
Audit Committee (Audcom); the audit committee is an important tool to enhance and develop 
the corporate governance, because the audit committee assists the board in the oversight role 
of monitor and review the effectiveness of the internal control system, corporate governance 
and risk management. Furthermore the committee coordinate the auditing works; internal and 
external audit. The general recommendations regarding the number of its members are a 
minimum of 3 to 6 members (Cadbury Committee 1992, Price Waterhouse 1993, NACD 
2000;). The BRC (1999) and national stock exchanges recommended a minimum of three 
members. Audit committee is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the bank has an audit 
committee, and zero otherwise. (Durgavanshi, 2014; Fanta et al. (2013) used this variable as 
a proxy for corporate governance. 
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Credit and Investment Committee (credinvscom); this committee will be used in this study 
as a proxy variable for corporate governance to assess its effect on both bank performance 
and risk management.  It is a dummy variable that will take the value of one if the bank has a 
Credit and Investment committee, and Zero otherwise.  
Capital Ratio (Capratio); capital ratio is a financial ratio and calculated by adding the Loan 
loss provision (LLP) to the Equity and the total will be divided by Total loan. The bank should 
have a Tier 1 capital ratio around 6% or greater, in this case they should not make any 
distribution of dividends or any kind of distributions that could affect the capital structure, in 
this case the bank could be classified as well-capitalized. Firms that are ranked 
undercapitalized or below are prohibited from paying any dividends or management fees. In 
addition, they are required to file a capital restoration plan. The CR has been used in many 
previous literature as a proxy variable of corporate governance by Tandelilin et al. (2007), 
Kim et al. (2012). 
CR = 
	

 
 
Loan to Deposits Ratio (LDR); this ratio represents the portion that depositors are 
contributing to finance the loans issued by banks to their borrowers as a source of capital. The 
Small percentage of LDR indicates that the depositors provides a large proportion to support 
the banks’ loans and the bank has no the ability to invest the extra deposits. In addition, if the 
LDR ratio is too high, it means that banks have no enough liquid assets to meet their expected 
and unexpected obligation or any fund requirements. LDR was used as a proxy variable of 
corporate governance by Tandelilin et al. (2007).   
LDR = 

 

 
 
Risk Committee (Riskcom); this is a dummy variable which is equal to one if the bank has a 
dedicated committee solely charged with monitoring and managing the risk management 
efforts within the bank, and Zero otherwise. Aebi et al. 2011 used this variable as a proxy for 
corporate governance. 
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4.4.2 Proxy variables for risk management 
Risk management represents risk-taking behavior of managers. All interested parties are 
concerned with how banks manage their risk carefully. This study uses some measurements 
of risk management, which are: 
Capital Risk (Caprisk); it is a financial ratio and can be calculated by dividing the total equity 
capital to total assets. The meaning of capital risk is the risk that investors may face when 
they be exposed to risk of losing all or part of the total amount invested. Capital Risk is used 
as a proxy variable for risk management by (Jiang et al. (2012); Tsorhe et al. (2011)). 
Credit Risk (credrisk); is inherent in lending, which is the major banking business. The credit 
risk arises when a borrower defaults on the loan repayment agreement. Banks whose 
borrowers default on their repayments may face cash flow problems, which directly affect 
their liquidity. In addition, this negatively affects the profitability and capital through extra 
specific provisions for bad debts (Bank of Uganda, 2002). In this study, credit risk will be 
used as proxy variable for risk management and measured by dividing Loan loss provision 
on Gross loans. This variable is used as a proxy for risk management by (Tsorhe et al. (2011); 
Rogers, 2008; Jiang et al. (2012)). 
Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR); all banks should maintain a capital adequacy ratio higher 
than the minimum ratio set by the central bank. Currently, the Basel Committee has proposed 
a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 8%. CAR is considered a very good banking tool to 
measure the bank’s ability to pay its liabilities, and meet any risks which may be incurred in 
the future. The reasons behind the minimum level of CAR is that to make sure that banks 
have enough capital to absorb any amount of losses before the bank become insolvent. Capital 
adequacy ratios is very important to ensure that there is efficiency and stability in the nation’s 
financial system.  
In this study, CAR will be used as proxy variable for risk management, and measured by 
dividing Capital / Total Risk Weighted Assets. This variable has been used as a proxy for risk 
management by (Epure and Lafuente (2015); Berger et al. (2014); Aspal and Nazneen 
(2014)). 
Liquidity Risk (Liqrisk); Liquidity is very important tool for banks to meet the expected and 
unexpected fluctuations in the balance sheet, and to provide the required funds for growth and 
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investment. Liquidity ratio represents a bank’s ability to manage its liquid assets efficiently 
and effectively, and how banks can invest the extra liquid assets and recognize high returns. 
(Tsorhe et al. (2011); Cornett et al. (2003); Jiang et al. (2012)) used this variable as a proxy 
for risk management. In this study, liquidity risk will be used as variable for risk management 
and will be measured as follows:  
1. 1/liquidity ratio. 
2. Liquidity ratio = (Liquid Assets / (Total Deposit + Short Term Funding)).  
Non-performing loan ratio (NPL); this is a ratio of non-performing loan to total loans. This 
ratio also represents managerial risk-taking behaviour relative to all firm resources. The High 
percentage of NPL indicates that banks take more risks in their operations and investments, 
and can mean larger losses for the bank as it writes off bad loans. A smaller NPL ratio reflect 
the effectiveness and efficiency of banks in handling their loans additional to the quality of 
their outstanding loans and the effectiveness of risk management. This variable was used as 
a proxy for risk management by (Tandelilin et al. (2007); Epure and Lafuente (2015)). 
4.4.3 Proxy variable for bank performance 
Bank performance represents the objective of shareholder’s interest. The board of directors 
and management work to maximize the benefit of a bank’s shareholders. In order to recognize 
this objective, they have to enhance and develop the bank’s performance. Bank performance 
can be measured as follows: 
Return on Equity ROE; this is a net income available to common stockholders divided by 
common equity (Brigham and Ehrhardt (2005); Peong and D Rasiah (2010)). This variable 
has been used in many literature by (Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012); Aebi et al. (2012); Farazi et 
al. (2011); Kim et al. (2010); Christopher and Yung (2009); Tandelilin et al. (2007); 
Durgavanshi, 2014; Cornett et al. (2003); Fanta et al. (2013); Rogers (2008); Pan, 2014; 
Rachdi and Ameur (2011)). In this study, ROE will be used as a proxy variable for bank 
performance and measured as follows: 
ROE = 
 
 	 
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Return on Assets ROA; this is calculated as the bank’s net income to its total assets. This 
variable has been used in many literature by (Emilia et al. (2012) USA; Epure and Lafuente 
(2015) Costa Rican; Aebi et al. (2012); Farazi et al. (2011) Middle East and North Africa; 
Christopher and Yung (2009); Cornett et al. (2003); Rogers, 2008 Uganda; Lai and Choi 
(2014); Fanta et al. (2013); Hoque and Muradoglu (2013); Oluwafemi et al. (2013); Rachdi 
and Ameur (2011)). In this study, ROA will be used as a proxy variable for bank performance.
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Table 4.1 Summary of variables used in previous studies 
Constructs Variables Measurement Reference 
Corporate Governance Capital Ratio (CR):  CR = 
	

 
 • Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
• Kim et al. (2012), Malaysia. 
 
Cash Claim on Central Bank (CCC): 
 
CCC = 
  

 
 Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
 Secondary Reserve Ratio (SRR): SRR = 
  

 
 Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
 Loan to deposits ratio (LDR): LDR = 

 

 
 Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
 Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP): LLP = 
  !  

 
 
• Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
• Fanta et al. (2013). 
 
Fixed Assets and Inventories to 
Capital (FAI): 
FAI = 
!"#  # $	 

 Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
 
Real estate loans to total assets 
(LOANTA),  
 
LOANTA, is real estate loans to total assets, Emilia et al. (2012). 
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Real estate loan losses to total assets 
(LOSSTA) 
LOSSTA, is real estate loan losses to total assets, 
 
Emilia et al. (2012), USA. 
 
Real estate loan losses to real estate 
loans (LOSSLN) 
LOSSLN, is real estate loan losses to real estate 
loans. 
Emilia et al. (2012). 
 Board size (BOS) Number of members of the board  
• Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012). 
• Aebi et al. (2012). 
• Lai and Choi (2014). 
• Durgavanshi (2014). 
• Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) 
• Fanta et al. (2013). 
• Oluwafemi et al. (2013). 
• Rachdi and Ameur (2011) 
 CEO Turnover  
CEO turnover is captured by a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one if the top executive manager 
was replaced, and zero otherwise. In addition, two 
dummy variables take the value of one if the successor 
is from inside or outside the bank, and zero otherwise. 
• Epure and Lafuente (2015). 
• Huson et al. (2001),  Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2001). 
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FAI = Fixed asset and inventory / 
Capital. 
 
FAI = Fixed asset and inventory / Capital. 
Kim et al. (2012), Malaysia. 
 Ownership structure (OWN) 
OWNF = Ownership structure for 
 foreign-owned banks. 
OWNG = Ownership structure for private 
domestically owned banks. 
 
• Kim et al. (2012). 
• Faraziet al. (2011). 
• Al-Hawary, 2011. 
• Pan, 2014. 
 
The CRO is a member of the 
executive board (CRO in executive 
board) 
CRO is a member of the executive board (CRO in 
executive board). If the CRO is a member of the 
executive board, his influence and power are 
expected to be larger as compared to a CRO situated 
on the third management level. 
Aebi et al. (2012).  
 The bank has a (Risk committee) 
Risk committee is a dummy variable, which is equal 
to one if the bank has a dedicated committee solely 
charged with monitoring and managing the risk 
management efforts within the bank (Risk 
committee). Banks, for which the variable Risk 
committee has a value of zero, have either no 
committee in charge of risk management at all or the 
audit committee assumes responsibility. 
Aebi et al. (2012). 
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 Role Duality 
1 if the chairman plays the role of CEO at the same 
time, 0 otherwise  
• Hoque and Muradoglu (2013). 
• Al-Hawary, 2011. 
• Coleman and Biekpe (2006). 
 
Board independence as measured by 
the percentage of independent outside 
directors 
Board independence, as measured by the percentage 
of independent outside directors on the board of 
directors (Board independence). The independent 
directors are defined as directors without any relation 
with the company except for their board seat. 
• Aebi et al. 2011. 
• Durgavanshi, 2014. 
• Hoque and Muradoglu (2013). 
• Pan, 2014. 
• Rachdi and Ameur (2011) 
 
Percentage of directors with 
experience (present or past) 
Percentage of directors with experience (present or 
past) as an executive officer in a bank or insurance 
company (% directors w. finance background). 
Aebi et al. 2011. 
 
The frequencies of board of directors 
meetings (BM) 
Number of board of directors meetings Lai and Choi (2014) 
 Capital: Capital adequacy ratio (CAR). 
CAR measured as follow = Capital / Total Risk 
Weighted Assets. 
• Lai and Choi (2014). 
• Kim et al. (2012), Malaysia. 
• Fanta et al. (2013) 
 Audit committee 1 if there is audit committee, 0 otherwise 
• Durgavanshi, 2014. 
• Fanta et al. (2013) 
 Gender diversity  
1 if there a is female member in the board of director, 
0 otherwise 
• Berger et al. (2014) 
• Hoque and Muradoglu (2013). 
• Stepanova, et al. (2012). 
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Risk Management Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) 
CAR measured as follows = Capital / Total Risk 
Weighted Assets. 
• Epure and Lafuente (2015). 
• Berger et al. (2014). 
• Aspal and Nazneen (2014) 
 Value at Risk (VAR) 
Value at risk (VAR) is a ratio of value at risk of 
individual bank to mean cross section value at risk of 
banks (based on all samples). It is represented by 5% 
quarterly profit and loss measure. The VAR used in 
the models is:  
VAR = (VARabs for individual bank ÷ Mean Cross 
Section VAR based on all samples). 
Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
 Non- performing Loan Ratio (NPL) 
This ratio also represents managerial risk-taking 
behavior relative to all organization resources. Higher 
NPL indicates that banks take more risk in their 
operations and investment. This behavior tends to 
expropriate the public interest. In order to protect the 
public interest and to maintain the stability of banking 
systems, Central Bank determines that banks should 
maintain their NPL less than 5%. Hence, this ratio is 
also a relevant proxy for both risk management and 
external good corporate governance. 
• Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
• Epure, Lafuente, (2015). 
 Business Risk (BR) 
Business risk (BR) can be represented by standard 
deviation of return on assets using nine overlapping 
periods on quarterly basis. 
• Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
• Cebenoyan and Strahan (2004)   
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 Capital Risk  
Capital Risk is defined as the ratio of equity capital 
to total assets. 
Tsorhe1 et al. (2011). 
 Credit Risk  
Credit Risk is defined as the ratio of loan loss 
provision to total loans. 
Tsorhe1 et al. (2011),  
Rogers, 2008,  
Jiang et al. (2012). 
 Liquidity Risk  
Liquidity Risk, is defined as the ratio of liquid 
funds. 
• Tsorhe1 et al. (2011). 
• Cornett et al. (2003). 
• Jiang et al.  (2012). 
Bank Performance  Return on assets ROA 
ROA, is calculated as the bank’s net income to its 
total assets. 
• Emilia et al. 2012, USA, 
• Epure and Lafuente, (2015) 
• Aebi et al. (2012), 
• Farazi et al. (2011), Middle East and North 
Africa. 
• Christopher and Yung (2009). 
• Cornett et al. (2003). 
• Rogers (2008), Uganda. 
• Lai and Choi (2014) 
• Fanta et al. (2013). 
• Hoque and Muradoglu (2013). 
• Oluwafemi et al. (2013). 
• Rachdi and Ameur (2011) 
 Return on equity ROE 
ROE, is calculated as the bank’s net income to 
equity. 
• Uwuigbe and Fakile (2012). 
• Aebi et al. (2012). 
• Farazi et al. (2011).  
• Kim et al. (2010).  
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• Christopher, Mo Fung Yung (2009). 
• Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
• Durgavanshi (2014). 
• Cornett et al. (2003). 
• Fanta et al. (2013) 
• Rogers, 2008, Uganda. 
• Pan, 2014. 
• Rachdi and Ameur (2011) 
 
The net interest margin (NIM) 
NIM, is the difference between interest income and 
interest expense relative to total assets. 
• Epure and Lafuente (2015). 
• Farazi et al. (2011), Middle East and North 
Africa. 
 
Ratios of total Overhead Costs to 
Assets 
Total Overhead Costs to Assets Farazi et al. (2011), Middle East and North Africa. 
 Personnel Costs to Assets = Personnel Costs / Total Assets Farazi et al. (2011), Middle East and North Africa. 
 Market-to-Book Ratio 
Market-to-Book ratio, equals the current share 
price divided by the book value per share. 
Christopher and Yung (2009). 
 
 Risk-adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC) 
RAROC = financial net income – loan impairment 
allowances / (CAR * total capital). Christopher and Yung (2009). 
 Efficiency of interest management 
The efficiency ratio for interest management, is 
equal net interest income divided by total assets. 
Christopher and Yung (2009). 
 Efficiency of non-interest management 
Efficiency of non-interest management, mainly 
includes fees from service charges. Others include 
commission income, net trading income, net gain /loss 
on financial investment, net gain/loss on investment 
Christopher and Yung (2009). 
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on securities, net insurance premium income, other 
operating income, and net insurance benefits and 
claims. 
 Cost efficiency ratio 
The formula for calculating the cost efficiency ratio is 
non-interest incomes divided by non-interest 
expenses. 
Christopher, Mo Fung Yung, (2009). 
 Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Capital adequacy is measured by CK/RWAs ratio 
(Core Capital / Risk Weighted Assets). 
• Rogers (2008) Uganda. 
• Cornett et al. (2003). 
 Asset Quality 
Asset Quality, is measured by NPA/ Total advances 
and Specific Provisions. 
• Rogers (2008), Uganda. 
• Cornett et al. 2003. 
 Liquidity 
Liquidity is measured using Liquidity Assets divided 
by Total Deposits & Total Advances divided by Total 
Deposits. 
• Rogers (2008), Uganda. 
• Aspal and Nazneen, (2014). 
 Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
Net Profit Margin (NPM): 
NPM = 
  
%&  
 
Tandelilin et al. (2007). 
 Operating Efficiency Indicators 
Operating Efficiency Indicators. 
• Noninterest exp. to noninterest rev, Operating 
expenses as a percent of operating revenue. 
• Noninterest exp. to net operating income, Operating 
expenses as a percentage of net interest income plus 
noninterest revenue. 
• Noninterest exp. to total assets, Operating expenses 
as a percentage of book value of total assets. 
Cornett et al. (2003). 
Page 100 of 272 
 
• Interest and fees on loans to loans, Interest and fee 
income on loans as a percentage of total loans and 
leases. 
• Personnel exp. to total assets, Personnel expenses as 
a percentage of book value of total assets. 
• Fixed assets to total assets, fixed assets as a percent 
of book value of total assets. 
 Growth Indicator 
Growth indicators  
• Asset growth rate, Change in book value of total 
assets as a percentage of book value of total assets 
in the previous year. 
• Deposit growth rate, Change in core deposits as a 
percentage of core deposits in the previous year. 
Cornett et al. (2003). 
 Loans: Advances to Assets Ratio. = Advances / total assets 
Aspal and Nazneen (2014). 
 
Asset Quality: Net Non-performing 
Assets to Net Advances Ratio. 
= Net Non-performing Assets / Net Advances. Aspal and Nazneen (2014). 
 
Management Efficiency: Expenditure 
to Income Ratio. 
= Expenditure / Income Ratio. Aspal and Nazneen, (2014). 
 OSS: (Operational self-sufficiency.  
Operating revenue / (Financial Expense + Loan loss 
provision + operating expense) 
Durgavanshi, 2014. 
Control variable  Bank Size Measured by the log of total assets 
• Oluwafemi et al. (2013). 
• Berger et al. (2014). 
• Al-Hawary, 2011. 
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• Rachdi and Ameur (2011). 
• Fanta et al. (2013) 
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Table 4.2 Summary of variables used in this study 
Construct Title Notation Measurement Source 
Control variable Bank Type Btype Islamic (1) - Non Islamic (0) Bank Scope 
Control variable Financial Crisis  Fincris Before FC 2008 (1) - After FC (0)  Dummy  
Control variable Government Ownership  Govown 
Government Ownership ˃ 50% (1) - 
Government ownership ˂ 50% (0) 
Bank Scope   
Control variable Bank Size Banksize LN (Total assets) Bank Scope 
Corporate Governance Board Size Bsize Number of Board Members  Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance 
Non-Executive Board 
Members % 
Nexc 
Percentage of Non-executive board 
members to total # of board members  
Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance Gender diversity Gender 
There is a female member (1) - No 
Female (0) 
Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance CEO Turnover CEOturn 
CEO Replacement during the year (1) - 
No Replacement during the year (0) 
Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance Role Duality Rdual 
Chairman is the CEO (1) - Chairman is 
not the CEO (0) 
Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance Audit Committee Audcom 
There is an Audit Committee (1) - No 
Audit Committee (0) 
Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance 
Credit and Investment 
Committee  
Credinvscom 
There is a  Credit and Investment 
Committee (1) - No (0) 
Annual Bank Reports 
Corporate Governance Capital Ratio  Capratio CR = 
	

 
 Bank Scope 
Corporate Governance Loan to Deposits Ratio LDR  LDR = 

 

 
 Bank Scope 
Corporate Governance Risk Committee  Riskcom 
There is a Risk Committee (1) - No Risk 
Committee (0) 
Annual Bank Reports 
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Risk Management Non- performing Loan 
Ratio (NPL) NPL  
Nonperforming loans (+90 Days past 
due) to total loans 
Bank Scope 
Risk Management Capital Risk  Caprisk 
Is defined as the ratio of equity capital to 
total assets. 
Bank Scope 
Risk Management Credit Risk Credrisk Loan loss provision / Gross loans. Bank Scope 
Risk Management Capital Adequacy Ratio  CAR 
Is measured by dividing Capital / Total 
Weighted Risks. 
Bank Scope 
Risk Management Liquidity Risk  Liqrisk  
Liquidity Risk (RM) = 1/liquidity ratio. 
liquidity ratio = (Liquid Assets / (Total 
Deposit + Short Term Funding))  
Bank Scope 
Bank Performance Return On Equity ROE  
Calculated as the bank’s net income to 
equity. 
Bank Scope 
Bank Performance Return On Asset ROA  
calculated as the bank’s net income to 
its total assets Bank Scope 
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4.5 Regression models 
Multiple Regression Model: the multiple linear regression model can be represented, in its 
general form, as follows: 
Yi = βo + β1  f1 (Xi1) +  β2  f2 (Xi2)  + . . . . . + βk  fk (Xik) +  ε 
 
where: 
 
Y                        : dependent variable 
X1, …………, Xk : independent (explanatory) variables 
βo, …………, βk  : regression model coefficients (parameters). 
f1, …………,  fk  : functions (transformations) of independent variables, such that the 
relationship between Y and each f(X) is assumed to be linear. 
ε                    : random error  
The dependent variable for the first three models is the bank performance and for the fourth 
model is risk management. The independent variables contain continuous variables and 
dummy variables that contain proxies of five groups. The first is corporate governance 
characteristics (board characteristics), board leadership, and board composition. The second 
group is top management turnover. The third group is the existence of main committees. The 
fourth group is the financial variables related to corporate governance. The fifth group is the 
control variables: ownership structure, bank size, bank type, and financial crisis.  
Four regression models have been developed in this study to examine the association between 
the three constructs; corporate governance, risk management and bank performance as 
follows. Furthermore, four models will be run for the cumulative data of the GCC banking 
sector, which include the data of Islamic and Conventional banks. In addition, the four models 
will be run separately; one time for Islamic data, and another time for conventional data, to 
make a comparison between the results. 
Model (1) association between corporate governance and bank performance: 
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BP = β0 + β1Bsize + β2Nexc + β3Gender + β4CEOturn + β5Rdual + β6Audcom + β7credinvscom 
+ β8Capratio + β9LDR+ β10Riskcom + β11Btype + β12Fincris + β13Govown + β14Banksize + 
ε 
 
This study follow the recent direction in literature of assessing the relationship between 
corporate governance and bank performance. In addition, the independent variables examined 
in the current study can be classified into five groups. The first is corporate governance 
characteristics (board characteristics): board leadership (role duality); Board composition 
(non-executive directors and gender diversity); and board size. The second group is top 
management turnover; (CEO-Turnover). The third group is the existence of main committees 
such as; (audit committee, risk committee, and credit & investment committee). The fourth 
group is the financial variables related to corporate governance (capital ratio and loan to 
deposits ratio).  The fifth group is the control variables, such as: ownership structure; 
(government ownership), firm size (bank size), bank type (Islamic and conventional), 
financial crisis (before and after crisis). A summary of the variables used in this study is 
presented in the previous section to show the definition and measurement of the 
abovementioned dependent and independent variables examined in the current study.  
Model (2); Test the association between risk management and performance: 
BP = β0 + β1NPL + β2Caprisk + β3credrisk + β4CAR+ β1Liqrisk + β11Btype + β12Fincris + 
β13Govown + β14Banksize + ε 
Model two of this study assess the relationship between risk management and bank 
performance. In addition, the independent variables examined in the current study can be 
classified into two groups. The risk management group consists of these variables (non-
performing loans - capital risk – credit risk – capital adequacy ratio – liquidity risk). The 
second group is the control variables, such as: ownership structure; (government ownership), 
firm size (bank size), bank type (Islamic and conventional), financial crisis (before and after 
crisis).  
 
Model (3); Measure the relationship between corporate governance, risk management and 
bank performance: 
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BP = β0 + β1Bsize + β2Nexc + β3Gender + β4CEOturn + β5Rdual + β6Audcom + 
β7Credinvscom + β8Capratio + β9LDR + β10Riskcom + β11NPL + β12Caprisk + β13credrisk 
+ β14CAR+ β15Liqrisk + β161Btype + β17Fincris + β18Govown + β19Banksize + ε 
Model three of this study assess the implications of both corporate governance and risk 
management on bank performance. In addition, the independent variables examined in the 
current study can be classified into six groups. The first is corporate governance 
characteristics (board characteristics): board leadership (role duality); Board composition 
(non-executive directors and gender diversity); and board size. The second group is top 
management turnover; (CEO-Turnover). The third group is the existence of main committees 
such as; (audit committee, risk committee, and credit & investment committee). The fourth 
group includes the financial variables related to corporate governance (capital ratio and loan 
to deposits ratio). The fifth group comprises the risk management group that consists of (non-
performing loans - capital risk – credit risk – capital adequacy ratio – liquidity risk). The sixth 
group is the control variables such as: ownership structure; (government ownership), firm 
size (bank size), bank type (Islamic and conventional), financial crisis (before and after crisis).   
Model (4) Test the association between corporate governance and risk management: 
RM = β0 + β1Bsize + β2Nexc + β3Gender + β4CEOturn + β5Rdual + β6Audcom + 
β7Credinvscom + β8Capratio + β9LDR + β10Riskcom + β111Btype + β12Fincris + β13Govown 
+ β14Banksize + ε 
Model four of this study assess the effect of corporate governance on risk management. In 
addition, the independent variables examined in the current study can be classified into five 
groups. The first is corporate governance characteristics (board characteristics): board 
leadership (role duality); Board composition (non-executive directors and gender diversity); 
and board size. The second group is top management turnover; (CEO-Turnover). The third 
group is the existence of main committees such as; (audit committee, risk committee, and 
credit & investment committee). The fourth group is the financial variables related to 
corporate governance, which are (capital ratio and loan to deposits ratio).  The fifth group is 
the control variables, such as: ownership structure; (government ownership), firm size (bank 
size), bank type (Islamic and conventional), financial crisis (before and after crisis).  
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4.6 Statistical analysis and tests 
This section will show the statistical techniques that will be used in this study in order to 
execute the empirical works of this thesis. To investigate the association between corporate 
governance, risk management and bank performance in the GCC banking sector, Analysis of 
Variance (ANOVA), Pearson and T-test as parametric tests will be employed. ANOVA test 
is an analysis tool that splits the aggregate variability found inside a data set into two parts; 
1) systematic factors and 2) random factors. Moreover, non-parametric tests, such as Mann 
Whitney, will be employed. As per the literature review, the Mann Whitney heavily used in 
CG and RM literature.   
Regarding the relationship between the three constructs, it can be observed that regression 
analysis is the dominant statistical technique in the previous literature. However, there are 
two types of tests, parametric and non-parametric. The parametric techniques are based on 
some assumptions that must be satisfied. On the other hand, non-parametric techniques are 
considered to be distribution free tests, so there is no need to justify these assumptions. It is 
commonly agreed that parametric tests are more powerful than non-parametric tests when the 
assumptions of parametric tests in terms of data are met (Siegel and Castellan (1988) as cited 
in Cooke (1998); Field (2000)). 
Multicollinearity implies that there is a linear relationship between two or more explanatory 
variables. In such a relationship between the predictors, OLS estimators may be biased, and 
if this linear relationship among the predictors is perfect, the estimates for a regression model 
cannot be uniquely computed. To check for multicollinearity, the current study will apply the 
common ways which include correlation coefficients; parametric (Pearson) and non-
parametric (Spearman); and variance inflation factors (VIF) in addition to tolerance values. 
To test the hypothesis of the current study, both bivariate and multivariate analysis will be 
used. 
Bivariate analysis; By calculating Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients for 
continuous independent variables, and using T-test and Mann Whitney test for categorical 
independent variables. 
Multivariate analysis; OLS with transformation as a statistical technique will be applied to 
analyse the relationship between the three constructs. 
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Summary of the techniques developed in this study will be as follow: 
Descriptive statistic ANOVA  
T-test Multicollinearity test 
Mann Whitney test OLS Regression 
Pearson analysis Spearman analysis 
  
4.7 Multivariate analysis 
Multivariate analysis is an expression used to describe analysis of data that are multivariate. 
Multivariate data consist of observations on several variables for a number of individuals or 
objects studied. Among the multivariate analyses is regression analysis, which is considered 
one of the most heavily used techniques in the CG and RM literature. The regression analysis 
is used in literature whereas there are one or more dependent variable/s that is could be a 
result of one or more independent variables; any changes in the independents variables can 
explain the changes in dependents variables. 
The relationship between dependents and independents may be linear or non-linear. The 
multiple regression is used when the relationship is between one dependent variable and two 
or more independent variables.  
As indicated before, the current study examines the relationship between bank performance 
and risk management as dependent variables, and a number of corporate governance and 
control variables; role duality, non-executive directors, gender diversity, board size, CEO-
Turnover, audit committee, risk committee, and credit & investment committee, capital ratio 
and loan to deposits ratio, government ownership, bank size, bank type, and financial crisis.  
Therefore, the multiple regression analysis is to be relevant to the current study. The Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) regression is considered to be the best and very useful technique when 
there are continuous and dummy variables in the model (Hutcheson and Sofroniou 1999). 
The following sections present the multiple regression model suggested in the current study, 
followed by the regression diagnostics that represent the first step to choose the relevant 
statistical method by which to analyse the collected data in the current study. 
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4.7.1 OLS regression analysis (OLS with Transformed data and normal scores) 
The majority of previous literature that are related to corporate governance and risk 
management have employed several forms of transformation to overcome the problems of 
non-satisfaction with the linear regression assumptions.  
The matter of transformation in corporate governance studies was examined by Cooke (1998), 
who undertook a review using rank regression, and suggests replacing the data with their 
normal scores. Under rank regression, the observations are transformed based on its ranking 
from the smallest to the largest (Conover and Iman 1981). Rank transformation is relatively 
insensitive to outliers and is considered to be distributed free, and for this reason ranks can 
be used to develop tests of heteroscedasticity and serial correlation (Cheng et al. (1992); 
Cooke, 1998). However, rank transformation suffers from some weaknesses. Under such type 
of transformation that is distribution free, caution must be taken in testing for and interpreting 
the significance of F and t-test. In addition, the error structure cannot be normal, and the 
mapping of individual observations to ranks is a somewhat arbitrary transformation (Cooke, 
1998). 
(Cooke, 1998) proposes using normal scores instead of ranks as an extension of rank method. 
Normal scores are based on the Van Der Waerden approach; transforming actual observations 
to the normal distribution by dividing the distribution into the number of observations plus 
one region, on the basis that each region has equal probability. Moreover, the regression 
coefficients derived using normal scores are meaningful. In addition, it offers a means 
whereby a non-normal dependent variable may be transformed into a normal one; a further 
advantage over ranks. In addition, Cooke indicates that the main advantage of replacing the 
ranks by normal scores is that the resulting tests would have exact statistical properties 
because of the following; significance levels can be determined, the F and t-tests are 
meaningful, and the power of the F and t-tests may be used.  
Based on the above-mentioned discussion, the transformation has been employed in this study 
to deal with the problem of assumptions’ violation. Several regression models were run based 
on different transformations. Variables that seemed to have a nonlinear relation with the 
dependent variable have been transformed, and to deal with the heteroscedasticity, the 
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dependent variable which is not normally distributed has been transformed. Then it is 
recommended to transform the dependent and independent variables to their normal scores, 
and not only the dependent one, to keep the relationship between the dependent variable and 
all independent variables (Cooke 1998). Examples for transformation is the bank size, which 
is represented by the Log. Of total assets. In the following sections, the OLS results will be 
presented for the four models. 
The R-squared (R2) is a statistical measure of how close the data are to the fitted regression 
line. The R-squared is the percentage of the response variable variation that is explained by a 
linear model. In addition it is known as the coefficient of determination for the multiple 
regression. As per practice, the low R-square are not always bad and the high R-square are 
not always good. 
4.7.2 Regression diagnostic 
In general, there are several methods to estimate regression coefficients (parameters). The 
linear regression is usually used; OLS method. For the justification of using OLS, there are 
four principal assumptions. 
1. Linearity: The relationship between the dependent variable and each independent variable 
should be linear. 
2. Independence and normality of Error: The error terms (εi) are independent (successive 
residuals are not correlated, no serial correlation) and identically distributed, and follow 
the normal distribution with constant mean zero and constant variance Ϭ2. 
3. Homoscedasticity: the variance of the error terms is constant for each observation (set of 
Xi values). 
4. There is no linear relationship between two or more independent variables (no 
multicollinearity). 
4.8 Summary 
This chapter aims to determine the best methodology to be followed in this study in order to 
test the hypothesis and answer the main research questions. The current study aims to explore 
the relationship between corporate governance and risk management and bank performance. 
The positivism philosophy is represented as most suitable to fulfil this goal, because it 
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depends on empirical evidence rather than individuals' opinions. Furthermore, this study 
relies on the quantitative paradigm that is relied on in collecting and analysing numerical data 
that enables the researcher to examine the relationship between variables empirically. Both 
positivism and quantitative methods are employed within the deduction approach, that 
depends on the proposed theoretical framework and the hypotheses derived to explain the 
expected association. This study depends mainly on the secondary data method to collect the 
data. The sources of the data in this study will bank’s annual reports and the “bankscope”. In 
addition, four hypotheses and the relevant variables of the three constructs have been adopted 
in order to test those hypotheses. Data in this study will be analysed using Stata software. 
Chapter five will discuss the results of this study.    
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         Chapter five: Statistical Results and Discussion 
5.1 Introduction 
The research questions of the current study have been presented in chapter one. The current 
chapter aims to answer the research questions related to the relationship between the three 
constructs (Corporate Governance, Risk Management, and Bank Performance). Furthermore, 
it tests the research hypotheses related to selected variables in chapter three. The chapter 
begins with descriptive statistics in section 5.2. Section 5.3 presents the bivariate analysis, 
while section 5.4 presents the multivariate analysis. The regression analyses are presented in 
section 5.5. Section 5.6 presents discussion of the statistical results. The chapter will end with 
the conclusion in section 5.7. 
5.2 Descriptive statistics 
Table 5-1: Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for both independent and dependent 
variables in the current study. In general and as mentioned in the table, the data are not 
normally distributed because the skewness for a normal distribution is zero. Negative values 
indicate that the data are skewed to the left side and positives indicate that the data are skewed 
right side. Furthermore, Kurtosis is a measure of whether the data are heavy-tailed or light-
tailed relative to the normal distribution. The data with high kurtosis tend to have heavy tails, 
and data with low kurtosis tend to have light tails. As mentioned in table 5-1, the kurtosis of 
credit risk is 182 which means that the credit risk tends to have heavy tails.  
The mean of board size is about 9 members, with a minimum of 3 members and a maximum 
of 15 members. In addition, it is notable that the mean of the proportion of non-executive 
members is about 91%, it ranges from (25%) to (100%); the high percentage of the mean may 
reflect that most of the boards in GCC region are consist of non-executive directors which 
comes in line with the common practice of forming boards. Capital ratio mean is around 29%, 
and the range between minimum and maximum is (0.7%) and (225%) respectively. Loan to 
deposits ratio mean is around 111%, and the range between minimum and maximum is (1%) 
and (982%), the high percentage of the mean means that very high percentage of the GCC 
Loans are financed from the deposits. Non-performing loan ratio mean is around 8%, with 
minimum (0%) and maximum (90%). A smaller NPL ratio reflects the capability of GCC 
banks in managing and mitigating the risk (losses of non-performing loans). Capital risk mean 
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is around 27%, with minimum (1%) and maximum (99%). Credit risk mean is around 1%, 
with minimum around (-57%) and maximum (29%). The mean capital adequacy ratio is about 
(27%), with minimum (0.05%) and maximum (226%). Liquidity Risk mean is around (6%), 
with minimum around (0%) and maximum (436%).  
 
Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistic (N=900) 
0 means (0%), 1 means (100%)        
Panel A:Continuous 
independent variables 
N Mean Min Max 
Std. 
Deviatio
n 
Skewness Kurtosis 
CG  
Board Size  900 8.693 3 15 1.956 -0.177 0.359 
Non-Executive Board Member  900 0.913 0.250 1 0.122 -2.890 11.457 
Capital Ratio 900 0.290 0.007 2.258 0.247 3.389 15.250 
Loan to Deposits Ratio 900 1.114 0.012 9.825 0.914 5.716 38.232 
RM  
Non-performing Loan Ratio 900 0.082 0.000 0.900 0.134 3.706 16.459 
Capital Risk  900 0.271 0.000 0.998 0.245 1.876 2.419 
Credit Risk  900 0.010 -0.566 0.288 0.029 -6.428 182.383 
CAR  900 0.271 0.000 2.262 0.216 3.667 21.423 
Liquidity Risk  900 0.063 0.000 4.367 0.194 15.615 30.472 
BP  
ROA  900 0.018 -0.555 0.531 0.058 -1.723 30.837 
ROE  900 0.100 -1.360 0.699 0.163 -3.238 23.319 
CV        
Bank Size 900 8.425 2.493 12.813 2.312 -0.186 -0.845 
 
Panel B  
Dummy variables 
  N % 
CG  
Gender Diversity     
Female 1 93 10 
No Female 0 807 90 
CEO-Turnover     
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Replaced  1 74 8 
Not replaced 0 826 92 
Role Duality    
Yes 1 35 4 
No 0 865 96 
Audit Committee     
Yes 1 747 83 
No 0 153 17 
Credit and Investment Committee     
Yes 1 539 60 
No 0 361 40 
Risk Committee (CG)    
Yes  1 678 75 
No 0 222 25 
CV 
 
Bank Type 
   
Islamic 1 300 33.33 
Conventional 0 600 66.66 
Financial Crisis    
Before 1 
450 
50 
After 0 
450 
50 
Organization Structure     
Government 1 160 18 
Non-Government  0 740 82 
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The mean ROA is about (2%), with minimum (-56%) and maximum (53%). ROE mean is 
around 10%, with minimum (-136%) and maximum (70%). The bank size ranges widely from 
2.493 to 12.813, with the mean of 8.425. 
Table 5-1: Panel B summarizes the descriptive statistics of this study’s dummy variables. It 
can be observed that the female participation in the board of directors in this study sample is 
10%, which is considered minor participation, but it actually reflects the culture of the GCC 
countries, whereas they still prefer to nominate the male gender in the top management 
positions and boards. The CEO-turnover is around 8 %, which reflects the stability of the 
GCC banking sector during the test period. Role duality is 4%; this minor percentage reflects 
the common separation concept in the GCC banking sector between the chairman and the 
CEO positions. Regarding the existence of different committees belonging to the board, it can 
be observed that there is a high degree of awareness and understanding of the importance of 
these committees in handling and controlling the bank risks overall, and taking relevant 
decisions relating to credit and investment. This conclusion has been built based on the high 
percentage of their existence, that is (audit committee 83%, credit and investment committee 
60%, risk committee 75%).    
5.3 Bivariate analysis 
This section examines the association between the dependent variables and each of the 
independent variables that will be used in this study to test the hypothesis. As indicated 
before, Pearson correlation as a parametric test (table 5-2/1), Spearman correlation as a non-
parametric test (table 5-2/2), and both of them have been used in the current study. For dummy 
variables, T-test and Mann Whitney test will be used (tables 5-3 and 5-4).  
5.3.1 Pearson correlation  
In relation to the association between corporate governance variables and bank performance 
represented by ROE and ROA, table 5-2/1 show that the association of both non-executive 
directors and capital ratio with ROE are significant at (5% and 1% significance levels 
respectively) and the correlation levels are (8.4% and 10%) which considered not strong, and 
both of them are significant with ROA at 1% significance level and the correlation are (10.6% 
and 14.1%) which also not strong. Regarding the board size and loan to deposit ratio, they are 
not significantly associated with ROE and ROA and the correlation is weak. In reference to 
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the control variables, the bank size is significantly associated with ROE and ROA at 1% and 
10% significance levels respectively, while the correlation was 28% with ROE and very weak 
with ROA.     
Regarding the association between risk management variables and bank performance 
represented by ROE and ROA, it was noted that there are four variables found to be 
significantly associated with ROE at 1% significance level, and those variables are; non-
performing loan, capital risk (CapRisk), credit risk (Credrisk), capital adequacy ratio, the 
correlation of those variables with ROE are (19.6%, 20.5%, 14.4% and 9.2%). The liquidity 
risk was found to be insignificantly associated with ROE and the correlation is very weak. 
For the association with ROA, it was found that the NPL, capital risk, and liquidity risk are 
not significantly associated with ROA and the correlation is very weak. However, the credit 
risk and CAR are significantly associated with ROA, at 1% significance level, and the 
correlation levels are (8.8% and 14.3% respectively).  
Furthermore, the association between corporate governance variables and risk management, 
represented by NPL was found as follows; two variables are significantly associated at 1% 
significance level, which are board size and capital ratio and their correlation are (11.6% and 
11.5). LDR was observed to be significant at 5%, and the correlation was 7.2% with a negative 
effect on NPL. In addition, the percentage of non-executive directors was found to be 
insignificant with NPL and the correlation is weak. As a control variable, the bank size was 
noticed to be negative and significantly associated with NPL at 1% significance levels and 
the correlation is 30.9%; this result is an important indicator that the larger bank size is 
associated with lower level of NPL and vice versa.   
 
Table 5-2/1: Pearson correlation matrix  
  BankSize Boardsize Nexc CapRatio LDR NPL CapRisk Credrisk CAR liqrisk ROE ROA 
BankSize 1            
Boardsize 0.240*** 1           
Nexc -0.002 0.100*** 1          
CapRatio -0.465*** -0.151*** 0.041 1         
LDR -0.207*** -0.153*** 0.140*** 0.122*** 1        
NPL -0.309*** -0.116*** 0.004 0.115*** -0.072** 1       
CapRisk -0.611*** -0.165*** -0.003 0.771*** 0.099*** 0.152*** 1      
Credrisk -0.015 0.053 0.072** -0.001 0.056* 0.057* -0.014 1     
CAR -0.498*** -0.132*** 0.009 0.881*** 0.136*** 0.047 0.709*** -0.052 1    
Liqrisk -0.087*** -0.013 0.047 0.079* 0.073** 0.021 0.011 -0.017 0.095*** 1   
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ROE 0.280*** 0.031 -0.084** -0.100*** 0.010 -0.196*** -0.205*** -0.144*** -0.092*** 0.022 1  
ROA 0.057* -0.014 -0.106*** 0.141*** 0.036 -0.019 0.029 -0.088*** 0.143*** .034  -- 1 
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).  
5.3.2 Spearman correlation 
Regarding the association between corporate governance variables and bank performance 
represented by ROE and ROA, table 5-2/2 shows that both of non-executive directors and 
capital ratio are significantly associated with ROE and ROA at 1% significance levels and 
their correlation in the range between (15.4% and 29.3%). Furthermore, the LDR is 
significantly associated with ROE at 1% and insignificant with ROA and their correlation 
was (32.9% and 5% respectively). In addition to the above, the board size is positively and 
significantly associated with ROE at 5% significance level and insignificant with ROA, and 
the correlation level was (17.9% and 24.4% respectively), this result suggest that the large 
board size the large percentage of ROE. In consistence with Pearson, the correlation 
coefficient between bank size and ROE and ROA is positive and significantly associated (at 
1% and 10% significance levels respectively), and the correlation was higher that Pearson 
whereas it is (37.2% and 35.9% respectively) this suggest that the larger bank size the better 
bank performance.     
In agreement with the results of Pearson correlation, the association between risk 
management’s variables; NPL, capital risk, credit risk, CAR were found significantly 
associated with ROE and ROA at 1% significance levels, and their correlation with ROE was 
(29.5%, 38.5%, 37.7% and 29.8% respectively) while their correlation with ROA was (19.2%, 
34.9%, 32.9% and 11.6% respectively). The liquidity risk was found insignificantly 
associated with ROE and significantly associated with ROA at 10% significance level, and 
the correlation of both of them are very weak.  
In addition, the association between corporate governance variables and risk management 
represented by non-performing loan NPL was found as follow; NPL is significantly 
associated with capital ratio, board size, and non-executive directors (at 1% , 5%, 10% 
significance level respectively) with weak correlation. Loan to deposit ratio LDR was 
observed to be insignificant with NPL and the correlation is weak. Regarding the association 
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between bank size and NPL, it was noticed to be negative and significantly associated with 
NPL at 1% significance levels and its correlation is 25.6%.  
 
Table 5-2/2: Spearman correlation matrix  
  
BankSize Boardsize nexc CapRatio LDR NPL CapRisk Credrisk CAR liqrisk ROE ROA 
BankSize 1            
Boardsize 0.226*** 1           
Nexc -0.047 0.067** 1          
CapitRatio -0.483*** -0.139*** 0.003 1         
LDR -0.270*** -0.051 0.156*** 0.236*** 1        
NPL -0.256*** -0.077** 0.058* 0.136*** -0.054 1       
CapRisk -0.570*** -0.182*** -0.078** 0.771*** 0.290*** 0.105***   1      
Credrisk -0.063* -0.102*** -0.007 0.171*** 0.082** 0.280*** 0.084** 1     
CAR -0.500*** -0.184*** 0.028 0.927*** 0.242*** 0.078** 0.730*** 0.115*** 1    
Liqrisk 0.151*** 0.025 0.046 -0.088*** 0.172*** -0.232*** -0.071** -0.021 -0.070** 1   
ROE 0.372*** 0.179** -0.223*** -0.293*** -0.329*** -0.295*** -0.385*** -0.377*** -0.298*** -0.013 1  
ROA 0.359* -0.244 -0.154*** 0.249*** -0.050 -0.192*** 0.349*** -0.329*** 0.116*** -0.061* -- 1 
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). *Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
Generally, as noted from tables 5-2/1 and 5-2/2 there are variety in the significance levels 
between the selected variables. In addition, Pearson and Spearman correlations were noted 
not strong enough to prove the association, whereas the maximum correlation level between 
the selected variable was 39.9%. By the way, Pearson and Spearman are still bivariate 
analysis, and the association between the selected variables will be examined and analysed 
using the multivariate analysis in the following sections which are more reliable than bivariate 
test.       
5.3.3 Dummy variables 
To test the association between the dependent variables and the dummy independent variables 
in the current study, two statistical tests have been developed; t-test as a parametric test and 
Mann Whitney test as non-parametric test. Table 5-3 presents the results of corporate 
governance and control variables on bank performance measured by ROE. Table 5-4 presents 
the results of corporate governance and control variables on risk management measured by 
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NPL. Generally and as mentioned in tables 5-3 and 5-4, sometimes there is agreement 
between the results of t-test and Mann Whitney, but in other cases there is disagreement 
between both, so in such cases of disagreement, this study will rely on the results of Mann 
Whitney as a non-parametric test.    
5.3.3.1 Dummy variables with ROE 
The results as per table 5-3 show that boards with female or without female as per t-test is 
insignificantly associated with ROE which means that the change in performance cannot be 
explained by the change in this variable. However, Mann Whitney test shows that there is a 
significant and negative association between both variables, which means that the non-
existence of female member on the board is significantly associated with lower ROE, at 5% 
significance level. On the other hand, boards with female members are associated with better 
performance.  
Both T-test and Mann Whitney concurred in that the CEO-turnover is significantly associated 
with ROE at 1% significance level with different direction, whereas the t-test indicated that 
the no replacement of CEO is associated with higher ROE. However the Mann Whitney 
indicated that the replacement of CEO during the year is associated with higher ROE. 
Interestingly, both the T-test and Mann Whitney agreed that the role duality is significantly 
associated with ROE at (10% and 5% respectively) level with different direction, whereas t-
test refer to that the separation between the two position is associated with better performance, 
however Mann Whitney indicates that the combination is associated with higher ROE.  
 
Table 5-3: Descriptive Statistics of Dummy Variables of 
Corporate Governance and Control Variables with ROE 
(N=900) 
 
Variable 
T-test 
Mann Whitney test 
N Mean S.D. t-value Prob. 
Mean 
Rank 
z-value Prob. 
Corporate 
Governance 
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Gender Diversity     0.577 .564  -2.067 .039 
Female 93 0.0918 0.09077 
  
397.77   
Males  807 0.1021 0.16941 456.58   
CEO-Turnover     5.061 .000  -3.056 .002 
Replaced  74 0.0104 0.26910 
  
362.09   
Not replaced 826 0.1092 0.14750 458.42   
Role Duality    1.861 .063  -2.422 .015 
Yes 35 0.0509 0.25819 
  
346.24   
No 865 0.1031 0.15789 454.72   
Audit Committee     1.922 .055  -1.293 .196 
Yes 747 0.0963 0.17283 
  
445.43   
No 153 0.1241 0.09990 475.24   
Credit and 
Investment 
Committee  
   4.023 .000  
-3.726 .000 
Yes 539 0.0833 0.17880 
  
424.1   
No 361 0.1276 0.13203 489.92   
Risk Committee 
(CG) 
   4.253 .000  -4.173 .000 
Yes  678 0.0880 0.17583 
  
429.82   
No 222 0.1411 0.10626 513.66   
Control 
Variables 
 
Bank Type    4.585 .000  -7.081 .000 
Islamic 300 0.0644 0.18837 
  
359.25   
Conventional 600 0.1176 0.14742 491.71   
Financial Crisis    -8.276 .000  -8.130 .000 
Before 450 0.1444 0.11992 
  
520.90   
After 450 0.0577 0.18728 380.10   
Government 
Ownership  
   0.412 .681  -1.181 .238 
Government 160 0.0962 0.11730 
  
428.51   
Non-Government  740 0.1021 0.17138 455.25   
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Furthermore, table 5-3 indicates that the existence of audit committee as per t-test is 
significantly associated with higher ROE, however the Mann Whitney indicated that there is 
insignificant association between both. Regarding the credit and investment committee, both 
of t-test and Mann Whitney agreed that the credit and investment committee is significantly 
associated with ROE at 1% significance level with different direction, whereas t-test indicated 
that the existence of the committee is associated with better performance, However, Mann 
Whitney indicated that the existence of this committee is associated with lower ROE.  
Both T-test and Mann Whitney agreed that the risk committee is significantly associated with 
ROE at 1% significance level with different direction, whereas t-test show that the existence 
of this committee is associated with higher ROE, however, Mann Whitney indicate that the 
existence of this committee is related to lower ROE.  
T-test and Mann Whitney agreed that the bank type is significantly associated with ROE at 
1% significance level with different direction, whereas Mann Whitney indicated that the 
Islamic banks are related to higher ROE, however t-test referred to that conventional bank is 
associated with better performance. Both T-test and Mann Whitney agreed that the financial 
crisis was significantly associated with ROE at 1% significance level. The results suggest that 
the higher ROE is associated with years before crisis. Both T-test and Mann Whitney agreed 
that the government ownership is insignificantly associated with ROE which means that the 
change in performance cannot be explained by change in the variable. 
5.3.3.2 Dummy variables with NPL 
The results as per table 5-4 will be as follows; the existence of female member on the board 
as per Mann Whitney is associated with higher NPL, on the other hand, the non-existence of 
female member is associated with better risk management. However, t-test revealed that the 
female member on the board is insignificantly associated with risk management.   
The findings of both the T-test and Mann Whitney reveal that the NPL is insignificantly 
different with the replacement of CEO. Regarding the role duality, the findings of the T-test 
reveal that the NPL is insignificantly different with the duality. However, Mann Whitney 
shows that the separation between the two positions is significantly associated with lower 
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NPL at 1% significance level which means better bank performance. The existence of the 
audit committee was significantly associated with lower NPL i.e. better bank performance 
under both tests (t-test and Mann Whitney) at 1% and 5% significance levels respectively. 
Furthermore, t-test and Mann Whitney agree that the existence of both risk committee and 
credit & investment committee is significantly associated with lower NPL at 1% significance 
level which means better risk management. 
 
Table 5-4: Descriptive Statistics of Dummy Variables of 
Corporate Governance and Control Variables with NPL  
(N=900) 
Variable 
T-test 
Mann Whitney test 
N Mean S.D. 
t-
value 
Prob. 
Mean 
Rank 
z-value Prob. 
Corporate Governance  
Gender Diversity     -0.187 .852  -2.700 .007 
Female 93 0.0838 0.07619 
  
519.05   
No Female 807 0.0811 0.13485 442.6   
CEO-Turnover     -0.633 .527  -1.002 .316 
Replaced  74 0.0905 0.12825 
  
479.34   
Not replaced 826 0.0806 0.13019 447.92   
Role Duality    1.458 .145  -3.199 .001 
Yes 35 0.0500 0.13621 
  
313.44   
No 865 0.0826 0.12966 456.05   
Audit Committee     -3.080 .002  -2.167 .030 
Yes 747 0.0874 0.13985 
  
458.95   
No 153 0.0520 0.05390 409.23   
Credit and Investment 
Committee  
   -3.207 .001  -5.638 .000 
Yes 539 0.0927 0.13361   490.26   
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No 361 0.0645 0.12264 391.13   
Risk Committee (CG)    -2.353 .002  -3.759 .000 
Yes  678 0.0872 0.13527 
  
469.04   
No 222 0.0636 0.11073 393.88   
Control Variables  
Bank Type    0.020 .984  -1.959 .050 
Islamic 280 0.0812 0.14941 
  
425.37   
Conventional 620 0.0814 0.12033 461.85   
Financial Crisis    0.390 .697  -1.429 .153 
Before 450 0.0797 0.13641 
  
438.18   
After 450 0.0831 0.12336 462.82   
Government Ownership    -1.631 .103  -1.569 .117 
Government 160 0.0966 0.13397 
  
479.58   
Non-Government  740 0.0781 0.12897 444.21   
 
Regarding control variables in table 5-4, both the government ownership and financial crisis 
are insignificantly associated with the NPL under both tests. In addition, t-test revealed that 
the NPL is insignificantly different with bank type. However, Mann Whitney shows that the 
conventional bank is significantly associated with lower NPL, at 10 % significant level and 
the Islamic bank is associated with higher NPL.  
From the above discussion, bivariate analysis provides evidence of the association between 
the dependent variables of bank performance and risk management and each one of the 
independent variables. As indicated in the literature review chapter, a number of prior 
corporate governance and risk management studies employed the two tests and found 
agreement in some cases and disagreement in other cases between the results of the two tests.  
5.4 Checking multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity implies that there is a linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables. When multicollinearity exists, it will be difficult to differentiate the individual 
effects of explanatory variables, and OLS estimators may be biased or tend to have large 
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variances (Murray, 2006). Furthermore, if there is a perfect linear relationship among the 
independents, the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. The two 
common ways to check for the presence of multicollinearity between independent variables 
are correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance values. These 
two ways have been used widely in corporate governance literature. The current study 
employs both of them to check whether the explanatory variables or the model suffer from 
multicollinearity for the cumulative data, which include all data of Islamic and conventional 
banks. In addition, the multicollinearity will be tested separately for Islamic data and 
conventional data. Table 5-5 Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and Tolerance coefficients of each explanatory variable for the cumulative data. 
Furthermore, tables 5-6 Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show the Variance Inflation Factor 
(VIF) and Tolerance coefficients of each explanatory variable for the Islamic banks’ data. In 
addition to the above, tables 5-7 Panel A, Panel B and Panel C show the VIF and Tolerance 
coefficients of each explanatory variable for the conventional banks’ data. 
Regarding the VIF, Damodar (2003) indicates that there is no problem if the VIF is less than 
(10). However, others suggest that the value of (5) can be used as a rule of thumb (Groebner 
et al. 2011).  
As mentioned in all these test tables, the VIF is less than (10) and less than (2) in most of 
them, and the tolerance is at the acceptable level. Therefore, the results of VIF and tolerance 
coefficients, based upon the rule of thumb, indicate that there is no unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity in the current study. 
It is commonly agreed that the correlation matrix is a powerful tool for indicating the 
relationship between predictors. There has been no agreement among researchers regarding 
the cut off correlation percentage (Alsaeed, 2006). Actually, some researchers use 0.8; e.g. 
Damodar (2003); others suggest using 0.7; e.g. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).  
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Table 5-5 
VIF and Tolerance Test Results 
For All banks  
ROE, ROA, and NPL  
Panel A 
ROE 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toleran
ce 
Board size 1.253 .798 
Non-executive director 1.080 .926 
Gender diversity 1.154 .866 
CEO-turnover 1.082 .924 
Role Duality 1.132 .883 
Audit Committee 1.516 .660 
Credit & inv. comm. 1.239 .807 
Capital Ratio 6.461 .155 
LDR  1.144 .874 
Risk Committee 1.615 .619 
NPL  1.230 .813 
CAR 5.255 .190 
Credit risk 1.056 .947 
Capital Risk 3.631 .275 
liquidity risk 1.045 .957 
Bank type 1.371 .729 
Financial crisis 1.131 .884 
Gov. ownership  1.194 .838 
Bank Size 2.325 .430 
 
Panel B  
ROA 
Variables 
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toleran
ce 
Board size 1.25 0.798 
Non-executive director 1.08 0.926 
Gender diversity 1.15 0.866 
CEO-turnover 1.08 0.924 
Role Duality 1.13 0.883 
Audit Committee 1.52 0.660 
Credit & inv. comm. 1.24 0.807 
Capital Ratio 5.46 0.195 
LDR  1.14 0.874 
Risk Committee 1.62 0.619 
NPL  1.23 0.813 
CAR 5.26 0.290 
Credit risk 1.06 0.947 
Capital Risk 3.63 0.275 
liquidity risk 1.05 0.957 
Bank type 1.37 0.729 
Financial crisis 1.13 0.884 
Gov. ownership 1.19 0.838 
Bank Size 2.33 0.430 
   
 
Panel C  
NPL 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Tolera
nce 
Board size 1.239 0.807 
Non-executive director 1.063 0.941 
Gender diversity 1.139 0.878 
CEO-turnover 1.075 0.930 
Role Duality 1.118 0.895 
Audit Committee 1.462 0.684 
Credit & inv. 
comm. 
1.216 0.822 
Capital Ratio 1.404 0.712 
LDR  1.105 0.905 
Risk Committee 1.585 0.631 
Bank type 1.194 0.838 
Financial crisis 1.124 0.890 
Gov. ownership 1.157 0.864 
Bank Size 1.593 0.628 
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Table 5-6 
VIF and Tolerance Test Results 
For Islamic Banks Data  
 ROE, ROA, and NPL 
Panel A  
ROE 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Tolera
nce 
Board size 1.65 0.604 
Non-executive board 
member 
1.32 0.760 
Gender diversity 1.25 0.798 
CEO-turnover 1.22 0.821 
Role Duality 1.75 0.571 
Audit Committee 1.81 0.552 
Credit & inv. comm. 1.82 0.549 
Capital Ratio 3.03 0.33 
LDR 1.47 0.679 
Risk Committee 2.12 0.471 
Non-performing loan 1.67 0.598 
Capital adequacy ratio 2.32 0.43 
Credit risk 1.44 0.694 
Capital Risk 5.01 0.199 
liquidity risk 1.51 0.662 
Financial crisis 1.2 0.834 
Gov. ownership 1.67 0.601 
Bank Size 3.97 0.252 
Panel B  
 ROA  
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toler
ance 
Board size 1.65 0.604 
Non-executive board 
member  
1.32 0.760 
Gender diversity 1.25 0.798 
CEO-turnover 1.22 0.821 
Role Duality 1.75 0.571 
Audit Committee 1.81 0.552 
Credit & inv. comm. 1.82 0.549 
Capital Ratio 3.03 0.33 
LDR 1.47 0.679 
Risk Committee 2.12 0.471 
Non-performing loan 1.67 0.598 
Capital adequacy ratio 2.32 0.43 
Credit risk 1.44 0.694 
Capital Risk 5.01 0.199 
liquidity risk 1.51 0.662 
Financial crisis 1.2 0.834 
Gov. ownership 1.67 0.601 
Bank Size 3.97 0.252 
 
Panel C  
NPL 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toler
ance 
Board size 1.58 0.634 
Non-executive board 
member 
1.28 0.780 
Gender diversity 1.18 0.846 
CEO-turnover 1.21 0.830 
Role Duality 1.66 0.604 
Audit Committee 1.69 0.593 
Credit & inv. comm. 1.62 0.616 
Capital ratio 1.52 0.660 
LDR 1.18 0.850 
Risk Committee 1.95 0.512 
Financial crisis 1.16 0.861 
Gov. ownership 1.61 0.622 
Bank Size 1.74 0.573 
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Table 5-7 
VIF and Tolerance Test Results 
For Conventional Banks Data  
 ROE, ROA, and NPL 
Panel A 
ROE 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toler
ance 
Board size 1.33 0.750 
Non-executive board 
member 
1.11 0.903 
Gender diversity  1.17 0.853 
CEO-turnover  1.08 0.926 
Role duality  1.07 0.935 
Audit committee 1.59 0.630 
Credit and inv. Comm.  1.22 0.819 
Capital ratio 6.07 0.165 
LDR 1.24 0.806 
Risk committee 1.64 0.609 
Non-Performing loan 1.53 0.655 
Capital Adequacy ratio 3.44 0.291 
Credit risk  1.04 0.958 
Capital risk 4.51 0.222 
liquidity risk  1.1 0.912 
Financial crisis 1.14 0.879 
Government ownership 1.26 0.796 
Bank size  2.23 0.449 
 
Panel B 
 ROA 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toler
ance 
Board size 1.33 0.750 
Non-executive board 
member 
1.11 0.903 
Gender diversity  1.17 0.853 
CEO-turnover  1.08 0.926 
Role duality  1.07 0.935 
Audit committee  1.59 0.630 
Credit and inv. Comm.  1.22 0.819 
Capital ratio 6.07 0.165 
LDR 1.24 0.806 
Risk committee  1.64 0.609 
Non-Performing loan 1.53 0.655 
Capital Adequacy ratio 3.44 0.291 
Credit risk  1.04 0.958 
Capital risk  4.51 0.222 
liquidity risk 1.1 0.912 
Financial crisis 1.14 0.879 
Gov. ownership 1.26 0.796 
Bank size 2.23 0.449 
 
Panel C  
NPL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variables  
Collinearity  
VIF 
Toler
ance 
Board size 1.3 0.769 
Non-executive board 
member 
1.08 0.923 
Gender diversity  1.15 0.872 
CEO-turnover  1.07 0.937 
Role duality  1.05 0.952 
Audit committee  1.51 0.661 
Credit and inv. Comm.  1.2 0.834 
Capital ratio 1.43 0.697 
LDR 1.13 0.883 
Risk committee  1.61 0.620 
Financial crisis 1.12 0.893 
Government ownership 1.2 0.835 
Bank size 1.58 0.634 
 
The following section employs multivariate analysis, multiple regression, to explain the 
association between the dependent and independent variables.  
5.5 Regression analysis  
This section employs multivariate analysis to explain the association between the dependent 
and independent variables for the four models. As per our review to the previous literature, it 
can be noted that the R-squared in number of studies is between 10% -50%, in this study the 
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average of R-squared is 10% - 32%. As mentioned in chapter four, the low R-square are not 
always bad and the high R-square are not always good.      
5.5.1 OLS results for regression model (1) 
This part will discuss the results of OLS as a multivariate regression test for model (1), which 
investigates the association between corporate governance and bank performance measured 
by ROE and ROA. There are six tables from 5-8 to 5-13 showing this association as follows: 
As indicated in table 5-8 which shows the relationship between corporate governance and 
ROE, the R squared for this model is 22.03% at 1% significance level. It was noted that there 
is negative and significant association between ROE and both non-executive board member 
and CEO-turnover, at 1% significance level. The existence of credit and investment 
committees are negatively and significantly associated with ROE, at 5% significant level. The 
LDR is positively and significantly associated with ROE at 10% significant level. All the 
control variables; bank type, bank size, government ownership, and financial crisis were 
noted as significant, with ROE at 1% significance level. However, there is no significant 
association between the ROE and (6) independent variables; board size, gender diversity, role 
duality, audit committee, risk committee, and capital ratio at any significant level.  
Table 5-8 Model (1) OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and ROE 
All Banks 
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board Size  -0.00184 0.002754 -0.67 0.503 -0.00725 0.003561 
Non-executive board member  -0.12243 0.041105 -2.98 0.003 -0.20310 -0.04175 
Gender diversity  0.013257 0.016959 0.78 0.435 -0.02003 0.046542 
CEO-turnover -0.06849 0.018255 -3.75 0.000 -0.10432 -0.03266 
Role duality -0.03941 0.026447 -1.49 0.137 -0.09132 0.012493 
Audit committee -0.01571 0.015571 -1.01 0.313 -0.04627 0.014851 
Credit and investment 
committee -0.02413 0.010884 -2.22 0.027 -0.04549 -0.00277 
Capital Ratio  0.031531 0.023238 1.36 0.175 -0.01408 0.077139 
LDR 0.010027 0.005568 1.8 0.072 -0.00090 0.020955 
Risk committee -0.00047 0.014126 -0.03 0.973 -0.02820 0.027254 
Bank type -0.04611 0.011415 -4.04 0.000 -0.06852 -0.02371 
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Financial crisis 0.081621 0.010256 7.96 0.000 0.06149 0.10175 
Government ownership -0.04697 0.01361 -3.45 0.001 -0.07368 -0.02026 
Bank size 0.024142 0.002642 9.14 0.000 0.018956 0.029327 
_cons 0.020788 0.049137 0.42 0.672 -0.07565 0.117227 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2203 
 
As mentioned in tables 5-9 and 5-10, the R squared for these models are 28.76 % and 20.92 
% respectively, at 1% significance level. The board size, Gender diversity, Role duality, 
Audit committee, and LDR in both Islamic banks and conventional banks are insignificant 
with ROE. Furthermore, bank size and financial crisis are significant with ROE at 1% 
significance level in both Islamic banks and conventional banks. In addition, the Non-
executive board member, credit and investment committee, and capital ratio were noted as 
significant with ROE in Islamic banks, while the three variables were insignificant in 
conventional banks. In conventional banks, the CEO-turnover, Risk committee, and 
Government ownership were noted as significant with ROE but insignificant in Islamic banks. 
Table 5-9 Model (1) OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and ROE 
Islamic banks  
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board Size  0.006889 0.005471 1.26 0.209 -0.00388 0.017661 
Non-executive board member  -0.6713 0.130594 -5.14 0.000 -0.92843 -0.41418 
Gender diversity  0.065261 0.050712 1.29 0.199 -0.03459 0.165108 
CEO-turnover -0.01751 0.044983 -0.39 0.697 -0.10608 0.07106 
Role duality -0.08322 0.089309 -0.93 0.352 -0.25906 0.092622 
Audit committee -0.03002 0.029448 -1.02 0.309 -0.088 0.027963 
Credit and investment 
committee 
-0.05862 0.028421 -2.06 0.04 -0.11458 -0.00266 
Capital Ratio  0.074057 0.042685 1.73 0.084 -0.00999 0.1581 
LDR 0.052929 0.05144 1.03 0.304 -0.04835 0.15421 
Risk committee 0.038479 0.034486 1.12 0.266 -0.02942 0.106378 
Financial crisis 0.093891 0.018275 5.14 0.000 0.057909 0.129873 
Government ownership 0.023847 0.036427 0.65 0.513 -0.04788 0.095569 
Bank size 0.032492 0.005034 6.45 0.000 0.022581 0.042403 
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_cons 0.268529 0.168956 1.59 0.113 -0.06413 0.601191 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R-squared  0.2876 
 
Table 5-10 Model (1) OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and ROE 
Conventional banks  
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board Size  -0.00471 0.003002 -1.57 0.117 -0.01061 0.001185 
Non-executive board member  -0.05276 0.034221 -1.54 0.124 -0.11996 0.014449 
Gender diversity  0.010796 0.015199 0.71 0.478 -0.01905 0.040646 
CEO-turnover -0.07537 0.035197 -2.14 0.033 -0.1445 -0.00625 
Role duality 0.029977 0.027905 1.07 0.283 -0.02483 0.08478 
Audit committee 0.011752 0.011104 1.06 0.290 -0.01006 0.03356 
Credit and investment 
committee 
-0.00631 0.011543 -0.55 0.585 -0.02898 0.016357 
Capital Ratio  -0.00479 0.026685 -0.18 0.858 -0.05719 0.04762 
LDR 0.006432 0.004984 1.29 0.197 -0.00336 0.01622 
Risk committee -0.03188 0.011104 -2.87 0.004 -0.05369 -0.01008 
Financial crisis 0.076102 0.010161 7.49 0.000 0.056146 0.096057 
Government ownership -0.0322 0.011433 -2.82 0.005 -0.05465 -0.00975 
Bank size 0.021345 0.0039 5.47 0.000 0.013687 0.029004 
_cons 0.007736 0.038044 0.2 0.839 -0.06698 0.082451 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.2092 
 
In relation to the association between corporate governance and ROA, and as mentioned in 
table 5-11, the R square is 14.54% with 1% significance level. It was noted that the Non-
executive board member, Gender diversity, CEO-turnover, Audit committee, capital ratio, 
LDR, government ownership, financial crisis, and bank size are significantly associated with 
ROA. Furthermore, the board size, role duality, risk committee, credit and investment 
committee, and bank type are insignificantly associated with ROA.  
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Table 5-11 Model (1) OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and ROA 
All Banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board Size  -0.0001 0.001045 -0.1 0.922 -0.00215 0.001949 
Non-executive board member  -0.05637 0.013316 -4.23 0.000 -0.08251 -0.03024 
Gender diversity  0.007943 0.00459 1.73 0.084 -0.00107 0.016951 
CEO-turnover -0.02704 0.010433 -2.59 0.01 -0.04752 -0.00657 
Role duality 0.009748 0.016309 0.6 0.55 -0.02226 0.041757 
Audit committee -0.01333 0.005538 -2.41 0.016 -0.0242 -0.00246 
Credit and investment 
committee -0.00557 0.003518 -1.58 0.114 -0.01247 0.001337 
Capital Ratio  0.051914 0.01213 4.28 0.000 0.028106 0.075722 
LDR 0.002932 0.001598 1.83 0.067 -0.00021 0.006069 
Risk committee 0.002128 0.003711 0.57 0.567 -0.00516 0.009412 
Bank type -0.00796 0.004947 -1.61 0.108 -0.01767 0.001752 
Financial crisis 0.02212 0.003357 6.59 0.000 0.015531 0.028709 
Government ownership -0.01432 0.002776 -5.16 0.000 -0.01977 -0.00887 
Bank size 0.005192 0.00141 3.68 0.000 0.002425 0.007959 
_cons 0.016569 0.018504 0.9 0.371 -0.01975 0.052887 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.1454 
 
In table 5-12 and Table 5-13 which show the association between corporate governance and 
ROA for Islamic Banks and conventional banks respectively, it was noted that the R squared 
are 24.78% and 15.24% respectively. Interestingly, it was found that the non-executive board 
member, capital ratio, risk committee, financial crisis, government ownership, and bank size 
are significantly associated with ROA in Islamic banks and conventional banks. The audit 
committee in Islamic banks was significantly associated with ROA; however, it is 
insignificant in conventional banks. The board size and CEO Turnover were significant with 
ROA in conventional banks, while it is insignificant in Islamic banks. In addition, the gender 
diversity, LDR, role duality, credit and investment committee were noted as insignificantly 
associated with ROA in Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
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Table 5-12 Model (1) OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and ROA 
Islamic Banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board Size  0.005634 0.00365 1.54 0.124 -0.00155 0.01282 
Non-executive board member  -0.31957 0.070728 -4.52 0.000 -0.45883 -0.18031 
Gender diversity  0.026624 0.017294 1.54 0.125 -0.00743 0.060674 
CEO-turnover -0.01205 0.01811 -0.67 0.506 -0.04771 0.023603 
Role duality 0.030158 0.035543 0.85 0.397 -0.03982 0.10014 
Audit committee -0.03944 0.015693 -2.51 0.013 -0.07033 -0.00854 
Credit and investment 
committee 
-0.0064 0.010292 -0.62 0.535 -0.02666 0.013867 
Capital Ratio  0.078439 0.024825 3.16 0.002 0.029561 0.127317 
LDR 0.016653 0.017135 0.97 0.332 -0.01708 0.05039 
Risk committee 0.028987 0.012566 2.31 0.022 0.004245 0.05373 
Financial crisis 0.039015 0.008878 4.39 0.000 0.021534 0.056495 
Government ownership 0.029114 0.016273 1.79 0.075 -0.00293 0.061155 
Bank size 0.010589 0.003184 3.33 0.001 0.004319 0.016859 
_cons 0.120613 0.07353 1.64 0.102 -0.02416 0.265388 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.2478 
 
Table 5-13 Model (1) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and ROA 
Conventional banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board Size  -0.00191 0.000864 -2.21 0.028 -0.0036 -0.00021 
Non-executive board member  -0.02412 0.009956 -2.42 0.016 -0.04368 -0.00457 
Gender diversity  0.005349 0.005062 1.06 0.291 -0.00459 0.015291 
CEO-turnover -0.02485 0.013079 -1.9 0.058 -0.05053 0.000841 
Role duality 0.002734 0.006432 0.43 0.671 -0.0099 0.015366 
Audit committee 0.001003 0.00295 0.34 0.734 -0.00479 0.006797 
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Credit and investment 
committee 
-0.00055 0.003125 -0.17 0.861 -0.00668 0.005592 
Capital Ratio  0.035799 0.010562 3.39 0.001 0.015057 0.056542 
LDR 0.001123 0.001328 0.85 0.398 -0.00148 0.003731 
Risk committee -0.00978 0.002971 -3.29 0.001 -0.01562 -0.00395 
Financial crisis 0.015239 0.002554 5.97 0.000 0.010223 0.020255 
Government ownership -0.01023 0.003196 -3.2 0.001 -0.01651 -0.00396 
Bank size 0.003658 0.001423 2.57 0.01 0.000864 0.006452 
_cons 0.018741 0.011864 1.58 0.115 -0.00456 0.042041 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.1524 
 
5.5.2 OLS results for regression model (2) 
This section will discuss the results of OLS test for model (2), which investigates the 
association between risk management and bank performance measured by ROE and ROA. 
There are six tables from 5-14 to 5-19 showing this association as follows: 
 As indicated in table 5-14 which shows the relationship between risk management and ROE, 
the adjusted R square for this model is 20.80% at 1% significance level. It was noted that the 
capital adequacy ratio is positively and significantly associated with ROE at 5% significant 
level. However, the non-performing loan, credit risk, capital risk, and liquidity risk are not 
significantly associated with the ROE at any significant level. The four control variables; 
bank type, bank size, government ownership, and financial crisis were noted as significant 
with ROE at 1% significance level.   
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Table 5-14 Model (2) 
OLS Regression Results 
Risk Management and ROE 
All Banks 
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-performing loan -0.1128801 0.0997106 -1.13 0.258 -0.3085753 0.082815 
Capital adequacy ratio  0.0814247 0.0374472 2.17 0.03 0.0079296 0.15492 
Credit risk  -0.5685732 0.3587931 -1.58 0.113 -1.272752 0.135606 
Capital risk  -0.0509412 0.034498 -1.48 0.140 -0.1186481 0.016766 
Liquidity  risk  0.0233387 0.0171242 1.36 0.173 -0.0102698 0.056947 
Bank type -0.0436627 0.012873 -3.39 0.001 -0.0689277 -0.0184 
Financial crisis 0.0904399 0.009823 9.21 0.000 0.0711609 0.109719 
Government 
ownership 
-0.0341454 0.0097252 -3.51 0.000 -0.0532324 -0.01506 
Bank size 0.0197569 0.0032442 6.09 0.000 0.0133896 0.026124 
_cons -0.0858073 0.039965 -2.15 0.032 -0.164244 -0.00737 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  .2080 
 
In table 5-15 and Table 5-16 which show the association between risk management and ROE 
for Islamic Banks and conventional banks respectively, it was noted that the adjusted R 
squared are 19.53% and 21.11% respectively. Interestingly, the Islamic banks are similar to 
Conventional banks in that the capital adequacy ratio, financial crisis and bank size are 
significantly associated with ROE. Furthermore, it was found that the capital risk and liquidity 
risk are insignificant in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks. The NPL and credit risk 
are significantly and inversely associated with ROE in Conventional banks and vice versa 
with Islamic banks, which means that in Conventional banks there is a good control over the 
NPL and credit risk to keep them at a lower level, which directly and positively enhance the 
bank performance represented by ROE. On the other hand, the Islamic banks need to make 
some efforts in this area.  
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Table 5-15 Model (2) 
OLS Regression Results 
Risk Management and ROE 
Islamic banks  
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Non-performing loan -0.22241 0.225803 -0.98 0.326 -0.66697 0.222138 
Capital adequacy ratio   0.100417 0.053982 1.86 0.064 -0.00586 0.206694 
Credit risk  -0.08538 0.433702 -0.2 0.844 -0.93923 0.768473 
Capital risk  -0.07724 0.066236 -1.17 0.245 -0.20764 0.053164 
Liquidity  risk  0.350588 0.243637 1.44 0.151 -0.12907 0.830249 
Financial crisis 0.105319 0.020626 5.11 0.000 0.064712 0.145926 
Government ownership -0.07531 0.026115 -2.88 0.004 -0.12672 -0.02389 
Bank size 0.021161 0.006933 3.05 0.002 0.007513 0.03481 
_cons -0.15856 0.081886 -1.94 0.054 -0.31977 0.002658 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.1953 
 
Table 5-16 Model (2) 
OLS Regression Results 
Risk Management and ROE 
Conventional banks  
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Non-performing loan -0.1127 0.051329 -2.2 0.028 -0.2133 -0.01209 
Capital adequacy ratio   0.074171 0.044802 1.66 0.098 -0.01364 0.161981 
Credit risk  -0.7492 0.180205 -4.16 0.000 -1.1024 -0.39601 
Capital risk  -0.05148 0.041707 -1.23 0.217 -0.13323 0.030262 
Liquidity  risk  0.008642 0.024599 0.35 0.725 -0.03957 0.056854 
Financial crisis 0.082458 0.010694 7.71 0.000 0.061497 0.103418 
Government ownership -0.02639 0.013362 -1.98 0.048 -0.05258 -0.0002 
Bank size 0.018033 0.003127 5.77 0.000 0.011905 0.024161 
_cons -0.06448 0.034708 -1.86 0.063 -0.13251 0.003547 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.2111 
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In a comparison between table 5-17 and 5-14 that show the association between risk 
management and ROA and ROE respectively, there is complete agreement between both of 
them, which means that the risk management has the same significance implication on both 
ROE and ROA. However, the capital adequacy ratio is positively and significantly associated 
with ROE at 1% significance level, and the non-performing loan, credit risk, capital risk, and 
liquidity risk are insignificantly associated with the ROA. The four control variables; bank 
type, bank size, government ownership, and financial crisis were noted as significant with 
ROA at 1% significance level.   
 
Table 5-17 Model (2) 
OLS Regression Results 
Risk Management and ROA 
All banks 
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-performing loan 0.020222 0.029953 0.68 0.50 -0.03857 0.07901 
Capital adequacy ratio   0.070515 0.02642 2.67 0.008 0.018662 0.122368 
Credit risk  -0.10969 0.077785 -1.41 0.159 -0.26235 0.042972 
Capital risk  -0.00872 0.023372 -0.37 0.709 -0.05459 0.03715 
Liquidity  risk  0.005121 0.005758 0.89 0.374 -0.00618 0.016421 
Bank type -0.00756 0.003945 -1.92 0.056 -0.0153 0.000181 
Financial crisis 0.02648 0.00381 6.95 0.000 0.019002 0.033958 
Government ownership -0.00994 0.002568 -3.87 0.000 -0.01498 -0.0049 
Bank size 0.005009 0.001303 3.84 0.000 0.002452 0.007567 
_cons -0.05058 0.015588 -3.25 0.001 -0.08118 -0.01999 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.1086 
 
In table 5-18 and Table 5-19 which show the association between risk management and ROA 
for Islamic banks and conventional banks respectively, it was noted that the adjusted R 
squared are 14.98% and 13.30% respectively. There is agreement between Islamic banks and 
 Page 137 of 272 
 
Conventional banks in that the capital adequacy ratio, capital risk, financial crisis, and 
government ownership, are significantly associated with ROA. Furthermore, the NPL is 
insignificantly associated with ROA in Islamic banks and conventional banks. Regarding the 
credit risk and bank size, conventional banks are significantly associated with ROA, and vice 
versa with Islamic banks. The liquidity risk in Islamic banks is significantly associated with 
ROA and vice versa with conventional banks. 
 
Table 5-18 Model (2) 
OLS Regression Results 
Risk Management and ROA 
Islamic Banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t [95% Conf. Interval] 
Non-performing loan -0.02155 0.059732 -0.36 0.719 -0.13915 0.096045 
Capital adequacy ratio   0.112328 0.044314 2.53 0.012 0.025086 0.199571 
Credit risk  0.074685 0.117875 0.63 0.527 -0.15738 0.306752 
Capital risk  -0.07423 0.043725 -1.7 0.091 -0.16031 0.011859 
Liquidity  risk  0.129753 0.071585 1.81 0.071 -0.01118 0.270686 
Financial crisis 0.044064 0.009392 4.69 0.000 0.025573 0.062555 
Government ownership -0.01946 0.006746 -2.88 0.004 -0.03274 -0.00618 
Bank size 0.002128 0.002868 0.74 0.459 -0.00352 0.007775 
_cons -0.03828 0.031819 -1.2 0.23 -0.10093 0.024361 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared  0.1498 
 
Table 5-19 Model (2) 
OLS Regression Results 
Risk Management and ROA 
Conventional Banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Non-performing loan 0.001817 0.014876 0.12 0.903 -0.02734 0.030972 
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Capital adequacy ratio   0.032343 0.012984 2.49 0.013 0.006895 0.057791 
Credit risk  -0.17244 0.052225 -3.3 0.001 -0.2748 -0.07009 
Capital risk  0.03494 0.012087 2.89 0.004 0.01125 0.05863 
Liquidity  risk  0.004027 0.007129 0.56 0.572 -0.00995 0.017999 
Financial crisis 0.018511 0.003099 5.97 0.000 0.012436 0.024586 
Government ownership -0.0087 0.003872 -2.25 0.025 -0.01629 -0.00111 
Bank size 0.004456 0.000906 4.92 0.000 0.002681 0.006232 
_cons -0.04037 0.010059 -4.01 0.000 -0.06009 -0.02066 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared 0.1330 
 
5.5.3 OLS results for regression model (3) 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, model (3) will investigate the association between 
both corporate governance and risk management with bank performance measured by ROE 
and ROA. This section discusses the results of the OLS test for model (3). There are six tables 
from 5-20 to 5-25 showing this association as follows: 
As indicated in table 5-20 which shows the relationship between corporate governance and 
risk management and ROE, the adjusted R squared is 0.2265 at 1% significance level. It was 
noted that the association between the ROE and non-executive board member, CEO turnover, 
non-performing loan, and credit risk are negative and significant at 1% significance level. In 
addition, capital risk is negatively and significantly associated with ROE at 5% significant 
level. Moreover, role duality and credit and investment committee are associated with ROE 
significantly with negative direction, at 10% significant level. There is no significant 
association between ROE and the following independent variables; capital ratio, board size, 
gender diversity, audit committee, risk committee, capital adequacy ratio, loan to deposit 
ratio, and liquidity risk. 
Interestingly, the four control variables; bank type, bank size, government ownership, and 
financial crisis were noted significant, with ROE at 1% significance level.   
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Table 5-20 Model (3) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROE 
All Banks data  
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  -0.002 0.002737 -0.73 0.466 -0.00737 0.003377 
Non-executive board member  -0.12042 0.040937 -2.94 0.003 -0.20077 -0.04008 
Gender diversity  0.007357 0.016871 0.44 0.663 -0.02575 0.040469 
CEO turnover  -0.07343 0.018099 -4.06 0.000 -0.10896 -0.03791 
Role duality  -0.04887 0.026309 -1.86 0.064 -0.10051 0.002763 
Audit committee  -0.00653 0.015668 -0.42 0.677 -0.03728 0.024223 
Credit and investment 
committee  -0.01878 0.010854 -1.73 0.084 -0.04008 0.002521 
Capital ratio 0.073185 0.049264 1.49 0.138 -0.0235 0.169873 
Non-performing loan  -0.10646 0.040806 -2.61 0.009 -0.18655 -0.02637 
Capital adequacy ration  -0.00225 0.051147 -0.04 0.965 -0.10264 0.098132 
Liquidity risk  0.024802 0.0257 0.97 0.335 -0.02564 0.075243 
Capital risk  -0.08005 0.037357 -2.14 0.032 -0.15337 -0.00674 
Credit risk  -0.60674 0.166433 -3.65 0.000 -0.93339 -0.28008 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.008226 0.005598 1.47 0.142 -0.00276 0.019213 
Risk committee  -0.00484 0.014093 -0.34 0.731 -0.0325 0.022817 
Bank type -0.0334 0.012091 -2.76 0.006 -0.05713 -0.00967 
Financial crisis 0.078491 0.010169 7.72 0.000 0.058534 0.098449 
Government ownership -0.04264 0.01366 -3.12 0.002 -0.06945 -0.01583 
Bank size 0.018815 0.003154 5.96 0.000 0.012624 0.025005 
_cons 0.08144 0.054571 1.49 0.136 -0.02566 0.188545 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared 0.2265 
 
Regarding table 5-21 and table 5-22 it was noted that the R squared is 31.49%and 24.77 % 
respectively. As shown in the tables, the non-executive board member, financial crisis, and 
bank size are significantly affecting the ROE in Islamic banks and conventional banks, the 
positive direction of association with bank size means that the larger bank size the higher 
bank performance. Interestingly in this model, the role duality, gender diversity, audit 
committee, LDR, NPL, credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk are insignificantly associated 
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with ROE in both type of banks; Islamic banks and conventional banks. In conventional 
banks, the board size, CEO turnover, risk committee, and government ownership are 
significantly associated with ROE and vice versa with Islamic banks. In Islamic banks, it was 
noted that the credit and investment committee, capital ratio, and capital adequacy ratio are 
significantly associated with ROE but are not significant in Conventional banks.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5-21 Model (3) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROE 
Islamic Banks  
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  0.008777 0.005756 1.52 0.129 -0.00256 0.020112 
Non-executive board member  -0.64342 0.13752 -4.68 0.000 -0.91421 -0.37263 
Gender diversity  0.037081 0.038253 0.97 0.333 -0.03824 0.112405 
CEO turnover  -0.02367 0.044267 -0.53 0.593 -0.11084 0.063498 
Role duality  -0.0951 0.094909 -1 0.317 -0.28198 0.09179 
Audit committee  -0.02538 0.034323 -0.74 0.46 -0.09296 0.042208 
Credit and investment committee  -0.04743 0.020399 -2.32 0.021 -0.08759 -0.00726 
Capital ratio 0.395124 0.177705 2.22 0.027 0.045206 0.745041 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.059078 0.054301 1.09 0.278 -0.04785 0.166001 
Risk committee  0.031945 0.035281 0.91 0.366 -0.03753 0.101417 
Non-performing loan  -0.20061 0.250754 -0.8 0.424 -0.69437 0.29315 
Capital adequacy ration  -0.32952 0.170404 -1.93 0.054 -0.66506 0.006026 
Credit risk  -0.55956 0.431613 -1.3 0.196 -1.40945 0.290325 
Capital risk  -0.07529 0.097856 -0.77 0.442 -0.26798 0.117395 
Liquidity risk  0.289091 0.214067 1.35 0.178 -0.13243 0.710609 
Financial crisis 0.091009 0.019649 4.63 0.000 0.052319 0.129699 
Government ownership 0.011398 0.033143 0.34 0.731 -0.05386 0.076659 
Bank size 0.023107 0.010227 2.26 0.025 0.00297 0.043244 
_cons 0.331508 0.154052 2.15 0.032 0.028166 0.634851 
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Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- square 0.3149 
 
 
Table 5-22 Model (3) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROE 
Conventional Banks Data 
ROE Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  -0.00626 0.001845 -3.39 0.001 -0.00988 -0.00264 
Non-executive board member  -0.0403 0.020239 -1.99 0.046 -0.07997 -0.00063 
Gender diversity  0.009881 0.015804 0.63 0.532 -0.0211 0.040857 
CEO turnover  -0.08079 0.039511 -2.04 0.041 -0.15823 -0.00335 
Role duality  0.023276 0.031987 0.73 0.467 -0.03942 0.085969 
Audit committee  0.020412 0.015346 1.33 0.183 -0.00967 0.050489 
Credit and investment 
committee  
-0.0052 0.005405 -0.96 0.336 -0.0158 0.00539 
Capital ratio 0.02256 0.051781 0.44 0.663 -0.07893 0.124048 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.002482 0.005193 0.48 0.633 -0.0077 0.01266 
Risk committee  -0.03487 0.013201 -2.64 0.008 -0.06075 -0.009 
Non-performing loan  -0.1148 0.086359 -1.33 0.184 -0.28406 0.054465 
Capital adequacy ration  0.048605 0.032074 1.52 0.13 -0.01426 0.111468 
Credit risk  -0.78324 0.612242 -1.28 0.201 -1.98321 0.41673 
Capital risk  -0.08551 0.057475 -1.49 0.137 -0.19816 0.027139 
Liquidity risk  0.009198 0.0101 0.91 0.362 -0.0106 0.028993 
Financial crisis 0.069151 0.017647 3.92 0.000 0.034565 0.103738 
Government ownership -0.02499 0.006545 -3.82 0.000 -0.03782 -0.01217 
Bank size 0.017832 0.003016 5.91 0.000 0.011921 0.023742 
_cons 0.056145 0.031769 1.77 0.077 -0.00612 0.118411 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- square 0.2477 
 
As indicated in table 5-23 which shows the relationship between corporate governance and 
risk management with ROA, the adjusted R squared is 15.75% at 1% significance level. It 
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was found that the non-executive board member, CEO turnover, capital ratio, audit 
committee, LDR, credit risk, bank size, government ownership, and financial crisis are 
significantly associated with ROA. Regarding the role duality, board size, gender diversity, 
credit and investment committee, risk committee, capital adequacy ratio, non-performing 
loan, liquidity risk, capital risk, and bank type, all of them are not significantly associated 
with ROA in this model.  
 
Table 5-23 Model (3) OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROA 
All Banks Data 
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  0.0000323 0.001037 0.03 0.975 -0.002 0.002068 
Non-executive board member  -0.05652 0.013566 -4.17 0.000 -0.08315 -0.0299 
Gender diversity  0.007445 0.004764 1.56 0.118 -0.00191 0.016795 
CEO turnover  -0.02782 0.01035 -2.69 0.007 -0.04814 -0.00751 
Role duality  0.010588 0.017877 0.59 0.554 -0.0245 0.045674 
Audit committee  -0.01331 0.005753 -2.31 0.021 -0.0246 -0.00202 
Credit and investment 
committee  
-0.00489 0.003521 -1.39 0.165 -0.0118 0.002023 
Capital ratio 0.051087 0.024577 2.08 0.038 0.00285 0.099324 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.003491 0.001645 2.12 0.034 0.000263 0.006719 
Risk committee  0.002246 0.003827 0.59 0.558 -0.00527 0.009757 
Non-performing loan  0.02834 0.030627 0.93 0.355 -0.03177 0.08845 
Capital adequacy ration  0.021642 0.016438 1.32 0.188 -0.01062 0.053904 
Credit risk  -0.13078 0.071376 -1.83 0.067 -0.27087 0.009303 
Capital risk  -0.02452 0.031667 -0.77 0.439 -0.08667 0.03763 
Liquidity risk  0.004854 0.005895 0.82 0.41 -0.00671 0.016423 
Bank type -0.00509 0.003976 -1.28 0.201 -0.0129 0.002712 
Financial crisis 0.02182 0.003311 6.59 0.000 0.015321 0.028319 
Government ownership -0.01486 0.003036 -4.89 0.000 -0.02082 -0.0089 
Bank size 0.005163 0.001405 3.68 0.000 0.002406 0.007919 
_cons 0.013818 0.018286 0.76 0.45 -0.02207 0.049707 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- square 0.1575 
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Regarding table 5-24 and table 5-25, it was noted that the adjusted R squared is 26.13% and 
18.05% respectively. As shown in the tables, the board size, non-executive board member, 
risk committee, financial crisis, and bank size are significantly associated with ROA in 
Islamic banks and Conventional banks. It was found that the role duality, gender diversity, 
credit and investment committee, capital ratio, NPL, LDR, credit risk, capital risk, and 
liquidity risk are insignificantly associated with ROA in both type of banks; Islamic and 
Conventional banks. In Conventional banks, the CEO turnover, capital adequacy ratio, and 
government ownership are significantly associated with ROA and vice versa in Islamic banks. 
The audit committee in Islamic banks is significantly associated with ROA, and insignificant 
in Conventional banks. 
Table 5-24 Model (3) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROA 
Islamic Banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  0.006251 0.003107 2.01 0.044 0.000162 0.01234 
Non-executive board member  -0.29608 0.070617 -4.19 0.000 -0.43449 -0.15767 
Gender diversity  0.022096 0.031914 0.69 0.489 -0.04045 0.084646 
CEO turnover  -0.01385 0.018255 -0.76 0.448 -0.04963 0.021929 
Role duality  0.023337 0.022358 1.04 0.297 -0.02048 0.067159 
Audit committee  -0.03625 0.013974 -2.59 0.009 -0.06364 -0.00886 
Credit and investment committee  -0.00939 0.012098 -0.78 0.438 -0.0331 0.01432 
Capital ratio 0.111433 0.08943 1.25 0.213 -0.06385 0.286713 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.016246 0.014285 1.14 0.255 -0.01175 0.044243 
Risk committee  0.025506 0.015361 1.66 0.097 -0.0046 0.055613 
Non-performing loan  0.005795 0.038598 0.15 0.881 -0.06985 0.081445 
Capital adequacy ration  -0.01397 0.090912 -0.15 0.878 -0.19215 0.16422 
Credit risk  -0.04024 0.185754 -0.22 0.829 -0.40431 0.323833 
Capital risk  -0.0423 0.033191 -1.27 0.203 -0.10735 0.022756 
Liquidity risk  0.090196 0.065439 1.38 0.168 -0.03806 0.218453 
Financial crisis 0.037843 0.009749 3.88 0.000 0.018736 0.05695 
Government ownership 0.025025 0.0223 1.12 0.262 -0.01868 0.068733 
Bank size 0.007169 0.003822 1.88 0.061 -0.00032 0.014659 
_cons 0.129461 0.076707 1.69 0.091 -0.02088 0.279804 
Prob. >F 0.000 
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Adjusted R- square 0.2613 
 
Table 5-25 Model (3) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROA 
Conventional Banks  
ROA Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  -0.00187 0.000777 -2.41 0.016 -0.0034 -0.00035 
Non-executive board member  -0.01789 0.00965 -1.85 0.064 -0.03684 0.00106 
Gender diversity  0.004539 0.005241 0.87 0.387 -0.00575 0.014832 
CEO turnover  -0.02481 0.013142 -1.89 0.06 -0.05062 0.001002 
Role duality  0.0059 0.006159 0.96 0.338 -0.0062 0.017995 
Audit committee  0.001144 0.00299 0.38 0.702 -0.00473 0.007016 
Credit and investment 
committee  
-0.00071 0.003117 -0.23 0.819 -0.00684 0.005407 
Capital ratio 0.000526 0.019591 0.03 0.979 -0.03795 0.039 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.001428 0.001325 1.08 0.281 -0.00117 0.00403 
Risk committee  -0.00861 0.003 -2.87 0.004 -0.0145 -0.00271 
Non-performing loan  0.005407 0.030415 0.18 0.859 -0.05433 0.06514 
Capital adequacy ration  0.027258 0.015629 1.74 0.082 -0.00344 0.057953 
Credit risk  -0.18294 0.118146 -1.55 0.122 -0.41497 0.049087 
Capital risk  0.029036 0.024384 1.19 0.234 -0.01885 0.076925 
Liquidity risk  0.004391 0.003827 1.15 0.252 -0.00313 0.011907 
Financial crisis 0.014704 0.002603 5.65 0.000 0.009593 0.019816 
Government ownership -0.00874 0.002996 -2.92 0.004 -0.01462 -0.00285 
Bank size 0.004666 0.001638 2.85 0.005 0.001449 0.007884 
_cons -0.0001 0.014058 -0.01 0.994 -0.02771 0.027505 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- square 0.1805 
5.5.4 OLS results for regression model (4) 
As mentioned in the methodology chapter, model (4) will investigate the association between 
corporate governance and risk management measured by NPL. This section discusses the 
results of the OLS test for model (4). There are three tables from 5-26 to 5-28 showing this 
association as follows:  
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As presented in table 5-26, the adjusted R squared is 15.22% at 1% significance level. It was 
found that the board size, role duality, and risk committee are associated negatively and 
significantly with NPL at 5% significant level. In addition, capital ratio and gender diversity 
are associated negatively and significantly with NPL at 10% significant level. Furthermore, 
the credit and investment committee is positively and significantly associated with NPL at 
5% significant level. Loan to deposit ratio is negatively and significantly associated at 1% 
significance level. The audit committee is associated positively and significantly at 1% 
significance level. In addition, there is no significant association between NPL and both non-
executive board member and CEO turnover at any level of significance. Interestingly, two of 
the control variables; bank type and financial crisis are not significantly associated with the 
NPL, but the other two variables; government ownership and bank size are significantly 
associated with NPL at 1% significance level     
 
Table 5-26 Model (4) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance with Risk Management NPL 
All Banks Data  
NPL Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  -0.0048 0.002271 -2.11 0.035 -0.00925 -0.00034 
Non-executive board member   0.026591 0.033906 0.78 0.433 -0.03995 0.093136 
Gender diversity  -0.02709 0.013989 -1.94 0.053 -0.05454 0.000369 
CEO- turnover  -0.00062 0.015058 -0.04 0.967 -0.03017 0.028932 
Role duality  -0.05258 0.021815 -2.41 0.016 -0.09539 -0.00976 
Audit committee 0.056992 0.012844 4.44 0.000 0.031785 0.0822 
Credit and investment 
committee 0.019804 0.008978 2.21 0.028 0.002184 0.037424 
Capital ratio -0.03424 0.019168 -1.79 0.074 -0.07186 0.003381 
Loan to deposit ratio  -0.02152 0.004593 -4.69 0.000 -0.03053 -0.01251 
Risk committee  -0.02458 0.011652 -2.11 0.035 -0.04744 -0.00171 
Bank type 0.001333 0.009416 0.14 0.887 -0.01715 0.019813 
Financial crisis -0.00496 0.00846 -0.59 0.558 -0.02156 0.011647 
Government ownership 0.039124 0.011226 3.49 0.001 0.017091 0.061158 
Bank size -0.02279 0.002179 -10.46 0.000 -0.02707 -0.01851 
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_cons 0.28404 0.040531 7.01 0.000 0.204491 0.363588 
Prob. >F 0.000 
 
Adjusted R- squared 0.1522 
 
As presented in table 5-27 and table 5-28, the adjusted R squared is 17.98% and 30.76% at 
1% significance level. It was found that the gender diversity, bank size are significantly 
associated with NPL in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks. Interestingly, the 
association direction between bank size and NPL is negative in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks, which means the larger the bank size, the lower NPL and better risk 
management. In addition, there is no significant association between NPL and both non-
executive board member and CEO turnover at any level of significance in both of Islamic 
banks and Conventional banks. The capital ratio, credit and investment committee in Islamic 
banks are significant with NPL, and vice versa in Conventional banks. Furthermore, it was 
found that the board size, role duality, audit committee, risk committee, LDR, government 
ownership, and financial crisis are significantly associated with NPL in Conventional banks, 
and vice versa in Islamic banks.    
 
Table 5-27 Model (4) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance with Risk Management NPL 
Islamic Banks  
NPL Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  -0.00459 0.006278 -0.73 0.465 -0.01696 0.007766 
Non-executive board member   -0.13349 0.113732 -1.17 0.242 -0.35742 0.090435 
Gender diversity  -0.11724 0.04552 -2.58 0.011 -0.20687 -0.02762 
CEO- turnover  -0.01465 0.03509 -0.42 0.677 -0.08373 0.054443 
Role duality  -0.01274 0.053029 -0.24 0.810 -0.11715 0.091664 
Audit committee 0.000188 0.018196 0.01 0.992 -0.03564 0.036015 
Credit and investment 
committee 0.103107 0.022366 4.61 0.000 0.05907 0.147144 
Capital ratio -0.13428 0.041533 -3.23 0.001 -0.21606 -0.05251 
Loan to deposit ratio  0.036696 0.058866 0.62 0.534 -0.07921 0.152599 
Risk committee  0.004594 0.021369 0.21 0.830 -0.03748 0.046669 
Financial crisis 0.018825 0.014933 1.26 0.209 -0.01058 0.048227 
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Government ownership -0.04003 0.037132 -1.08 0.282 -0.11314 0.033082 
Bank size -0.01077 0.003502 -3.08 0.02 -0.01767 -0.00388 
_cons 0.278265 0.148388 1.88 0.062 -0.0139 0.57043 
Prob. >F 0.000 
R- squared 0.1798 
 
Table 5-28 Model (4) 
OLS Regression Results 
Corporate Governance with Risk Management NPL 
Conventional Banks  
NPL Coef. Std. Err. T P>t 
[95% 
Conf. 
Interval] 
Board size  -0.0071 0.001106 -6.43 0.000 -0.00927 -0.00494 
Non-executive board member   0.025882 0.035387 0.73 0.465 -0.04348 0.09524 
Gender diversity  -0.0187 0.00474 -3.94 0.000 -0.02799 -0.00941 
CEO- turnover  0.004519 0.013838 0.33 0.744 -0.0226 0.03164 
Role duality  -0.03287 0.012234 -2.69 0.007 -0.05684 -0.00889 
Audit committee 0.060633 0.005554 10.92 0.000 0.049747 0.071518 
Credit and investment committee -0.00736 0.009007 -0.82 0.414 -0.02501 0.010292 
Capital ratio 0.021155 0.040582 0.52 0.602 -0.05838 0.100694 
Loan to deposit ratio  -0.03002 0.002587 -11.6 0.000 -0.03509 -0.02495 
Risk committee  -0.03172 0.005121 -6.19 0.000 -0.04176 -0.02168 
Financial crisis -0.0184 0.008075 -2.28 0.023 -0.03422 -0.00257 
Government ownership 0.044111 0.008083 5.46 0.000 0.028269 0.059954 
Bank size -0.02598 0.00175 -14.84 0.000 -0.02941 -0.02254 
_cons 0.349572 0.038749 9.02 0.000 0.273626 0.425519 
Prob. >F 0.000 
Adjusted R- squared 0.3076 
5.6 Discussion of statistical results 
This section discusses the statistical results to identify the determinants of association 
between corporate governance and risk management and bank performance by testing the 
hypotheses of the current study. The following discussion will show the results of the four 
models as follows; once showing the data for all banks, , and then a comparison between the 
results of Islamic banks and conventional banks. Furthermore, as mentioned in the following 
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sub-sections, both of bivariate and multivariate results are consistent in number of 
associations, and they are not consistent in other number of associations. In such case of 
disagreement, this study will rely on the results of multivariate results because the 
multivariate test is more reliable than the bivariate, and the multivariate test take in 
consideration number of variables which is not allowed under the bivariate test.      
5.6.1 Discussion of results of model (1) 
5.6.1/1 Results of association between corporate governance and bank performance 
ROE for all banks data 
Ten independent variables related to corporate governance have been investigated in the 
current study using bivariate and multivariate analyses. A summary of the results of the 
statistical employed techniques is presented in Table 5-29. 
Board size. As per the result, there is agreement between the bivariate and multivariate test, 
whereas the association between the board size and ROE is insignificant, which means that 
the variation in the ROE in GCC banking sector cannot be explained by the number of the 
board members. The result is consistent with Belkhir (2009), who found no significant 
relationship between board size and firm performance. The results are also in line with 
Zulkafli and Samad (2007); their findings suggest no significant relationship between the 
board size and performance measures (e.g. return on assets and Tobin’s Q). 
Furthermore, the results are inconsistent with the evidence from previous studies in different 
counties, such as; Bennedsen et al. (2004), who concluded that there is a negative association 
between board size and bank performance. Shakir (2008) found that the board size has a 
consistent negative relationship with Tobin’s Q in all regressions, and in most instances is 
statistically significant too. In addition, the results are inconsistent with Adams and Mehran 
(2005); Dwivedi and Jain (2005); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); Jensen, 1993; Kyereboah-
Coleman and Biekpe (2006); Mak and Kusnadi (2005); Sanda et al. (2003); Durgavanshi 
(2014), Fanta et al. (2013); Stepanova et al. (2012); Rachdi and Ameur (2011); Hoque and 
Muradoglu (2013). In disagreement with the result, Mollah and Zaman (2015) found that the 
effect of board size on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative.  
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Non-executive board member. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the 
Non-executive board member is significant variable. As can be seen in the table 5-29, there 
is agreement among statistical techniques about the negative significant association of non-
executive board member with bank performance measured by ROE at 99% confidence level. 
This means that the percentage of non-executive board members is negatively affecting the 
ROE, for example, the higher the percentage of non-executive board members the lower ROE 
and vice-versa. As per the result, the executive directors could positively affect the bank 
performance, as they can provide a more in-depth understanding and better information on 
which the board may base its decisions.  
This result is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2007), who found that more executive 
directors might positively affect the quality of information that reaches the board and enhance 
performance. Similarly, the result agrees with Busta (2007) UK, who found a negative 
correlation between the non-executive board member and performance. In the same line with 
the result, Pathan and Faff (2012) found that the independent directors decrease bank 
performance. This conclusion comes in conformity with Hoque and Muradoglu (2013), who 
found that the percentage of independent directors in the board has a negative and significant 
coefficient with performance measured by (annual stock market return and ROA). In general 
and similar to this study conclusion, Erkens et al. (2012) found that firms with independent 
boards experienced worse stock returns during the crisis.  
On the other hand, the result disagrees with Al-Hawary (2011), who found that the percentage 
of non-executive directors had a statistically significant positive effect on performance. 
Furthermore and inconsistent with the result, Adams (2012) shows that banks with more 
independent board members performed worse during the crisis; this finding is consistent with 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For non-banks, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no significant relation between the percentage of outside directors and firm 
value.  
Gender diversity. As seen from the table, the bivariate analysis indicated that the association 
between the gender diversity and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and 
significant at 5%. However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the 
gender diversity and ROE is insignificant at any significant level, which means that the 
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existence of female members on the board cannot explain the variation in the ROE in the 
GCC banking sector. This result reflects the culture of GCC countries, whereas the female 
members on the board are not playing advanced roles in which they can positively affect the 
performance, unlike females in western countries. 
This result is consistent with Wachudi and Mboya (2012) who concluded that board gender 
diversity has no significant effect on the performance of banks. In the same line, Hoque and 
Muradoglu (2013) concluded that the existence of female directors on the board does not add 
value to the board. Inconsistent with the results, Stepanova et al. (2012) found that there is a 
positive relationship between gender diversity and performance, which is due to female 
directors providing banks with better monitoring which leads to better performance.  
Furthermore and disagree with the result, Low et al. (2015) who concluded that increasing 
numbers of female directors on the board has a positive effect on firm performance, as 
measured by ROE. García-Mecaa et al. (2015), found that female member on the board 
increases bank performance, while national diversity inhibits it. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
and Ahern and Dittmar (2012) noted that there is a negative relationship between female 
gender in the board and profitability. The interpretation of this result suggests that female 
directors engage in excessive monitoring that decreases shareholder value (Almazan and 
Suarez (2003); Adams and Ferreira (2007)). In relation to investment, females make poorer 
decisions, as they face greater obstacles compared to men in obtaining information about 
investment projects (Bharat et al. (2009)). 
CEO-turnover. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the replacement of 
CEO is a significant variable at 1% significance level, with negative direction. As per the 
result, the non-replacement of CEO is significantly associated with lower bank performance 
measured by ROE. This result can be explained by stating that the non-replacement of CEO 
during the year is related to lower ROE. On the other hand, the replacement of CEO during 
the year is related to better performance, this result is explained in that the new CEO being 
more active and motivated to achieve the bank’s goals and objectives. Furthermore, the new 
CEO is coming from an outside environment with different knowledge and experience that is 
necessary to enhance and develop bank performance.   
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In line with the results, there is a group of literature that found that there are significant 
positive changes in firm performance when CEO departures were followed by the 
appointment of a new CEO from outside the firm, Borokhovich et al. (1996), Farrell and 
Whidbee (2003) or Huson et al. (2004). Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) and 
Huson et al. (2004) concluded that the CEO departure from his position might be due to 
retirement or movement to an external position. As a result, the departures are not a sign of 
poor performance, and consequently, firms’ future performance is expected to show smaller 
variations when compared with unexpected departures.  
On the other hand, the result is inconsistent with a group of previous literature, which found 
that the CEO-turnover is negatively affecting the bank performance. The board replaces a 
poorly performing CEO to enhance and develop the firm’s performance, Huson et al. (2001); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001). The improvements of shareholders’ wealth and business 
operations follow CEO-turnover (Denis and Denis 1995; Huson et al. 2004).  
Role duality. As per the results indicated in the table, the bivariate analysis indicated that the 
association between the role duality and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and 
significant at 5%. However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the 
role duality and ROE is insignificant, which means that the change in role duality cannot 
explain the changes in ROE.    
The multivariate result is consistent with (Durgavanshi 2014) who found that the separation 
of board chairman and CEO does not have a statistically significant effect on the financial 
performance.  In line with this result, Hoque and Muradoglu (2013) who concluded that there 
is role duality in 49% of the sample, and the duality is not significant for the stock market 
return and consequently bank performance. 
Furthermore and inconsistence with the results, Al-Hawary (2011) found that the combination 
between the two positions of chairman and executive manager in one individual has had a 
positive effect on bank performance, as role duality may be attributed to the family ownership 
which characterizes Jordanian banks. In addition, role duality enables the CEO to act rapidly 
and may provide strong leadership (Brickley et al., 1997). Furthermore, role duality creates a 
strong individual power base, which could affect the effective control exercised by the board 
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(e.g. Donaldson and Davis (1991); Jensen and Meckling (1976); Fama and Jensen (1983); 
Whittington 1993).  
Audit committee. As indicated in table 5-29, the audit committee is insignificantly associated 
with bank performance measured by ROE. As per the result, the existence of audit committee 
not affect the ROE significantly. The result can be explained by stating that the audit 
committee in the GCC banking sector still does not play the efficient and effectiveness role 
in handling of internal control weaknesses and risk areas, and ensuring the reliability of its 
financial reporting.  
Consistent with the result, Durgavanshi (2014) who found that there is no significant 
relationship between the existence of an audit committee and both Return on Equity ROE and 
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS). In line with the result, Kajola (2008) who investigated 
the relationship between the audit committee and the performance and concluded that the 
audit committees occupied by a majority of outside members have no influence on the firm’s 
performance. In agreement with the result, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) reported evidence 
indicating that the independence of the audit committee members has no effect on the 
probability of earnings restatement.  
Inconsistent with the result, Klein (2002) reported a negative correlation between earnings 
management and audit committee independence. In agreement with this conclusion, Fanta et 
al. (2013), found that the existence of an audit committee in the board had a statistically 
significant negative effect on bank performance. Similarly, Anderson et al. (2004), found that 
fully independent audit committees are associated with a significantly lower cost of debt 
financing.  
Credit and investment committee. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the 
credit and investment committee is negatively and significantly associated with the ROE at 
(1% and 5% significant level respectively). As per the result, the existence of such a 
committee significantly affects the bank performance by a lower ROE percentage. In addition, 
this committee does not play an effective role in maximizing the bank’s return. As per the 
review of GCC banks’ annual reports, it was noted that 539 out of 900 observations have 
established a “credit and investment committee” to play an important role as a control tool, 
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and carry out one or more functions. These functions include approving extension or renewal 
of credit facilities, granting temporary excesses to customers with credit facilities approved 
by the board, approving early repayments of facilities, monitoring the performance and 
quality of the Group’s credit portfolio; and overseeing the administration and effectiveness 
of and compliance with, the credit policies through the review of such processes, reports and 
other information as it deems appropriate. Based on the above, this variable will be used as a 
proxy for corporate governance, whereas this result could be used by other researchers in 
future studies for comparison. 
Capital ratio. As seen from the table, the bivariate analysis indicated that the association 
between the capital ratio and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and significant 
at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the capital ratio 
and ROE is insignificant. Relying on the multivariate result, there is no significant association 
between capital ratio and ROE, which means that the changes in capital ratio cannot explain 
the variation in the ROE in the GCC banking sector.  
Loan to deposit ratio (LDR). The multivariate analyses indicate that the loan to deposit ratio 
is positively and significantly associated with the ROE at 10% significance level. This result 
could be explained in that banks with effective management can keep the LDR and bank 
returns on high level, however the ineffective management cannot keep control over the ROE 
to be in high level at the same time cannot promote their loans to investors. The result disagree 
with Fanta et al. (2013) who found that the loan to deposits ratio does not have statistical and 
significant relationship with bank performance.  
Risk committee. As indicated in the table, the bivariate analysis indicated that the association 
between the risk committee and bank performance measured by ROE is significant at 1%. 
However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the risk committee and 
ROE is insignificant, which means that the risk committee cannot explain the variation in the 
ROE in the GCC banking sector. This result can be explained by stating that the concept of 
risk management in the GCC banking sector is not matured enough to affect the performance. 
Inconsistent with the multivariate result, Battaglia and Gallo (2015) who found that there is a 
positive relationship between the size of the risk committee and ROE and ROA and suggests 
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that, over the period 2007–2011, banks with a larger risk committee perform better in terms 
of profitability.  
Furthermore and consistent with the interpretation, Mongiardino and Plath (2010) who found 
that the risk governance in large banks seems to have improved only to a limited extent despite 
the increased regulatory pressure induced by the credit crisis. In addition, they concluded that 
the better banking risk governance needs to have at least a dedicated board-level risk 
committee, and the majority should be independent. Furthermore, they found that there were 
only a small number of banks to follow best practices in 2007. Even though most large banks 
had a dedicated risk committee, most of them met very infrequently. 
Furthermore and in line with the result, Aebi et al. (2012) found that merely having a risk 
committee does not necessarily help banks’ crisis performance. However, having a more 
dedicated committee that meets more frequently and is larger seems to positively affect the 
banks’ performance in the crisis. 
Bank type. Both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the bank type is 
significantly associated with bank performance at 1% significance level with negative 
direction. The result suggest that the conventional banks were significantly associated with 
lower performance. Which means that conventional banks in GCC need to exert more efforts 
to enhance their performance and increase their returns by attracting more customers and 
investors to their products.    
Inconsistence with the result, Johnes et al. (2014) who compare the performance of Islamic 
and conventional banks prior to, during and immediately after the 2008 financial crisis (2004-
2009) and found no significant difference in mean between conventional and Islamic banks 
when efficiency is measured, relative to a common frontier. Furthermore and not in 
correspondence with us, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) found that the financial crisis had a 
negative impact on profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks, but the Islamic banks 
were more profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis although not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, Siraj and Pillai (2012) investigated the differences in 
the growth of performance indicators of conventional banks and Islamic banks in the GCC 
region. The study revealed that Islamic banks are more equity financed than conventional 
banks. In addition, conventional banks have growth in revenue during the period, but could 
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not achieve improved profitability due to higher provisions towards credit losses and 
impairment losses. 
Financial crisis. As per the result indicated in the table, there is disagreement between 
bivariate and multivariate analyses, whereas the bivariate analysis indicated that the 
association between the financial crisis and performance measured by ROE is negative and 
significant at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis indicates that the association between 
the financial crisis and ROE is positive and significant, at 1% significance level. The results 
suggest that the years before the crisis are more significant and related to higher return on 
equity. This result is in harmony with the idea that the performance before the crisis should 
be better than after the crisis, because banks take some time to recover after a crisis.   
Generally, there is agreement with Aebi et al. (2012), who concluded that for the banks to be 
better prepared to face the financial crisis, they have to significantly improve the quality and 
profile of their corporate governance and risk management function. Furthermore and in line 
with this study, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) found that the financial crisis had a negative 
impact on profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks, but the Islamic banks were 
more profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis although not statistically 
significant. 
Government ownership. As per the result indicated in the table, the bivariate analysis 
indicated that the association between the government ownership and bank performance 
measured by ROE is insignificant. However, the multivariate analysis indicated that that the 
association between government ownership and ROE is negative and significant at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that the non-government banks are significantly 
associated with lower return on equity. This result comes in match with the idea that the 
performance of banks owned by government is better than that of banks owned by non-
government in their performance. Furthermore this result highlights that the non-government 
banks need to develop and enhance their performance.  
Inconsistence with the result, Farazi et al. (2011) who found that state banks are significantly 
less profitable than private banks in the non-GCC region. This result seems to be due to a 
combination of policy mandates and operational inefficiencies. In addition, La Porta et al. 
(2002) show that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent 
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financial development and GDP growth. Barth et al. (2007) find similar results in a study 
focused on banking regulation. However, Yeiati et al. (2007) revisit La Porta et al. (2002) by 
using more recent data, better estimation techniques, and additional controls, and show that 
the evidence that states that bank prevalence leads to lower growth and financial development 
is not strong. Two recent papers (Korner and Schnabel (2010) and Andrianova et al. (2010)) 
reach similar conclusions. They find a negative relationship between a high fraction of public 
ownership in the banking system and growth when financial development and the quality of 
political institutions are low, conditions that tend to prevail in developing countries.  
However, similar to Levy-Yeyati et al. (2007), they do not find a negative impact of public 
ownership and growth in developed countries. They stress that the quality of institutions and 
governance are important in studying the impact of public ownership on growth. 
Bank size. The result revealed that there is agreement between both of bivariate and 
multivariate analyses, whereas bank size is positively and significantly associated with bank 
performance measured by ROE at 1% significance level. The results suggest that the larger 
the bank size the higher ROE, and the smaller the bank size the lower the ROE. The result 
can be explained by stating that the higher bank return on equity is likely to be due to 
economies of scale and larger market share related to the larger banks. Furthermore, the result 
can be explained by stating that the banks with large size have huge structure and have the 
ability to nominate a very good qualified and experienced staff; this staff has the required 
knowledge and experience in handling and managing assets and risks. 
The result is consistent with Fanta et al. (2013) who found that the bank size had a statistically 
significant positive effect on bank performance measured using ROE, implying that large 
banks enjoy better profits than smaller banks. This benefit is likely to be due to economies of 
scale and larger market share possessed by the larger banks. Furthermore, the result in 
compliance with the results of Tomar et al. (2012). Similar to the above, Bertay et al. (2013) 
found that banks with large absolute size tended to be more profitable, as indicated by the 
return on assets.  
Inconsistent with the results, Al-Hawary, (2011) found that there is no statistical significant 
effect in Tobin's Q (p =0.796).  
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Table 5-29 
Model (1) Summary of Results 
Corporate Governance with ROE 
All Banks Data 
Independent Variables 
Bivariate analysis 
OLS Pearson  T-test Mann 
Whitney 
Board size      
Non-executive board member   (-) **   (-) *** 
Gender diversity    (-) **  
CEO- turnover   (+) *** (-) *** (-) *** 
Role duality   (+) * (-) **  
Audit committee  (+) *   
Credit and investment committee  (+) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Capital ratio (-) ***    
Loan to deposit ratio     (+)* 
Risk committee   (+)*** (-) ***  
Bank type  (+)*** (-) *** (-) *** 
Financial crisis  (-) *** (-) *** (+)*** 
Government ownership    (-) *** 
Bank size (+)***   (+)*** 
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).            ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level 
(2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
5.6.1/2 Results of association between corporate governance and bank performance 
ROE for Islamic banks and conventional banks 
As per table 5-30, which shows a comparison between the results of Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks, the results will be as follow: 
Board size, it was insignificantly associated with ROE in both Islamic banks and 
conventional banks. In general, the result agrees with Belkhir (2009) and Zulkafli and Samad 
(2007), who concluded that there is an insignificant relationship between board size and firm 
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performance. Inconsistent with the result, Mollah and Zaman (2015) found that the effect of 
board size on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative.  
Non-executive board member, as seen from table 5-30, in Islamic banks there is a negative 
and significant association between the percentage of non-executive board members and 
ROE; it means that the higher the percentage of non-executive board members, the less ROE 
and vice-versa. On the other hand, it was concluded that in Islamic banks the executive 
directors could positively affect the bank performance, as they have a greater understanding 
about the business and better information on which the board may base its decisions. 
Regarding the Conventional banks, this relationship was insignificant. In general this result 
gives us an indication that the non-executive directors in Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks in the GCC need to be more dedicated and qualified in order to affect the performance 
positively. Mollah and Zaman (2015) are in agreement with the results, whereas they found 
that the effect of board independence on the performance of Islamic banks is overall negative.  
Gender diversity, as seen from table 5-30, in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks, 
the association between the gender diversity and ROE is insignificant at any significant level, 
which means that the nominating of female members in the board cannot explain the variation 
in ROE. 
CEO-turnover, as per table 5-30, the replacement of the CEO is insignificant in Islamic 
banks. However, the association is negative and significant with ROE in Conventional banks, 
which means the replacement of the CEO is significantly associated with better bank 
performance measured by ROE.    
Role duality, audit committee and LDR, as seen from table 5-30, the association between 
role duality, audit committee, and LDR with ROE is insignificant in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks. This means that the role duality and the existence of an audit committee 
and LDR cannot explain the changes in ROE in the overall GCC banking sector.    
Credit and investment committee, as shown in table 5-30, credit and investment committee 
is negatively and significantly associated with the ROE in Islamic banks and insignificant in 
Conventional banks. There is an indication from the result that the existence of this committee 
in the GCC banking sector is not matured enough to enhance and develop the ROE. In 
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addition, in Islamic banks, this committee is not playing an effective role in maximizing the 
bank’s return.  
Capital ratio, as shown in table 5-30, in Islamic banks there is a positive and significant 
association between capital ratio and ROE, which means that the higher percentage of capital 
ratio is related to better bank performance measured by ROE. However, this relationship is 
insignificant in Conventional banks. 
Financial crisis, as seen from table 5-30, the association between the financial crisis and 
ROE is positive and significant at 1% significance level in both of Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks.  The results suggest that years before the crisis are more significant and 
related to higher ROE. This results in accordance with the idea that the performance before 
the crisis should have been better than after the crisis because banks took some time to recover 
after the crisis in the entire GCC banking sector.   
Government ownership, from table 5-30, the association between government ownership 
and ROE is negative and significant at 1% significance level in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks. This result suggests that banks owned by non-government are more 
significant and related to lower return on equity in the GCC banks. This result comes in 
agreement with the idea that the performance of banks owned by government is better than 
that of banks owned by non-government.  
Bank size, from table 5-30, the bank size is positively and significantly associated with bank 
performance measured by ROE at 1% significance level in all GCC banks. The results suggest 
that the larger the bank size, the higher the ROE and the smaller the bank size, the lower the 
ROE.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Page 160 of 272 
 
Table 5-30 
Model (1): Summary of Results 
Corporate Governance with ROE 
(All Banks Data- Islamic Banks – conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All Banks Data  Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Board size     
Non-executive board member   (-) *** (-) ***  
Gender diversity     
CEO- turnover  (-) ***  (-) ** 
Role duality     
Audit committee    
Credit and investment committee (-) ** (-) **  
Capital ratio  (+) *  
Loan to deposit ratio (LDR) (+)*   
Risk committee    (-) *** 
Bank type (-) *** -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership (-) *** (-) *** (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
The hypothesis test results based on the statistical results of Model (1) of the association 
between corporate governance and bank performance measured by ROE will be as follow;  
H1.1 There is significant association between role duality and ROE  Rejected 
H1.2 
There is insignificant association between non-executive board 
member and ROE  Rejected 
H1.3 There is insignificant association between gender diversity and ROE  accepted 
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H1.4 There is significant association between board size and ROE  Rejected 
H1.5 There is significant association between CEO-turnover and ROE  Accepted 
H1.6 There is insignificant association between audit committee and ROE  Accepted 
H1.7 There is significant association between risk committee and ROE  Rejected 
H1.8 
There is significant association between credit and investment 
committee and ROE Accepted 
H1.9 
There is significant association between capital ratio and ROE  
Rejected 
H1.10 There is significant association between (LDR) and ROE  Accepted 
5.6.1/3 Results association between corporate governance and bank performance ROA 
for (all banks data – Islamic banks – conventional banks) 
As per table 5-31, which shows a comparison between the results of Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks, the results will be as follow:  
Board size, from table 5-31 it was concluded that the board size was insignificantly 
associated with ROA in Islamic banks. However, it was negative and significant with ROA 
in conventional banks. This result can be explained by stating that in conventional banks the 
smaller board size is more focused, and related to better bank performance ROA. In general, 
this result is inconsistent with Lai and Choi (2014) who concluded that there is a statistically 
insignificant relationship between ROA and board sizes. Furthermore, this result disagrees 
with Belkhir (2009) and Zulkafli and Samad (2007) who concluded that there is an 
insignificant relationship between board size and firm performance.  
Non-executive board member, as per table 5-31 there is a negative significant association 
of non-executive board members with bank performance measured by ROA in both Islamic 
banks and Conventional banks. This result can be explained by stating that the higher the 
percentage of non-executive board members, the less ROA and vice-versa. As per the result, 
the executive directors could positively affect the bank performance, as they have a greater 
understanding and better information on which the board may base its decisions.  
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The result is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2007) who found that more executive 
directors might positively affect the quality of information that reaches the board and 
enhances performance. Similarly, the result agrees with Busta (2007) UK who found a 
negative correlation between the non-executive board member and performance. In line with 
this result, Hoque and Muradoglu (2013), found that the percentage of independent directors 
in the board has a negative and significant coefficient with performance measured by ROA. 
On the other hand, the result disagrees with Al-Hawary (2011), who found that the percentage 
of non-executive directors had a statistically significant positive effect on performance. 
Furthermore and inconsistent with the result, Adams (2012) shows that banks with more 
independent board members performed worse during the crisis; this finding is consistent with 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012).   
Gender diversity, as seen from the table 5-31, it was found that the association between the 
existence of female member on the board and ROA is insignificant in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks, which means that nominating male or female members in the board of 
all type of banks cannot explain the variation in the ROA in the GCC banking sector. This 
result agrees with Wachudi and Mboya (2012), who concluded that board gender diversity is 
insignificant with the performance of banks. In the same line, Hoque and Muradoglu (2013), 
concluded that gender diversity does not add any value to the board. Furthermore, and 
disagreeing with this result, there is a negative relationship between the presence of the female 
gender in the board and profitability (Adams and Ferreira (2009); Ahern and Dittmar (2012)). 
In addition and inconsistent with the result, García-Mecaa et al. (2015), found that gender 
diversity increases bank performance, while national diversity inhibits it.  
CEO-turnover, from the table 5-31, it was noted that in Islamic banks there is no significant 
association with ROA. However, in Conventional banks the CEO-turnover is a significant 
variable with negative direction. The result can be explained by stating that in conventional 
banks the board my replace the CEO if the board feel that the current CEO cannot achieve 
the target and enhance the bank performance, as per the result the new CEO may be more 
active and motivated to achieve the bank’s goals and objectives.  
Borokhovich et al. (1996), Farrell and Whidbee (2003) or Huson et al. (2004) agree with the 
results in Conventional banks, whereas they noted that there are significant positive changes 
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in firm performance when CEO departures were followed by the appointment of a new CEO 
from outside the firm. 
Huson et al. (2001); Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) concluded that the CEO-turnover 
negatively affects the bank performance. 
Role duality, as per the results indicated in the table 5-31, the association between the role 
duality and ROA is insignificant in Islamic banks and Conventional banks, which means that 
the duality or the separation between the two positions of chairman and CEO are not an issue 
and insignificant with bank performance measured by ROA.  Agreeing with these results, 
Durgavanshi (2014) found that the separation of board chairman and CEO does not have a 
statistically significant effect on the financial performance. Furthermore and in consistence 
with the results, Al-Hawary (2011) found that the combination between the two positions of 
chairman and executive manager in one person has had a positive effect on bank performance.  
Audit committee, as indicated in table 5-31 the audit committee is insignificantly associated 
with bank performance measured by ROA in Conventional banks. However, it is negative 
and significant in Islamic banks. The result in Conventional banks can be explained   through 
stating that the existence of an audit committee will not significantly affect the ROA because 
the audit committee in Conventional banks still does not play the efficient and effective role 
of handling the internal control, risks, and governance. Furthermore, in Islamic banks the 
existence of an audit committee adversely affects the ROA. 
Credit and investment committee, as indicated in table 5-31, in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks there is an insignificant association between this committee and ROA. 
In addition this committee is not playing an effective role in maximizing the bank’s return. 
Based on this result, the role of this committee should be enhanced in order to assist the banks 
in achieving their goals. 
Capital ratio, as seen from the table 5-31, the capital ratio is positively and significantly 
associated with bank performance measured by ROA in Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks of the GCC. This means the higher the Capital ratio, the better the bank ROA.  
Loan to deposit ratio (LDR), as mentioned in table 5-31, the LDR is insignificantly 
associated with ROA in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks. This result disagrees 
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with Fanta et al. (2013), who found that the loan to deposits ratio does not have a statistically 
significant effect on performance.  
Risk committee, as indicated in table 5-31, in Islamic banks, there is a positive and significant 
association between risk committee and ROA, which means that the existence of this 
committee in Islamic banks is related to better ROA. On the other hand, in Conventional 
banks there is a negative and significant association between risk committee and ROA, which 
means the existence of a risk committee affects the ROA adversely.  
Financial crisis, from the table 5-31, there is a positive and significant association between 
the crisis and ROA. This result comes in correspondence with the idea that the performance 
before the crisis should be better than after the crisis, because banks take some time to recover 
after a crisis. In agreement with us, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) found that the financial 
crisis had a negative impact on profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks, but the 
Islamic banks were more profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis.  
Government ownership, as mentioned in table 5-31, in Islamic banks there is a positive and 
significant association between the ownership and ROA, which means that the banks owned 
by non-government are related to higher ROA. Regarding the Conventional banks, there is 
significant association between the government ownership and ROA and it can be explained 
by stating that the banks owned by government are associated with better ROA. 
Bank size, as per table 5-31 there is complete agreement between Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks in that there is a positive and significant association between bank size 
and ROA. This results suggest that the larger the bank size, the higher the ROA and the 
smaller the bank size, the lower the ROA. 
In addition, the result indicated that the bigger banks have huge structures and have the ability 
to nominate a highly qualified and experienced staff; this staff have the required knowledge 
and experience in handling and managing assets and risks. 
The result is consistent with Fanta et al. (2013), who found that the bank size had a statistically 
significant positive effect on bank performance measured using ROE, implying that large 
banks enjoy better profits than smaller banks. This benefit is likely to be due to economies of 
scale and larger market share possessed by the larger banks. Furthermore, the result in line 
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with the results of Tomar et al. (2012). Similar to the above, Bertay, et al. (2013) found that 
banks with large absolute size tend to be more profitable as indicated by the ROA.  
 
Table 5-31 
Model (1): summary of Results 
Corporate governance with ROA 
(All banks Data- Islamic banks –Conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All Banks Data  Islamic Banks 
Conventional 
Banks 
Board size    (-) ** 
Non-executive board member   (-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Gender diversity  (+) *   
CEO- turnover  (-) **  (-) * 
Role duality     
Audit committee (-) ** (-) **  
Credit and investment committee    
Capital ratio (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
Loan to deposit ratio (LDR) (+)*   
Risk committee   (+) ** (-) *** 
Bank type  -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership (-) *** (+) * (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) *** (+) ** 
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
From the above discussion, the legitimacy and stakeholder theory can explain the relationship 
between corporate governance proxied by board size, NEBM, gender diversity, CEO-
turnover, role duality, audit committee credit and investment committee, capital ratio, LDR 
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and risk committee and bank performance. Furthermore, as per the legitimacy theory, banks 
owned by government are significantly associated with better ROE.     
The hypothesis test results based on the statistical results of Model (1) of the association 
between corporate governance and bank performance measured by ROA will be as follow:  
H1.1 There is significant association between role duality and ROA  Rejected  
H1.2 
There is insignificant association between the non-executive board 
member and ROA 
Rejected 
H1.3 
There is insignificant association between Gender diversity and 
ROA 
Rejected 
H1.4 There is significant association between board size and ROA  Rejected  
H1.5 There is significant association between CEO-turnover and ROA  Accepted 
H1.6 
There is insignificant association between audit committee and 
ROA  
Rejected 
H1.7 There is significant association between risk committee and ROA Rejected  
H1.8 
There is significant association between credit and investment 
committee and ROA Rejected  
H1.9 There is significant association between capital ratio and ROA  Accepted 
H1.10 There is significant association between LDR and ROA  Accepted 
5.6.2/1 Model (2): results of association between risk management and bank 
performance measured by ROE for all banks data 
Five independent variables related to risk management have been investigated in the current 
study using bivariate and multivariate analyses. A summary of the results of the statistical 
employed techniques is presented in Table 5-32. 
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Non-performing loan (NPL), as mentioned in the table, the bivariate analysis indicated that 
the association between the non-performing loan and bank performance measured by ROE is 
significant at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the 
non-performing loan and ROE is insignificant at any significant level, which means that the 
variation in ROE cannot be explained by the changes in non-performing loan in the GCC 
banking sector.  
In consistence with this result, Helhel (2015) investigated the impact of bank-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants on profitability of 14 private and commercial banks in Georgia 
for the period from (2009 - 2013) by panel data analysis, and found that the association 
between the non-performing loan and bank performance measured by ROE is statistically 
insignificant.   
Inconsistent with the result, Vatansever and Hepşen (2013) found that the return on equity 
positively and significantly affect the NPL ratio. In addition, Epure and Lafuente (2012) 
found that non-performing loans negatively affect the efficiency and return on assets. 
Capital adequacy ratio, both of bivariate and multivariate analyses, indicate that the CAR 
is significantly associated with bank performance measured by ROE at (1% and 10% 
significant level respectively) with different direction. The results suggest that the CAR is in 
positive and significant association with ROE, which means that the higher the CAR 
percentage, the higher the ROE. This association between CAR and ROE can be explained 
by stating that the GCC banking sector maintains control over the CAR percentage as per 
Basel I and II instructions to keep it on suitable level, in order to assess the bank’s ability to 
pay its liabilities and meet any risks which may be incurred in the future. In addition, it was 
concluded that banks that keep this percentage higher than the required level are associated 
positively with higher ROE. 
The result is consistent with Epure and Lafuente (2015) found that the capital adequacy ratio 
positively affects the net interest margin. This supports the notion that incurring monitoring 
costs and having higher levels of capitalization may enhance performance. Furthermore, 
Bateni et al. (2014) found that there is a positive and significant association between return 
on equity ROE and capital adequacy ratio (CAR).  
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Disagreeing with the result, Navapan and Tripe (2003), who found that there is a negative 
and significant association between CAR and ROE. In addition, Büyükşalvarcı and Abdioğlu, 
(2011) investigated the determinants of Turkish banks' capital adequacy ratio and its effects 
on financial positions of banks covered by the study for the period (2006 – 2010), and found 
that the return on equity has a negative and significant effect on CAR.  
Credit risk, as seen from the table, bivariate analysis indicated that the association between 
the credit risk and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and significant at 1%. 
However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the credit risk and ROE 
is insignificant, which means that the variation in the ROE in the GCC banking sector cannot 
be explained by the change in credit risk.  
Consistent and in line with the result, Sayedi (2014) found that credit risk has an insignificant 
and negative effect on profitability. In addition, banks should ensure that they continue to 
maintain a low level of credit risk in order to increase the profitability; this is because the 
insignificant decline in credit risk has a negative effect on the profitability of banks. 
Inconsistent with the result, Hakim and Neamie (2001) examined the relationship between 
credit risk and bank’s performance of Egypt and Lebanon bank in 1990s. Using data for banks 
from the two countries over the period 1993-1999, they found that credit risk is positively 
associated with profitability as a measurement of bank performance. In addition and not in 
line with the result, Rogers (2008), found that credit risk has a negative relationship with 
financial performance. This is in line with extant finance literature which highlights that, it is 
probable that when risky lending increases the payback declines. This in turn negatively 
affects commercial banks’ earnings. Similarly, the coefficient on credit risk is significant at 
10% level, indicating that banks with higher credit risk are less efficient (Jiang et al. 2012). 
Furthermore, Aduda and Gitonga (2011) found that there is an effect of credit risk 
management on profitability at a reasonable level. In addition, Tabari, et al. (2013) found that 
there is a negative and significant association between credit risk and bank performance, 
which means that the credit risk will cause the performance of the bank to weaken. 
Capital risk, as mentioned in the table, bivariate analysis indicated that the association 
between the capital risk and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and significant 
at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis found that the association between the capital risk 
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and ROE is insignificant, which means that the variation in the ROE in the GCC banking 
sector cannot be explained by the change in capital risk. Generally and consistent with the 
result, Tsorhe, et al. (2011), found that the board strength (as a corporate governance proxy) 
does not have a significant impact on capital risk and subsequently bank performance. This 
result comes in correspondence with (Aboagye and Otieku 2010), who concluded that an 
index that captures the state of corporate governance, outreach to clients, dependence on 
subsidies and use of technology is not statistically associated with their financial performance. 
Liquidity risk, the result revealed complete agreement between both bivariate and 
multivariate analyses, whereas the association between liquidity risk and bank performance 
measured by ROE is insignificant. This result means that the variation in the ROE in the GCC 
banking sector cannot be explained by the change in liquidity risk.  
Inconsistent with the result, Tabari, et al. (2013) found that there is a negative and significant 
association between liquidity risk and bank performance, which means that the liquidity risk 
will cause the performance of the bank to weaken. In addition, Berger (1995) calculated the 
liquidity risk of a bank through the ratio of cash asset to total asset in order to study the 
performance of a bank. In his research, he found that there is a positive relationship between 
liquidity risk of bank and return on total asset. Furthermore, in the banking sector, liquidity 
risk has an opposite effect on profitability. Some studies such as Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992) and Barth et al. (2003) supported the positive effect of risk on profitability; while some 
studies such as Bourke (1989) and Kosmidou et al. (2005) believed in its negative effect.  
Bank type, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the bank type is significantly 
associated with bank performance at 1% significance level. The result suggest that the 
conventional banks were significantly associated with lower performance. Which means that 
conventional banks in GCC need to exert more efforts to enhance their performance and 
increase their returns by attracting more customers and investors to their products.  
In contrast with the result, Johnes et al. (2014) compare the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks prior to, during and immediately after the 2008 financial crisis (2004-
2009) and found no significant difference in mean between conventional and Islamic banks 
when efficiency is measured relative to a common frontier. Furthermore and not 
corresponding with us, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) found that the financial crisis had a 
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negative impact on profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks although the Islamic 
banks were more profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis, although not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, Siraj and Pillai (2012) investigated the differences in 
the growth of performance indicators of conventional banks and Islamic banks in the GCC 
region. The study revealed that Islamic banks are more equity financed than conventional 
banks. In addition, conventional banks have growth in revenue during the period, but could 
not achieve improved profitability due to higher provisions towards credit losses and 
impairment losses. 
Financial crisis, as per the result indicated in the table, bivariate analysis indicated that the 
association between the financial crisis and performance measured by ROE is negative and 
significant at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis indicated that the association between 
the financial crisis and ROE is positive and significant at 1% significance level. The results 
suggest that the years before the crisis are more significant and related to the increase in return 
on equity. This result comes in line with the idea that the performance before the crisis should 
have been better than after the crisis, because banks take some time to recover after a crisis.   
Generally, the result is agree with Aebi et al. (2012), who concluded that for the banks to be 
better prepared to face the financial crisis, they have to significantly improve the quality and 
profile of their corporate governance and risk management function. Furthermore and in line 
with us, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) found that the financial crisis had a negative impact 
on the profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks, but the Islamic banks were more 
profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis although not statistically 
significant. 
Government ownership, as per the result indicated in the table, bivariate analysis indicated 
that the association between the government ownership and bank performance measured by 
ROE is insignificant. However, the multivariate analysis indicated that the association 
between government ownership and ROE is negative and significant at 1% significance level. 
The results suggest that banks owned by non-government are more significant and related to 
lower return on equity.   
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Inconsistent with us, Farazi et al. (2011) found that state banks are significantly less profitable 
than private banks in the non-GCC region. This result seems to be due to a combination of 
policy mandates and operational inefficiencies. In addition, La Porta et al. (2002) show that 
higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower subsequent financial 
development and GDP growth. Barth et al. (2007) find similar results in a study focused on 
banking regulation. However, Yeiati et al. (2007) revisit La Porta et al. (2002) by using more 
recent data, better estimation techniques and additional controls, and show that the evidence 
that state bank prevalence leads to lower growth and financial development is not strong. Two 
recent papers (Korner and Schnabel (2010) and Andrianova et al. (2010)) reach similar 
conclusions. They find a negative relationship between a high fraction of public ownership in 
the banking system and growth when financial development and the quality of political 
institutions are low, conditions that tend to prevail in developing countries.  
However, similar to Levy-Yeyati et al (2007), they do not find a negative impact of public 
ownership and growth in developed countries. They stress that the quality of institutions and 
governance are important in studying the impact of public ownership on growth. 
Bank Size, the result revealed complete agreement between both bivariate and multivariate 
analyses that indicate that the bank size is positively and significantly associated with bank 
performance measured by ROE at 1% significance level. The results suggest that the larger 
bank size, the higher the ROE and the smaller the bank size, the lower the ROE.  
The result is consistent with Fanta et al. (2013), who found that the bank size had a statistically 
significant positive effect on bank performance measured using ROE, implying that large 
banks enjoy better profits than smaller banks. This benefit is likely to be due to economies of 
scale and larger market share possessed by the larger banks. Furthermore, the result in 
correspondence with the results of Tomar et al. (2012). Similar to the above, Bertay, et al. 
(2013) found that banks with large absolute size tend to be more profitable, as indicated by 
the return on assets.  
Inconsistent with the result, Al-Hawary, (2011) found that there is no statistical significant 
effect in Tobin's Q (p =0.796).  
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Table 5-32 Model (2)  
Summary of Results 
Risk Management with ROE 
All Bank Data 
Independent Variables 
Bivariate analysis OLS 
Pearson  T-test Mann  
Non-performing loan (-)***    
Capital adequacy ratio   (-)***   (+)* 
Credit risk  (-)***    
Capital risk  (-)***    
Liquidity  risk      
Bank type  (+)*** (-) *** (-) *** 
Financial crisis  (-) *** (-) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership    (-) *** 
Bank size (+)***   (+) *** 
5.6.2/2 Model (2): Results of association between risk management and bank 
performance ROE for Islamic banks and conventional banks) 
As per table 5-33, which shows a comparison between the results of Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks as follow:  
Non-performing loan (NPL), as indicated in table 5-33, in Islamic banks the NPL is 
insignificant with ROE. However, in Conventional banks there is a negative and significant 
association between NPL and ROE which represents a healthy relationship; on the other hand, 
the lower the level of NPL, the higher the percentage of ROE. The result in conventional 
banks is consistent with Zhang et al. (2016), who concluded that an increase in the NPL 
negatively affects the bank performance.  
Capital adequacy ratio (CAR), as per table 5-33, in both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks the CAR is positively and significantly associated with ROE; this result means that the 
higher the CAR percentage, the Higher the ROE. This association between CAR and ROE in 
both Islamic and Conventional banks can be explained by stating that these banks maintain 
control over the CAR percentage as per Basel I and II instruction to keep it at a suitable level 
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(the minimum is 8 %) for stability purposes, and they simultaneously attempt to maximize 
their returns.   
Furthermore, Bateni, et al. (2014) found that there is a positive and significant association 
between ROE and capital adequacy ratio (CAR). Büyükşalvarcı, A., and Abdioğlu, H. (2011) 
investigated the determinants of Turkish banks' capital adequacy ratio and its effects on 
financial positions of banks, and found that the ROE has a negative and significant effect on 
CAR.   
Credit risk, as seen from table 5-33, the association in Conventional banks is better than in 
Islamic banks. It was noted that the association in Islamic banks with ROE is insignificant, 
while there is a negative and significant association with ROE which means that they should 
maintain the credit risk at a low level in order to increase the ROE. 
Capital risk and liquidity risk, as per table 5-33, in both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks, the association between capital risk and liquidity risk with ROE is insignificant, which 
means the changes in ROE cannot be explained by the changes in capital risk and liquidity 
risk. 
Generally, and consistent with the result, Tsorhe, et al. (2011), found that the board strength 
(as a corporate governance proxy) does not have a significant impact on capital risk and 
consequently bank performance. This result comes in compliance with (Aboagye and Otieku 
2010), who concluded that an index that captures the state of corporate governance, outreach 
to clients, dependence on subsidies and use of technology is not statistically associated with 
their financial performance. Furthermore, and in consistence with the result, Tabari, et al. 
(2013) found that there is a negative and significant association between liquidity risk and 
bank performance. 
Financial crisis, as per the result indicated in table 5-33, in both Islamic and Conventional 
banks the association between the financial crisis and ROE is positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that the years before the crisis are related to the increase 
in ROE. This result comes in correspondence with the idea that the performance before the 
crisis should have been better than after the crisis, because banks take some time to recover 
after a crisis.   
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Government ownership, as seen in table 5-33, in both of Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks, the association between government ownership and ROE is significant. The results 
suggest that banks owned by non-government are associated with lower return on equity, on 
the other hand banks owned by government are related more to a higher return on equity. This 
result comes in agreement with the idea that the performance of banks owned by government 
is better than the performance of banks owned by non-government. This result reflects the 
strength and power of government banks in the GCC region.  
Bank size, as per table 5-33, in both Islamic and Conventional banks, the bank size is 
positively and significantly associated with bank performance measured by ROE, at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that the larger the bank size, the higher the ROE.  
The result is consistent with Fanta et al. (2013), who found that the bank size had a statistically 
significant positive effect on bank performance measured using ROE, implying that large 
banks enjoy better profits than smaller banks. Similar to the above, Bertay, et al. (2013) found 
that banks with large absolute size tended to be more profitable as indicated by the return on 
assets.  
 
Table 5-33 Model (2) 
Summary of Results 
Risk Management with ROE 
(All Banks Data- Islamic Banks – Conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All Banks  Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Non-performing loan   (-) ** 
Capital adequacy ratio   (+)* (+)* (+)* 
Credit risk    (-) *** 
Capital risk     
Liquidity  risk     
Bank type (-) *** -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership (-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
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Bank size (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
From the above discussion, the requirements of central banks in GCC regarding number of 
ratios such as; NPL, CAR, credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk can support the use of 
legitimacy and stakeholder theory in explaining the relationship between risk management 
and bank performance. Furthermore, as noted the GCC central banks have vital role in 
monitor and control the banks performance.     
The hypothesis test results based on the statistical results of Model (2) of the association 
between risk management and bank performance measured by ROE will be as follow;  
H2.1 There is significant association between NPL and ROE  Rejected 
H2.2 There is significant association betweenCapital risk and ROE  Rejected 
H2.3 There is significant association between Credit risk and ROE  Rejected 
H2.4 There is insignificant association between CAR and ROE Rejected 
H2.5 There is significant association between liquidity risk and ROE  Rejected 
5.6.2/3 Model (2): Results of association between risk management and bank 
performance ROA for Islamic banks and conventional banks 
Table 5-34 will show the comparison between the results of Islamic banks and conventional 
banks as follow:  
Non-performing loan (NPL), as indicated in table 5-34, in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks the NPL is insignificant with ROA. Inconsistent with the result, Zhang 
et al. (2016) concluded that an increase in the NPL negatively affected the bank performance.  
Capital adequacy ratio, as per table 5-34, in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks the 
CAR is positively and significantly associated with ROA; this result means that the higher 
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the CAR the Higher the ROA. The association between CAR and ROA in both Islamic and 
Conventional banks can be explained by stating that all banks in the GCC region should 
maintain control over the CAR percentage as per Basel I and II instructions to keep it at a 
suitable level for stability purposes, and simultaneously attempt to maximize their returns.   
Credit risk, as indicated in table 5-34, the association in Conventional banks is better than in 
Islamic banks. The association in Islamic banks with ROA is insignificant, while in 
Conventional banks, there is a negative and significant association with ROA which means 
that they should maintain the credit risk at a low level in order to increase the ROA.  
Capital risk, as per table 5-34, in Islamic banks the association between capital risk and ROA 
is significant and negative, which means that in Islamic banks they need to keep the capital 
risk down to recognize higher ROA. On the other hand, in Non- Islamic banks the association 
is positive and significant, which means in order to recognize higher ROA they will be 
exposed to higher capital risk.    
Financial crisis, as per the result indicated in table 5-34, in both Islamic and Conventional 
banks the association between the financial crisis and ROA is positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. The result of this study suggest that the years before the crisis are related 
to the increase in ROA. This result comes in agreement with the idea that the performance 
before the crisis should have been better than after the crisis, because banks take some time 
to recover after a crisis.   
Government ownership, as indicated in table 5-34, in both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks, the association between government ownership and ROA is significant. The results 
suggest that banks owned by government are related more to higher returns. This result comes 
in agreement with the idea that the performance of banks owned by government is better than 
the performance of banks owned by non-government. This result reflects the strength and 
power of government banks in the GCC region.    
Bank Size, as per table 5-34, in Conventional banks the bank size is positively and 
significantly associated with bank performance measured by ROA at 1% significance level. 
However, in Islamic banks it is insignificant.  
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Table 5-34 Model (2) 
Summary of Results 
Risk Management and ROA 
(All Banks Data- Islamic Banks – Conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All banks Data  Islamic Banks 
Conventional 
Banks 
Non-performing loan    
Capital adequacy ratio   (+) *** (+) ** (+) ** 
Credit risk    (-) *** 
Capital risk   (-) * (+) *** 
Liquidity  risk   (+) *  
Bank type (-) *   
Financial crisis (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership (-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Bank size (+) ***  (+) *** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed).*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
The hypothesis test results based on the statistical results of Model (2) of the association 
between risk management and bank performance measured by ROA will be as follow: 
H2.1 
There is significant association between NPL and bank 
performance measured by ROA  
Rejected  
H2.2 
There is significant association between Capital risk and bank 
performance measured by ROA  
Rejected 
H2.3 
There is significant association between Credit risk and bank 
performance measured by ROA  Rejected 
H2.4 
There is insignificant association between CAR and bank 
performance measured by ROA  
Rejected 
H2.5 
There is significant association between liquidity risk and bank 
performance measured by ROA  Rejected 
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5.6.3/1 Model (3): implication of both corporate governance and risk management on 
bank performance ROE for all banks data 
Ten independent variables related to corporate governance and five independent variables 
related to risk management have been investigated in the current study, to investigate the 
association of applying both corporate governance and risk management on bank 
performance measured by ROE, using bivariate and multivariate analyses. A summary of the 
results is presented in table 5-35. 
Board size, as mentioned in the table, there is agreement between the bivariate and 
multivariate tests, whereas the association between the board size and ROE is insignificant, 
which means that the variation in the ROE in the GCC banking sector cannot be explained by 
the number of the board members. The result is consistent with Belkhir (2009), who found 
no significant relationship between board size and firm performance. The results are also in 
line with Zulkafli and Samad (2007); their findings suggest no significant relationship 
between the board size and performance measures (e.g. return on assets and Tobin’s Q). 
Furthermore, the results are inconsistent with the evidence from prior studies in different 
counties, such as; Bennedsen et al. (2004), who concluded that there is a negative association 
between board size and bank performance. Shakir, R. (2008) found that the board size has a 
consistent negative relationship with Tobin’s Q in all regressions, and in most instances is 
statistically significant too. In addition, the results are in consistence with Adams and Mehran 
(2005); Dwivedi and Jain (2005); Lipton and Lorsch (1992); Jensen, 1993; Coleman & 
Biekpe (2006); Mak and Kusnadi (2005); Sanda et al. (2003); Durgavanshi (2014), Fanta et 
al. (2013); Stepanova et al. (2012); Rachdi and Ameur (2011); Hoque and Muradoglu (2013).  
Non-executive board member, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the 
Non-executive board member is a significant variable. As can be seen in the table 5-35, there 
is agreement among statistical techniques about the negative significant association of non-
executive board member with bank performance, measured by ROE at a confidence level of 
99%. This means that the percentage of non-executive board members is negatively affecting 
the ROE, for example, the higher the percentage of non-executive board members, the less 
ROE and vice versa. As per the result, the executive directors could positively affect the bank 
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performance, as they can provide more in-depth understanding and better information on 
which the board may base its decisions.  
The result is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2007) who found that more executive 
directors might positively affect the quality of information that reaches the board and enhance 
performance. Similarly, the result agrees with Busta I. (2007) UK, who found a negative 
correlation between the non-executive board members and performance. In the same line with 
the result, Pathan and Faff (2012) found that the independent directors decreased bank 
performance. This conclusion comes in conformity with Hoque and Muradoglu (2013), who 
found that the percentage of independent directors in the board has a negative and significant 
coefficient with performance measured by (annual stock market return and ROA). In general 
and similar to this study conclusion, Erkens et al. (2012) found that firms with independent 
boards experienced worse stock returns during the crisis.  
On the other hand, the results disagree with Al-Hawary (2011), who found that the percentage 
of non-executive directors had a statistically significant positive effect on performance. 
Furthermore and inconsistent with the result, Adams (2012) shows that banks with more 
independent board members performed worse during the crisis; this finding is consistent with 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012). For non-banks, Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Bhagat and 
Black (2002) find no significant relationship between the percentage of outside directors and 
firm value.  
Gender diversity, as seen from the table, multivariate analysis found that the association 
between the gender diversity and ROE is insignificant at any significant level, which means 
that the existence of female members on the board cannot explain the variation in the ROE in 
the GCC banking sector. This result reflects the culture of GCC countries, in which the 
females there do not playing effective and efficient roles in GCC.   
The result is consistent with Wachudi and Mboya (2012) who concluded that board gender 
diversity has no significant effect on the performance of banks. In the same tone, Hoque and 
Muradoglu (2013), concluded that the gender diversity (the existence of female directors) 
does not add any value to the board.  In consistence with the results, Stepanova et al. (2012) 
found that there is a positive relationship between gender diversity and performance; this is 
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due to female directors provide banks with better monitoring, which leads to better 
performance.  
Furthermore and disagreeing with the result, Low, D. et al. (2015) found that increasing the 
numbers of female directors on the board has a positive effect on firm performance, as 
measured by return on equity ROE. Inconsistent with the result, Gulamhussena and Santa 
(2015) who found that the presence and percentage of female directors in boardrooms has a 
positive influence on performance. In addition, they noted that there is a negative relationship 
between the presence of women in boardrooms and risk-taking. In addition, there is a negative 
relationship between the female gender in the board and profitability (Adams and Ferreira 
(2009); Ahern and Dittmar (2012)). The interpretation of this result suggests that female 
directors engage in excessive monitoring that decreases shareholder value (Almazan and 
Suarez, 2003); Adams and Ferreira (2007)). In relation to investment, females make poorer 
decisions as they face greater obstacles as opposed to men in obtaining information about 
investment projects (Bharat et al. (2009)). 
CEO-turnover, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the replacement of the 
CEO is significantly associated with better bank performance measured by ROE at 1 % 
significant level. This result can be explained by stating that when banks faces financial 
troubles because of CEOs who cannot achieve banks’ goals and objectives, the boards should 
think about replacing those CEOs with new CEOs. The new CEO is more active and 
motivated to achieve the bank’s goals and objectives. Furthermore, the new CEO is coming 
from an exterior environment with different knowledge and experience that is necessary to 
enhance and develop the bank performance.    
In line with the results, there is a group of literature that found that there are significant 
positive changes in firm performance when CEO departures were followed by the 
appointment of a new CEO from outside the firm, Borokhovich et al. (1996), Farrell and 
Whidbee (2003) or Huson et al. (2004). Furthermore, Hermalin and Weisbach (2001) and 
Huson et al. (2004) concluded that the CEO’s departure from his position might be due to 
retirement or movement to an external position. As a result, the departures are not a sign of 
poor performance, and consequently, firms’ future performance is expected to show smaller 
variations when compared with unexpected departures.  
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On the other hand, the result is inconsistent with a group of previous literature, which found 
that the CEO-turnover is negatively affecting the bank performance. The board replaces a 
poorly performing CEO to enhance and develop the firm’s performance, Huson et al. (2001); 
Hermalin and Weisbach (2001). The improvements of shareholders’ wealth and business 
operations follow CEO-turnover (Denis and Denis 1995; Huson et al. 2004).  
Role duality, as per the results indicated in the table, both bivariate and multivariate analyses 
indicate that the role duality is a significant variable at (5% and 10% significant level 
respectively). As per the result, the role duality is negatively and significantly associated with 
bank performance measured by ROE. This result means that the duality between the two 
positions of chairperson and CEO is more significant and related to the high percentage of 
ROE. The result can be explained by stating that when one person is the CEO and the 
chairperson simultaneously, then he/she has the power to take decisions easier and faster, 
concurrently, he/she has deep understanding and experience about the bank’s operation.    
Furthermore and consistently with the results, (Al-Hawary, S. 2011) found that the 
combination between the two positions of chairman and executive manager in one individual 
has had a positive effect on bank performance; role duality may be attributed to the family 
ownership which characterizes Jordanian banks. In addition, role duality enables the CEO to 
act rapidly and may provide strong leadership (Brickley et al., 1997). Furthermore, role 
duality creates a strong individual power base, which could affect the effective control 
exercised by the board (e.g. Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama 
and Jensen, 1983; Whittington, 1993).  
On the other hand, the result is inconsistent with (Durgavanshi 2014) who found that the 
separation of board chairman and CEO does not have a statistically significant effect on the 
financial performance.  Furthermore and not in line with the result, Hoque and Muradoglu 
(2013) concluded that there is role duality in 49% of the sample, and the duality is not 
significant for the stock market return regressions and then bank performance. 
Audit committee, as indicated in table 5-35 both tests indicate that the audit committee is 
insignificantly associated with bank performance measured by ROE at any significant level. 
As per the result, whether the audit committee exists or not, it will not affect the ROE due to 
the insignificant relationship between the two variables. The result can be explained by 
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asserting that the audit committee in the GCC banking sector is not sufficiently matured and 
still does not play an efficient and effective role in handling the internal control weaknesses, 
risk issues, and ensuring the reliability of its financial reporting.  
Consistent with the result, Durgavanshi (2014) who found that there is no significant 
relationship between the existence of an audit committee and both Return on Equity ROE and 
Operational Self Sufficiency (OSS). In the same line of the result, Kajola (2008) investigated 
the relationship between the audit committee and the two performance measures, and 
concluded that the audit committees being occupied by a majority of outside members has no 
influence on the firm’s performance. Agreeing with us, Agrawal and Chadha (2005) reported 
evidence indicating that the independence of the audit committee members has no effect on 
the probability of earnings restatement.  
Inconsistently with the result, Klein (2002) reports a negative correlation between earnings 
management and audit committee independence. In agreement with this conclusion, Fanta et 
al. (2013), found that the existence of an audit committee in the board had a statistically 
significant negative effect on bank performance. Similarly, Anderson, et al. (2004), found 
that fully independent audit committees were associated with a significantly lower cost of 
debt financing.  
Credit and investment committee, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the 
credit and investment committee is significantly associated with the ROE at (1% and 10% 
significant level respectively) with negative direction. As per the result, the existence of such 
a committee is related to the decrease in ROE. This result may be explained by stating that 
this committee within the GCC banking sector is still not playing an efficient and effective 
role in maximizing the banks’ return. Furthermore, in recent years, the majority of GCC banks 
established credit and investment committees to work as a control tool, in order to carry out 
several functions. These include approving extension or renewal of credit facilities, granting 
temporary excesses to customers with credit facilities approved by the Board, approving early 
repayments of facilities, monitoring the performance and quality of the Group’s credit 
portfolio and overseeing the administration and effectiveness of and compliance with the 
credit policies through the review of such processes, reports and other information as it deems 
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appropriate. Based on the above, this variable will be used in this study as a proxy for 
corporate governance, whereas this result could be used in future studies for comparison.   
Capital ratio, as per the results indicated in the table, bivariate analysis indicated that the 
association between the capital ratio and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and 
significant at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis indicated that the association between 
the capital ratio and ROE is insignificant. Relying on the multivariate result, the changes in 
ROE cannot be explained by variation in capital ratio.  
Loan to deposit ratio LDR, as per the results indicated in the table, bivariate analysis 
indicated that the association between the LDR and bank performance measured by ROE is 
negative and significant at 1%. However, the multivariate analysis found that the association 
between the LDR and ROE is insignificant. Based on the multivariate result, the changes in 
ROE cannot be explained by variation in LDR. 
The multivariate result is consistent with Fanta et al. (2013) who found that the loan to 
deposits ratio does not have a statistically significant effect on performance.  
Risk committee, as indicated in the table, multivariate analysis found that the association 
between risk committee and ROE is insignificant, which means that the risk committee cannot 
explain the variation in the ROE in the GCC banking sector. This result can be explained by 
declaring that the concept of risk management through a dedicated risk committee in the GCC 
banking sector is not sufficiently matured to affect the performance. 
This result is consistent with Mongiardino and Plath (2010) who found that the risk 
governance in large banks seems to have improved only to a limited extent, despite the 
increased regulatory pressure induced by the credit crisis. In addition, they concluded that the 
better banking risk governance needs to have at least a dedicated board-level risk committee, 
and the majority should be independent. Furthermore, they found that only a small number of 
banks observed best practices in 2007. Even though most large banks had a dedicated risk 
committee, most of them met very infrequently. 
Furthermore and in line with the result, Aebi et al. (2012) who found that merely having a 
risk committee does not necessarily help banks’ crisis performance. However, having a more 
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dedicated committee that meets more frequently and is larger seems to positively affect the 
banks’ performance in the crisis.  
Non-performing loan (NPL), as mentioned in the table, both bivariate and multivariate 
analyses indicate that the NPL is negatively and significantly associated with the ROE at 1% 
significance level. The results reflect the degree of management efficiency in the GCC 
banking sector in managing and controlling both NPL and ROE, because this negative 
association means that there is lower NPL (decrease in NPL) with higher ROE. In the case of 
efficient management, there is evidence that the management have the ability to keep the non-
performing loans at a low level and maximize the bank return. Moreover, in the case of 
inefficient management, they cannot keep the NPL at a lower level and cannot maximize the 
banks return. The result is in line with Epure and Lafuente (2015) who found that non-
performing loans negatively affect the efficiency and return on assets. 
Inconsistent with the result, Helhel (2015) who investigated the impact of bank-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants on profitability of 14 private and commercial banks in Georgia 
for the period between (2009-2013) by panel data analysis, and found that the association 
between the non-performing loan and bank performance measured by ROE is statistically 
insignificant. In addition, Vatansever and Hepşen (2013) who found that the return on equity 
positively and significantly affected the NPL.  
Capital adequacy ratio, as per the table, bivariate test indicates that the CAR is significantly 
associated with bank performance measured by ROE at (1%). However, multivariate analysis 
indicates that there is an insignificant relationship between CAR and ROE. The results 
suggest that the CAR is insignificantly associated with ROE, which means that the changes 
in ROE cannot be explained by CAR percentage.  
The multivariate result is inconsistent with Navapan and Tripe (2003) who found that there 
is a negative and significant association between CAR and ROE. In addition, Epure and 
Lafuente (2015) found that the capital adequacy ratio positively affects the net interest 
margin. This supports the fact that incurring monitoring costs and having higher levels of 
capitalization may enhance performance. Furthermore, Bateni, et al. (2014) found that there 
is a positive and significant association between ROE and capital adequacy ratio. Disagreeing 
with the result, Büyükşalvarcı and Abdioğlu (2011) who investigated the determinants of 
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Turkish banks' capital adequacy ratio and its effects on the financial positions of banks 
covered by the study for the period (2006 – 2010) found that the return on equity has a 
negative and significant effect on CAR.   
Credit risk, as seen in the table, there is agreement between the bivariate and multivariate 
tests whereas the both tests indicated that the association between the credit risk and bank 
performance measured by ROE is negative and significant at 1% significance level. The result 
can be explained by stating that the lower the percentage of credit risk, the higher the 
percentage of ROE and vice versa.  
Interestingly, good management will maintain control over credit risk to keep it on the lowest 
level. At the same time, they will apply efforts to maximize the bank return. On the other 
hand, inefficient management cannot keep control over the percentage of credit risk,and they 
do not have the abilities and capabilities to achieve the maximum return on equity. 
In correspondence with the result, Rogers (2008), found that credit risk has a negative 
relationship with financial performance. This is in line with extant finance literature which 
highlights that, it is probable that when risky lending increases the payback declines. This in 
turn negatively affects commercial banks’ earnings. Similarly, the coefficient on credit risk 
is significant at 10% percent level of significance, indicating that banks with higher credit 
risk are less efficient (Jiang et al. 2012). Furthermore, Aduda and Gitonga (2011) found that 
there is an effect of credit risk management on profitability at a reasonable level. In addition, 
Tabari et al. (2013) found that there is a negative and significant association between credit 
risk and bank performance, which means that the credit risk will cause the performance of 
bank to be weaken. 
Inconsistent with the result, Hakim and Neamie (2001) examined the relationship between 
credit risk and bank’s performance of Egypt and Lebanon banks in 1990s. Using data for 
banks from the two countries over the period (1993-1999), they found that credit risk is 
positively associated with profitability as a measurement of bank performance. Furthermore 
and inconsistent with the result, Sayedi (2014) who found that credit risk has insignificant 
and negative effect on profitability. In addition, banks should ensure that they continue to 
maintain a low level of credit risk in order to increase the profitability; this is because the 
insignificant decline in credit risk has a negative effect on the profitability of banks. 
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Liquidity risk, as mentioned in the table, there is agreement between both bivariate and 
multivariate analysis whereas both of them indicate that the association between the liquidity 
risk and bank performance measured by ROE is insignificant. The results suggest that the 
change in ROE cannot be explained by the variance in liquidity risk in the GCC banking 
sector.  
Inconsistent with the result, Tabari, et al. (2013) found that there is a negative and significant 
association between liquidity risk and bank performance, which means that the liquidity risk 
will cause the performance of the bank to weaken. Furthermore, in the banking sector, 
liquidity risk has an opposite effect on profitability. Additionally, Berger (1995) calculated 
the liquidity risk of a bank through the ratio of cash assets to total assets in order to study the 
performance of a bank. In his research, he found that there is a positive relationship between 
liquidity risk and bank performance measured by return on total assets. Some studies such as 
Molyneux & Thornton (1992) and Barth et al. (2003) supported the positive effect of risk on 
the profitability; while some studies such as Bourke (1989) and Kosmidou et al. (2005) 
believed in its negative effect. 
Capital risk, as mentioned in the table, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that 
the capital risk is negatively and significantly associated with the ROE at (1% and 5% 
significant level respectively). This result reflects the efficiency of the banking sector 
management, because when the bank has an efficient and effective management, this 
management will keep control over capital risk to maintain it at the lowest level while 
simultaneously applying efforts to maximize the bank return. On the other hand, inefficient 
management cannot keep control over the percentage of capital risk; at the same time, they 
do not have the capabilities to recognize the maximum return on equity.      
Inconsistent with the result, Tsorhe, et al. (2011), found that the board strength (as a corporate 
governance proxy) does not have a significant impact on capital risk. This result comes in 
accord with (Aboagye and Otieku 2010) who concluded that an index that captures the state 
of corporate governance, outreach to clients, dependence on subsidies and use of technology 
is not statistically associated with their financial performance. 
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Bank type, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the bank type is significantly 
associated with bank performance at 1% significance level. This results suggest that 
conventional banks were significantly associated with bank performance by decreasing the 
ROE. As mentioned before management in conventional banks need to exert more efforts to 
develop and enhance the performance. 
In contrast with the result, Johnes et al. (2014) who compared the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks prior to, during and immediately after the 2008 financial crisis (2004-
2009) and found no significant difference in mean between conventional and Islamic banks 
when efficiency is measured relative to a common frontier. Furthermore and not in line with 
the result, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) who found that the financial crisis had a negative 
impact on profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks, but the Islamic banks were 
more profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis although not statistically 
significant. Furthermore, Siraj and Pillai (2012) investigated the differences in the growth of 
performance indicators of conventional banks and Islamic banks in the GCC region. The 
study revealed that Islamic banks are more equity financed than conventional banks. In 
addition, conventional banks have growth in revenue during the period, but could not achieve 
improved profitability due to higher provisions towards credit losses and impairment losses. 
Financial crisis, as per the result indicated in the table, multivariate analysis indicates that 
that the association between the financial crisis and ROE is positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that the years before the crisis are more significant and 
related to the increase in return on equity. This result corresponds with the idea that the 
performance before the crisis should have been better than after the crisis because banks take 
some time to recover after a crisis.   
Generally, the result in agreement with Aebi et al. (2012) who concluded that for the banks 
to be better prepared to face the financial crisis, they have to significantly improve the quality 
and profile of their corporate governance and risk management function. Furthermore and in 
line with us, Amba and Almukharreq (2013) found that the financial crisis had a negative 
impact on profitability of both Islamic and conventional banks although the Islamic banks 
were more profitable than conventional banks during the financial crisis, but not statistically 
significant. 
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Government ownership, as per the result indicated in the table, multivariate analysis 
indicates that the association between government ownership and ROE is significant at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that banks owned by government are more significant 
and related to a higher return on equity. This result comes in agreement with the idea that the 
performance of banks owned by government is better than the performance of banks owned 
by non-government, because banks take some time to recover after a crisis. This result reflects 
the strength and power of government banks in the GCC region.   
Inconsistent with the result, Farazi et al. (2011) found that state banks are significantly less 
profitable than private banks in the non-GCC region. This result seems to be due to a 
combination of policy mandates and operational inefficiencies. In addition, La Porta et al. 
(2002) showed that higher government ownership of banks is associated with slower 
subsequent financial development and GDP growth. Barth et al. (2007) find similar results in 
a study focused on banking regulation. However, Yeiati et al. (2007) revisit La Porta et al. 
(2002) by using more recent data, better estimation techniques, and additional controls, and 
show that the evidence that state bank prevalence leads to lower growth and financial 
development is not strong. Two recent papers (Korner and Schnabel (2010) and Andrianova 
et al. (2010)) reached similar conclusions. They find a negative relationship between a high 
fraction of public ownership in the banking system and growth when financial development 
and the quality of political institutions are low, conditions that tend to prevail in developing 
countries.  
However, similar to Levy-Yeyati et al. (2007), they don’t find a negative impact of public 
ownership and growth in developed countries. They stress that the quality of institutions and 
governance are important in studying the impact of public ownership on growth. 
Bank size, the result revealed complete agreement between both bivariate and multivariate 
analysis that indicated that the bank size is positively and significantly associated with bank 
performance measured by ROE at 1% significance level. The results suggest that the larger 
the bank size the higher the ROE and the smaller the bank size the lower the ROE. The result 
can be explained by stating that the higher bank return is likely to be due to economies of 
scale and larger market share related to the larger banks. On the other hand, the bigger banks 
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have very big structures and the ability to nominate a very good qualified and experienced 
staff. This staff has the required knowledge in handling and managing assets and risks. 
The result is consistent with Fanta et al. (2013) who found that the bank size had a statistically 
significant positive effect on bank performance measured using ROE, implying that large 
banks enjoy better profits than smaller banks. This benefit is likely to be due to economies of 
scale and larger market share possessed by the larger banks. Furthermore, this result in 
agreement with the results of Tomar et al. (2012). Similar to the above, Bertay, et al. (2013) 
found that banks with large absolute size tended to be more profitable as indicated by the 
return on assets.  
Inconsistent with the result, Al-Hawary, (2011) found that there is no statistical significant 
effect in Tobin's Q (p =0.796).  
 
Table 5-35 Model (3) 
Summary of Results of CG and RM with ROE 
For All Banks Data  
Independent Variables 
Bivariate analysis 
OLS 
Pearson  T-test Mann 
Whitney 
Board size      
Non-executive board member   (-) **   (-) *** 
Gender diversity    (-) **  
CEO- turnover   (+)*** (-) *** (-) *** 
Role duality   (+)* (-) ** (-)* 
Audit committee  (+)*   
Credit and investment committee  (+)*** (-) *** (-)* 
Capital ratio (-) ***    
Loan to deposit ratio      
Risk committee   (+)*** (-) ***  
Non-performing loan (-)***   (-)*** 
Capital adequacy ratio   (-)***    
Credit risk  (-)***   (-)*** 
Capital risk  (-)***   (-)** 
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Liquidity  risk      
Bank type  (+)*** (-) *** (-) *** 
Financial crisis  (-) *** (-) *** (+)*** 
Government ownership    (-)*** 
Bank size (+)***   (+)*** 
 
5.6.3/2 Model (3): Implication of both of corporate governance and risk management on 
bank performance ROE for Islamic banks and conventional banks 
Table 5-36 show the comparison between the results of Islamic banks and Conventional banks 
as follow:  
Board size, as per table 5-36, in Islamic banks the association between the board size and 
ROE is insignificant, which means that the variation in the ROE in Islamic banks cannot be 
explained by the changes in board size. However, in Conventional banks there is a negative 
and significant association with ROE. The result in Conventional banks disagrees with 
Belkhir (2009) who found no significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance. Furthermore, there is agreement with Zulkafli and Samad (2007) who noted 
that no significant relationship exists between the board size and performance measures (e.g. 
return on assets and Tobin’s Q). In agreement with the result, Shakir (2008) found that the 
board size has a consistent negative relationship with Tobin’s Q in all regressions, and in most 
instances is statistically significant too.  
Non-executive board member, table 5-36 presents that in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks there is a negative and significant association between non-executive 
board member and bank performance measured by ROE. This means that the high percentage 
of non-executive board members is negatively affecting the ROE; and as noted, the high 
percentage of non-executive board members is related to lower ROE and vice-versa. The 
result is consistent with Adams and Ferreira (2007) who found that more executive directors 
might positively affect the quality of information that reaches the board and enhance 
performance. Similarly, the results agree with Busta (2007) UK, who found a negative 
correlation between the non-executive board member and performance.  
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Gender diversity, as per table 5-36, the association between the existence of female on the 
board and ROE is insignificant at any significant level, which means that the existence of 
female members on the board cannot explain the variation in the ROE in the GCC banking 
sector.  
CEO-turnover, from the table 5-36, in Islamic banks the CEO-turnover is insignificant; 
however, in Conventional banks the association was negative and significant. As per this 
result, the replacement of the CEO is significantly associated with better bank performance 
measured by ROE.  
Role duality, as per the results indicated in table 5-36, in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks the association between the role duality and bank performance measured 
by ROE is insignificant. This result means that the duality or the separation between the two 
positions of chairman and CEO is insignificant with bank performance.    
Audit committee, as indicated in table 5-36 the audit committee in all GCC banks is 
insignificantly associated with bank performance measured by ROE. The result can be 
explained in that the audit committee in the GCC banking sector still does not play an efficient 
and effective role in handling the issues of internal control weaknesses and risk areas.  
Credit and investment committee, as per table 5-36, in Conventional banks the association 
with ROE is insignificant. Moreover, it was noted that in Islamic banks the association is 
negative and significant, which means that the existence of such a committee significantly 
affects the bank performance by decreasing the ROE. In addition, this committee is not 
playing an effective role in maximizing the bank’s return.  
Capital ratio, from table 5-36, in Conventional banks, the association between the capital 
ratio and bank performance measured by ROE is insignificant. However, in Islamic banks the 
association between capital ratio and ROE is positive and significant.    
Loan to deposit ratio LDR, as seen from table 5-36, in both Islamic and Conventional banks 
the association between LDR and ROE is insignificant. The results suggest that the changes 
in ROE cannot be explained by the changes in LDR. Agreeing with the result, Fanta et al. 
(2013) found that the loan to deposits ratio does not have a statistically significant effect on 
performance.  
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Risk committee, as indicated in table 5-36, in Islamic banks the risk committee is 
insignificantly associated with ROE. In conventional banks, the association between the risk 
committee and bank performance measured by ROE is negative and significant. This result 
can be explained by stating that the concept of risk management in the GCC banking sector 
is not matured enough to affect the performance positively. 
Non-performing loan (NPL), Credit risk, Capital risk and Liquidity risk, as indicated in 
table 5-36, all of those variables were insignificantly associated with ROE in both Islamic 
banks and Conventional banks. However, in general in the GCC banking sector and using the 
cumulative data, there is a negative and significant association between NPL, credit risk, and 
capital risk with ROE. 
Capital adequacy ratio, as indicated in table 5-36, in Conventional banks the CAR is 
insignificantly associated with ROE. In Islamic banks, there is a negative and significant 
association with ROE.  
Financial crisis, as per the result indicated in table 5-36, in both Islamic and Conventional 
banks the association between the financial crisis and ROE is positive and significant, at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that the years before the crisis are related to the increase 
in ROE.   
Government ownership, as seen in table 5-36, in Islamic banks the association between 
government ownership and ROE is insignificant. In Conventional banks, the association with 
ROE is negative and significant. The results suggest that conventional banks owned by 
government are related more to a higher return on equity.  
Bank size, as per table 5-36, in both Islamic and Conventional banks, the bank size is 
positively and significantly associated with bank performance measured by ROE. The results 
suggest that the larger the bank size, the higher the ROE.  
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Table 5-36 Model (3):  
Summary of Results of CG and RM with ROE for  
(All Banks Data- Islamic Banks – Conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All Banks Data Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Board size    (-) *** 
Non-executive board member   (-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Gender diversity     
CEO- turnover  (-) ***  (-) ** 
Role duality  (-)*   
Audit committee    
Credit and investment committee (-)* (-) **  
Capital ratio  (+) **  
Loan to deposit ratio     
Risk committee    (-) *** 
Non-performing loan (-)***   
Capital adequacy ratio    (-)*  
Credit risk  (-)***   
Capital risk  (-)**   
Liquidity  risk     
Bank type (-) *** -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership (-)***  (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) ** (+) *** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
 
5.6.3/3 Model (3): Implication of both of corporate governance and risk management on 
bank performance ROA for Islamic banks and conventional banks 
Table 5-37 shows a comparison between the results of Islamic banks and Conventional banks 
as follow; 
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Board size, as per table 5-37, in Islamic banks the association between the board size and 
ROA is insignificant, which means that the variation in the ROA in Islamic banks cannot be 
explained by the changes in board size. However, in Conventional banks there is a negative 
and significant association with ROA. This result in Conventional banks disagrees with 
Belkhir (2009) who found no significant relationship between board size and firm 
performance.  
Non-executive board member, from table 5-37, in both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks there is a negative and significant association between non-executive board member 
and bank performance measured by ROA. This means that the high percentage of non-
executive board members is negatively affecting the ROA; the high percentage of non-
executive board members is related to lower ROA and vice-versa.  
Gender diversity, as per table 5-37, the association between gender diversity and ROA is 
insignificant at any significant level, which means that nominating male or female members 
in the board cannot explain the variation in the ROA in the GCC banking sector.  
CEO-turnover, from the table 5-37, in Islamic banks the CEO-turnover is insignificant. 
However, in Conventional banks the association was negative and significant. As per this 
result, the replacement of the CEO is significantly associated with better bank performance 
measured by ROA.  
Role duality, as per the results indicated in table 5-37), in both Islamic banks and 
Conventional banks the association between the role duality and bank performance measured 
by ROA is insignificant, which means that the duality or the separation between the two 
position of chairman and CEO is not of consequence and insignificant with bank performance.    
Audit committee, as indicated in table 5-37 the audit committee in Conventional banks is 
insignificantly associated with ROA, while in Islamic banks it is negative and significant. The 
results suggest that the audit committee in Islamic banks still does not play an efficient and 
effective role.  
Credit and investment committee, as per table 5-37, in both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks, the association with ROA is insignificant. The results suggest that this committee is 
not playing an effective role in maximizing the bank’s return.  
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Capital ratio, loan to deposit ratio LDR, non-performing loan NPL, credit risk, capital 
risk and liquidity risk, from table 5-37, in Islamic banks and Conventional banks, the 
association between the capital ratio, LDR, NPL, Credit risk, Capital risk and Liquidity risk 
with bank performance measured by ROA is insignificant.  
Risk committee, as indicated in table 5-37, in Islamic banks the risk committee is positively 
and significantly associated with ROA which means that the existence of risk a committee is 
related to higher ROA. In conventional banks, the association between the risk committee 
and bank performance measured by ROA is negative and significant. The result can be 
explained by stating that the concept of risk management in conventional banks is not matured 
enough to affect the performance positively. 
Capital adequacy ratio, as indicated in table 5-37, in Islamic banks the CAR is 
insignificantly associated with ROA. In Conventional banks the CAR is positively and 
significantly associated with ROA.   
Financial crisis, as per the result indicated in table 5-37, in both Islamic and Conventional 
banks the association between the financial crisis and ROA is positive and significant at 1% 
significance level. The results suggest that the years before the crisis are related to the increase 
in ROA.   
Government ownership, as mentioned in table 5-37, in Islamic banks the association 
between government ownership and ROA is insignificant. In Conventional banks, the 
association with ROA is negative and significant. The results suggest that conventional banks 
owned by government are related more to higher ROA.  
Bank size, as per table 5-37, in both Islamic and Conventional banks, the bank size is 
positively and significantly associated with bank performance measured by ROA. The results 
suggest that the larger the bank size, the higher the ROA.  
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Table 5-37 
Model (3): Summary of Results 
CG and RM with ROA 
(All Banks Data- Islamic Banks – Conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All Banks Data Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Board size    (-) ** 
Non-executive board member   (-) *** (-) *** (-) * 
Gender diversity     
CEO- turnover  (-) ***  (-) * 
Role duality     
Audit committee (-) ** (-) ***  
Credit and investment committee    
Capital ratio (+) **   
Loan to deposit ratio  (+) **   
Risk committee   (+) * (-) *** 
Non-performing loan    
Capital adequacy ratio     (+) * 
Credit risk  (-)*   
Capital risk     
Liquidity  risk     
Bank type  -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government ownership (-)***  (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) * (+) *** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
5.6.4/1 Model (4) Results of association between corporate governance and risk 
management (NPL), for all banks data 
Ten independent variables related to corporate governance have been investigated in the 
current study so as to investigate the association between corporate governance and risk 
management measured by NPL, using bivariate and multivariate analyses. In general, Lai and 
CHOI (2014) found that there is no statistical significant association between NPL and 
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corporate governance. As per the literature review, there are minor number of studies 
investigate the association between the corporate governance’s independent variables and 
non-performing loan as a measure of risk management. The results of the study could be used 
in future research for benchmarking purposes. A summary of the results of the employed 
statistical techniques is presented in table 5-38 
Board size, as indicated in the table, there is agreement between the bivariate and multivariate 
analysis, whereas the association between board size and NPL is negative and significant at 
1% and 5% significant level. This negative relationship can be explained by stating that the 
higher the number of board members the lower the percentage of NPL, which means better 
risk management. 
In line with this study’s result, Surifah (2013) who found that there is a negative and 
significant association between board size and NPL, which means the larger the board size 
the lower the NPL and better risk management. Consistent with the result, Poudel and Hovey 
(2013) found that the association between board size and NPL is negative and significant, 
alternatively stated the bigger board size lead to lower NPL, which means better efficiency in 
the commercial banks. 
Inconsistent with the result, Kumah et al. 2014 concluded that the board of directors is not 
directly responsible for risk management. Nyor and Mejabi (2013) found that board size as a 
corporate governance variable has no significant impact on non-performing loans of Nigerian 
deposit money banks. In addition, the agency theory assumes that a smaller board is 
recommended to minimize the agency cost, by effective control over the management, 
whereas larger boards might increase the number of potential interactions and conflicts among 
the group members (Yoshikawa & Phan, 2003). Furthermore, Lai and Choi (2014) found that 
the NPL does not have a statistically significant relationship with board sizes. 
Non-executive board member, as indicated in the table there is agreement between the 
bivariate and multivariate analyses, whereas the association between non-executive board 
member and NPL is insignificant. This results suggest that the association between Non-
executive board member and NPL is insignificant, which means that the change in NPL 
cannot be explained by the change in the percentage of non-executive board members. On the 
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other hand, both of the executive and non-executive directors in the GCC banking sector are 
not playing a significant role in reducing the (NPL), which means better risk management.  
Gender diversity, as seen in the table, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that 
the gender diversity is significantly associated with the NPL at (1% and 10% significant level 
respectively). This result means that the existence of female member on the board are more 
significantly associated with higher NPL in GCC banking sector. This result can be logically 
explained by stating that the females in the GCC region are still not mature enough in the 
business sphere due to the culture of the GCC region toward females, in addition to the above, 
males in this region are more experienced and powerful than females.      
CEO-turnover, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the CEO-turnover is 
insignificant with NPL. As per the result, the CEO replacement is insignificantly associated 
with risk management measured by NPL. On the other hand, the change in NPL cannot be 
explained by variation in CEO-turnover. 
Role duality, as per the results indicated in the table, there is agreement between the bivariate 
and multivariate analysis whereas the association between the role duality and risk 
management measured by NPL is negative and significant at 1% and 5%. The results suggest 
that the duality between the two positions (chairman – CEO) is more significantly associated 
with risk management by increasing NPL. On the other hand and as per the descriptive 
analysis, there are 865 observations out of 900 observations that have a separation which 
means that there is separation between the two positions in most of the observations, which 
is more associated with lower NPL. Furthermore, from the above-mentioned observations, 
there is a general trend in the GCC to split the two positions.     
Audit committee, as indicated in table 5-38 bivariate analysis indicates that the audit 
committee is negatively and significantly associated with NPL. However, the multivariate 
analysis indicates that the association between the audit committee and NPL is positive and 
significant at 1% significance level. As per the multivariate results, the existence of an audit 
committee is significantly associated with higher NPL. As per the result, the audit committee 
in the GCC is not playing an effective and efficient role in in reducing the non-performing 
loans.  
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Inconsistent with this study’s result, Poudel and Hovey (2013) who found that corporate 
governance variable (audit committee) has a significant negative relationship with NPL ratio. 
Credit and investment committee, as indicated in table 5-38, there is disagreement between 
bivariate and multivariate analysis, whereas the bivariate analysis indicates that the credit and 
investment committee is negatively and significantly associated with NPL. However, the 
multivariate analysis indicates that the association between the credit and investment 
committee and NPL is positive and significant at 5% significant level. The results suggest 
that the existence of the committee is more significantly associated with NPL than the non-
existence of the committee. As per this study’s results, this committee in the GCC banking 
sector is not playing an effective and efficient role in reducing the non-performing loans. 
Capital ratio, as indicated in table 5-38 bivariate analysis indicates that the capital ratio is 
positively and significantly associated with NPL. However, the multivariate analysis 
indicates that the association between the capital ratio and NPL is negative and significant at 
10% significant level. The results suggest that the capital ratio is negative and significantly 
associated with NPL. Consistently with the result, Salas and Saurina (2002) who reveal that 
the capital ratio is statistically significant with non- performing loans. 
Loan to deposit ratio, as indicated in table 5-38 bivariate analysis indicates that the LDR is 
insignificantly associated with NPL. However, the multivariate analysis indicates that the 
association between LDR and NPL is negative and significant, at 1% significance level. 
Based on the multivariate result, the higher the percentage of LDR, the lower the percentage 
of NPL. On the other hand, the results reflect the management efficiency in the GCC banking 
sector in managing and controlling both LDR and NPL, because this negative association 
means that there is higher LDR (increase in total loans) with lower non-performing loans. In 
this case, there is evidence that the management have the ability to keep the non-performing 
loans at a low level and vice versa.    
Risk committee, as indicated in the table, there is agreement between the bivariate and 
multivariate analysis, whereas the association between the risk committee and NPL is 
negative and significant at (1% and 5% significant level respectively). On the other hand, the 
results refer to the fact that the existence of a risk committee is more significantly associated 
with lower NPL in the GCC banking sector. Here in this model, there is an evidence that the 
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risk committee is playing a very important and active role in the GCC banking sector in 
reducing the bad loans or the non-performing loans, which leads us to state that the existence 
of a risk committee is related to better risk management. In general, the result is consistent 
with Kumah et al. (2014) who concluded that only senior management and risk owners are 
directly responsible for risk management. 
Bank type, multivariate analysis indicates that the bank type (Islamic – conventional) is 
insignificantly associated with risk management measured by NPL. The results of this study 
suggest that there is an insignificant association between bank type and NPL; this result means 
that the change in NPL is not affected significantly by bank type, whether Islamic or 
conventional.  
Inconsistent with the result of this study, Kabir, M., at al. (2015) found that Islamic banks 
have significantly higher NPL than conventional banks, suggesting that Islamic banks have 
higher credit risk. 
Financial crisis, both bivariate and multivariate analyses indicate that the financial crisis of 
2008 is insignificantly associated with the NPL. The results suggest that the changes in NPL 
cannot be explained by the variance of crisis, whether before crisis or after crisis.  
Government ownership, as indicated in the table, multivariate analysis found that the 
association between the banks owned by government and NPL is positive and significant, at 
1% significance level which means that banks owned by government is significantly 
associated with lower NPL i.e. better risk management. In addition, the non-government 
banks do not have efficient tools and good corporate governance to keep the NPL at a low 
level, compared to government owned banks that have a good tools and better governance. 
As per the result, there is agreement with the other three models that the government 
ownership has better corporate governance and risk management compared with the non-
government owned banks, which is reflected in higher ROE and lower NPL.  
Inconsistently, Iannotta et al. (2007) and Berger et al. (2005) found that the reasons behind 
the poor performance of government owned banks are, for example, the poor loan quality 
(non–performing loans) and high insolvency risk.  
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Bank size, the result revealed complete agreement between both bivariate and multivariate 
analyses that indicate that the bank size is negatively and significantly associated with NPL 
at 1% significance level. The results suggest that the larger the bank size the lower the NPL 
which means that there is better risk management. In addition, the bigger banks have very big 
structures and have the ability to hire very qualified and experienced staff; this staff has the 
required knowledge in handling and managing the assets and risks. The result of this study is 
in agreement with Adnan et al. (2011), who found that there is a negative association between 
bank size and NPL at 5% significant level. In agreement with the result, Salas and Saurina 
(2002) found that bank size is significantly associated with non-performing loans. Hu et al. 
(2004) and Rajan and Dhal (2003) reported similar empirical evidence. 
 
Table 5-38 
Model (4): Summary of Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management NPL 
All Banks Data 
Independent Variables 
Bivariate analysis OLS 
Pearson  T-test Mann  
Board size  (-)***   (-)** 
Non-executive board member       
Gender diversity    (-)*** (-)* 
CEO- turnover      
Role duality    (-)*** (-)** 
Audit committee  (-)*** (-)** (+)*** 
Credit and investment committee  (-)*** (-)*** (+)** 
Capital ratio (+)***   (-)* 
Loan to deposit ratio     (-)*** 
Risk committee   (-)*** (-)*** (-)** 
Bank type   (-)*  
Financial crisis     
Government ownership    (+)*** 
Bank size (-)***   (-)*** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
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5.6.4/2 Model (4) Results of association between corporate governance and risk 
management NPL for Islamic banks and conventional banks 
Table 5-39 presents a comparison between the results of Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks as follow; 
Board size, as indicated in table 5-39, in Islamic banks the association between board size 
and NPL is insignificant. However, in Conventional banks there is a negative and significant 
association between board size and NPL. This negative and significant relationship can be 
explained by stating that the higher the number of board members, the lower the percentage 
of NPL, which means better risk management. In line with the result, Surifah (2013), found 
that there is a negative and significant association between board size and (NPL); in 
contradiction with this, Nyor and Mejabi (2013) found that board size as a corporate 
governance variable has no significant impact on the non-performing loans of Nigerian 
deposit money banks.  
Non-executive board member, CEO-turnover, as mentioned in table 5-39, in both Islamic 
banks and Conventional banks the Non-executive board member and CEO-turnover is 
insignificantly associated with NPL. The results suggest that the changes in NPL cannot be 
explained by the changes in non-executive board member or CEO-turnover. On the other 
hand, both of executive and non-executive directors in the GCC banking sector are not 
playing a significant role in reducing the NPL. 
Gender diversity, as seen from the table 5-39, in Islamic banks and Conventional banks the 
association between gender diversity and NPL is negative and significant, which means that 
the existence of female members in the board is more associated with higher NPL in the GCC 
banking sector.      
Role duality, as per the results indicated in the table 5-39, in Islamic banks the association 
between role duality and NPL is insignificant. However, in Conventional banks, there is a 
negative and significant association with NPL. The results suggest that the duality between 
the two positions (chairman – CEO) is more significantly associated with risk management 
by increasing NPL. 
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Audit committee, as indicated in table 5-39, in Islamic banks there is an insignificant 
association with NPL. Furthermore, in conventional banks there is a positive and significant 
association with NPL; this result suggests that the existence of an audit committee is more 
significantly associated with higher NPL. As per this result, the audit committee in the GCC 
is not playing an effective and efficient role in reducing the NPL. Inconsistent with the result, 
Poudel and Hovey (2013), found that the audit committee has a significant negative relation 
with NPL. 
Credit and investment committee, as indicated in table 5-39, in Conventional banks there 
is an insignificant association with NPL. In addition, in Islamic banks there is a positive and 
significant association with (NPL); this result suggests that the existence of the committee is 
more significantly associated with higher NPL.  
Capital ratio, as indicated in table 5-39, in Conventional banks there is an insignificant 
association with (NPL), while in Islamic banks this association is negative and significant 
with NPL. Consistent with the result, Salas and Saurina (2002) reveal that capital ratio is 
statistically significant with non- performing loans. 
Loan to deposit ratio LDR, as indicated in table 5-39 in Islamic banks there is an 
insignificant association with NPL. However, in Conventional banks it is negative and 
significant; this result suggests that the higher the percentage of LDR, the lower the 
percentage of NPL.  
Risk committee, as indicated in the table 5-39, in Islamic banks there is an insignificant 
association with NPL. However, in Conventional banks it is negative and significant; based 
on this result, the existence of risk committee is more significantly associated with lower NPL 
in Conventional banks. 
Financial crisis, as indicated in the table 5-39, in Islamic banks there is an insignificant 
association with NPL. However, in Conventional banks there is a negative and significant 
association with NPL. The results suggest that the years before the crisis are related to the 
decrease in NPL.   
Government ownership, as indicated in the table 5-39, in this model the association in 
Islamic banks with NPL is insignificant. However, in Conventional banks it is positive and 
 Page 204 of 272 
 
significant, which means the non-government ownership is significantly associated with 
higher NPL. On the other hand, government banks are associated with a lower level of NPL, 
i.e. better risk management. 
Bank Size, as indicated in the table 5-39, in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks the 
bank size is negatively and significantly associated with NPL. The results suggest that the 
larger the bank size the lower the NPL, which means that there is better risk management. In 
addition, the larger banks have very big structures and have the ability to hire a highly 
qualified and experienced staff; this staff has the required knowledge in handling and 
managing the assets and risks.  
 
Table 5-39 
Model (4): Summary of Results 
Corporate Governance and Risk Management NPL 
(All banks Data- Islamic Banks – Conventional Banks)  
Independent Variables 
OLS 
All Banks Data  Islamic Banks Conventional 
Banks 
Board size  (-)**  (-)*** 
Non-executive board member      
Gender diversity  (-)* (-)** (-) *** 
CEO- turnover     
Role duality  (-)**  (-) *** 
Audit committee (+)***  (+) *** 
Credit and investment committee (+)** (+) ***  
Capital ratio (-)* (-) ***  
Loan to deposit ratio  (-)***  (-) *** 
Risk committee  (-)**  (-) *** 
Bank type  -------- -------- 
Financial crisis   (-) ** 
Government ownership (+)***  (+)*** 
Bank size (-)*** (-) ** (-)*** 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).     ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-
tailed). 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
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The hypothesis test results based on the statistical results of Model (4) of the association 
between corporate governance and risk management measured by NPL will be as follow: 
H3.1 There is significant association between role duality and risk 
management measured by NPL 
Accepted 
H3.2 
There is significant association between the percentage of non-
executive directors and risk management measured by (NPL) 
Rejected 
H3.3 There is significant association between Gender diversity and risk 
management measured by NPL 
Accepted 
H3.4 
There is significant association between board size and risk 
management measured by (NPL) 
Accepted 
H3.5 
There is significant association between CEO-turnover and risk 
management measured by (NPL) 
Rejected 
H3.6 
There is significant association between audit committee and risk 
management measured by NPL 
Accepted 
H3.7 
There is significant association between risk committee and risk 
management measured by (NPL) 
Accepted 
H3.8 
There is significant association between credit and investment 
committee and risk management measured by (NPL) 
Accepted 
H3.9 
There is significant association between capital ratio and risk 
management measured by (NPL) 
Accepted 
H3.10 
There is significant association between (LDR) and risk 
management measured by NPL 
Accepted 
 
From the above discussion of the results of this study, it can be noted that there are many 
agreements and disagreements with previous literature’s results. Furthermore, based on the 
results, number of predefined hypothesis have been accepted and other number of hypothesis 
have been refused. As presented, it can be concluded that further investigation in the future 
should be done for the same region but in different period.      
5.7 Conclusion 
This chapter aimed to identify the determinants of corporate governance and risk management 
practices in the GCC banking sector. This chapter reports the empirical findings of the 
association between corporate governance and risk management and bank performance for 
the period from 2003 to 2012 (10 years).  
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In this study, two types of analyses have been employed, bivariate and multivariate tests to 
analyse the data of the current study. In order to test the relationships between the dependent 
variables and each of the continuous variables, the bivariate analysis have been used, 
correlation coefficients; parametric and non-parametric tests. Furthermore, T-test and Mann 
Whitney tests were used as parametric and non-parametric tests to test the correlation between 
the dependent variables and each of nominal independent variables (dummy variables). In 
addition, the multivariate analysis have been used based on the regression analyses. To 
identify the relevant statistical technique, the data was examined to validate the assumptions 
of the classical regression; regression diagnostic. 
As mentioned at the top of this chapter, the R-squared (R2) of some models is low and as 
presented the low R-square are not always bad, and many important associations could be 
drawn from the dependent and independent variables. 
In reference to the empirical section and based on the findings of Model (1), the regression 
analysis has been ran to investigate the relationship between corporate governance’s variables 
and ROE and ROA. As mentioned in table 5-40 Panel (A) and (B), there are a number of 
variables that have a similar relationship with ROE and ROA. In the data of both banks, 
Islamic banks and conventional banks, those variables are CEO-turnover, role duality, LDR, 
financial crisis, and bank size. However, the other variables of corporate governance and 
control variables have a different relationship with ROE and ROA in all types of banks.   
Furthermore, in Islamic banks, there are a number of variables that have a similar relationship 
(insignificant association) with both ROE and ROA; those variables are board size, gender 
diversity, CEO-turnover, LDR, and role duality. In addition, the non-executive board 
members have a significant negative association with ROE and ROA. The capital ratio is 
positively and significantly associated with ROE and ROA. 
In Conventional banks, it was found that there are several variables that have similar 
relationships with ROE and ROA as follows; gender diversity, role duality, audit committee, 
credit and investment committee, and LDR are insignificantly associated with ROE and ROA. 
In addition, the CEO-turnover and risk committee are significantly and negatively associated 
with ROE and ROA.  
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Table 5-40 
Model (1) 
Summary of Results  
Panel A  
Corporate Governance and ROE  
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
All 
Banks 
Data 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conven
tional 
Banks 
Board size     
Non-executive board 
member   
(-) *** (-) ***  
Gender diversity     
CEO- turnover  (-) ***  (-) ** 
Role duality     
Audit committee    
Credit and investment 
committee 
(-) ** (-) **  
Capital ratio  (+) *  
Loan to deposit ratio 
(LDR) 
(+)*   
Risk committee    (-) *** 
Bank type (-) *** -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) (+) 
Government ownership 
(-) *** (-) *** (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) (+) 
 
Panel B 
Corporate governance ROA 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
All 
Banks 
Data  
Islamic 
Banks 
Conve
ntional 
Banks 
Board size    (-) ** 
Non-executive board 
member   
(-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Gender diversity  (+) *   
CEO- turnover  (-) **  (-) * 
Role duality     
Audit committee (-) ** (-) **  
Credit and investment 
committee 
   
Capital ratio (+) *** (+) (+) 
Loan to deposit ratio 
(LDR) 
(+)*   
Risk committee   (+) ** (-) 
Bank type  -------- -------
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) (+) 
Government ownership 
(-) *** (+) * (-) 
*** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) (+) ** 
 
*** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  ** Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*Correlation 
is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
 
In reference to the empirical section and based on the findings of Model (2) table 5-41 Panel 
(A) and (B), it was concluded that there are a number of variables which have the same 
relationship with ROE and ROA in the collective data of both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks. Those variables are CAR and credit risk. Interestingly, in Islamic banks the capital risk 
and liquidity risk are insignificant with ROE; however, it was significant with ROA. 
Regarding the NPL, it was noted that the NPL is insignificant with ROE and ROA in Islamic 
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banks, however in Conventional banks, this association was significant with ROE and 
insignificant with ROA. 
Regarding the control variables, both financial crisis and government ownership have the 
same association with ROE and ROA in Islamic banks and Conventional banks. 
 
Table 5-41 
Model (2) 
Summary of Results 
Panel (A)  
Risk Management andROE 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
All 
Banks 
Data 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conven. 
Banks 
Non-performing loan 
  (-) ** 
Capital adequacy 
ratio   
(+)* (+)* (+) * 
Credit risk    (-) *** 
Capital risk     
Liquidity  risk     
Bank type (-) *** -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government 
ownership 
(-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Bank size (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
 
Panel (A)  
Risk Management and ROA 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
All 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conven. 
Banks 
Non-performing 
loan 
   
Capital adequacy 
ratio   
(+) *** (+) ** (+) ** 
Credit risk    (-) *** 
Capital risk   (-) * (+) *** 
Liquidity  risk   (+) *  
Bank type (-) * -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+) *** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government 
ownership 
(-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Bank size (+) ***  (+) *** 
 
 
Based on the findings in the empirical section of Model (3) Table 5-42 panel A and B, it was 
concluded that there are a number of corporate governance and risk management variables 
which have the same association with ROE and ROA in both Islamic banks and Conventional 
banks. Those variables are; Board size, Non-executive board members, Gender diversity, 
CEO- turnover, Role duality, LDR, NPL, Credit risk, Capital risk, Liquidity risk, Financial 
crisis, Government ownership, and Bank size. Interestingly, the audit committee was 
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significant only with ROA in Islamic banks, while the credit and investment committee was 
significant only with ROE in Islamic banks. 
 
Table 5-42 
Model (3) 
Summary of Results 
Panel A  
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROE 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
All 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conven. 
Banks 
Board size    (-) *** 
Non-executive board 
member   
(-) *** (-) *** (-) ** 
Gender diversity     
CEO- turnover  (-) ***  (-) ** 
Role duality  (-)*   
Audit committee    
Credit and investment 
committee 
(-)* (-) **  
Capital ratio  (+) **  
Loan to deposit ratio     
Risk committee    (-) *** 
Non-performing loan 
(-)***   
Capital adequacy 
ratio   
 (-)*  
Credit risk  (-)***   
Capital risk  (-)**   
Liquidity  risk     
Bank type (-) *** -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government 
ownership 
(-)***  (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) ** (+) *** 
 
Panel B  
Corporate Governance and Risk Management with ROA 
Independent 
Variables 
OLS 
All 
Banks 
Islamic 
Banks 
Conven. 
Banks 
Board size    (-) ** 
Non-executive board 
member   
(-) *** (-) *** (-) * 
Gender diversity     
CEO- turnover  (-) ***  (-) * 
Role duality     
Audit committee (-) ** (-) ***  
Credit and 
investment 
committee 
   
Capital ratio (+) **   
Loan to deposit ratio  
(+) **   
Risk committee   (+) * (-) *** 
Non-performing loan 
   
Capital adequacy 
ratio   
  (+) * 
Credit risk  (-)*   
Capital risk     
Liquidity  risk     
Bank type  -------- -------- 
Financial crisis (+)*** (+) *** (+) *** 
Government 
ownership 
(-)***  (-) *** 
Bank size (+)*** (+) * (+) *** 
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In reference to the empirical section and based on the findings of Model (4) table 5-43 panel 
A and B, it was concluded that there are a number of corporate governance variables which 
have the same relationship with NPL in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks. These 
variables are; Non-executive board members, Gender diversity, CEO-turnover, and bank size. 
Furthermore, the Board size, Role duality, LDR, Risk committee, and financial crisis were 
negatively and significantly associated with NPL in conventional banks and insignificant in 
Islamic banks. Both audit committee and government ownership are positively and 
significantly associated with NPL in Conventional banks, and insignificant in Islamic banks.  
As mentioned in this chapter, the legitimacy and stakeholder theory can explain the 
relationship between corporate governance proxied by: board size; NEBM; gender diversity;  
CEO-turnover; role duality; audit committee; credit and investment committee; capital ratio; 
LDR; risk committee and risk management: NPL bank performance: ROE; ROA. 
Furthermore, as per legitimacy theory, banks owned by government are significantly 
associated with better ROE.     
The GCC central banks ply very important role in protecting the rights of all stakeholders by 
stating number of ratios such as NPL, CAR, credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk. The 
central banks monitor the performance, this role of central banks could support the use of 
legitimacy and stakeholder theory in explaining the relationship between the three constructs. 
In the current chapter, the regression analysis have been done for the four models, the results 
have been discussed and analysed to explore the relationship between the three constructs. 
Furthermore this chapter presented comparison between the results of Islamic and 
conventional banks. Chapter six will present the conclusion, implication, limitation and 
recommendations for future literature.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusions, Implication, Limitations and 
Recommendations for Future Research 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents and summarizes the results and conclusion of this study, and presents 
the contribution, implications, limitations and recommendations for future research as well. 
This chapter starts with section 6.2 that defines and outlines the research questions and 
methodology. Section 6.3 summarizes the findings of the study. Section 6.4 outlines the 
research contributions. Implications of the study are presented in section 6.5. Limitations of 
the study are presented in section 6.6. Lastly, this chapter ends with section 6.7 that presents 
the recommendations for future research. 
6.2 Research questions and methodology 
During the past couple of decades, corporate governance and risk management have been 
heavily discussed, especially in the banking sector. Due to the importance of corporate 
governance and risk management, this study highlights the relationship between both of them 
and their effect on bank performance in the GCC banking sector. Furthermore, this study used 
a sample of 90 active banks from all GCC countries during the period from (2003-2012). This 
study aims to answer the following questions: 
Q1. Does better corporate governance lead to better bank performance? 
Q2. Does better risk management mean better bank performance? 
Q3. Does better corporate governance and risk management lead to better bank 
performance? 
Q4. Does better corporate governance lead to better risk management? 
Empirically, this study answers the research questions by applying a regression analysis to 
investigate the association between corporate governance and risk management over the 
selected period. Moreover, the results have been analysed to outline the extent to which 
corporate governance and risk management affect the bank performance, and to which extent 
corporate governance affects risk management over time. In addition to the above, a number 
of hypothesis have been formulated based on the proposed theoretical framework and 
evidence from prior studies. The formulated hypotheses have been tested in the empirical 
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section using OLS regressions as a statistical method. The next section presents the findings 
of this study. 
6.3 Findings of the study 
The current study highlights the applicability of the political-economic approach; stakeholder 
theory and legitimacy theory to an understanding of the relationship between corporate 
governance, risk management and bank performance. Based on the selected sample, there is 
evidence supporting some of the predefined hypotheses, i.e. there is agreement between the 
hypotheses and the results. On the other hand, some of the results disagree with the 
hypotheses. Furthermore, the current study presents a comparison between the results of 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. This section will highlight the important findings that 
have been reached in chapter five as follows: 
Model (1): corporate governance and bank performance  
The regression analysis has been ran to investigate the relationship between the corporate 
governance variables and bank performance measured by ROE and ROA for all banks’ data, 
Islamic banks and conventional banks. The highlighted findings as per table 5-40 is as follow;   
- It was concluded that there is variation on the effect of bank performance measured 
by ROE and ROA with regard to the effect of CEO-turnover, role duality, LDR, 
financial crisis and bank size on ROE and ROA. Whereas, the CEO-turnover is 
insignificant with ROE and ROA in Islamic banks, however, it is negative and 
significant on both ROE and ROA in conventional banks.  
- The role duality and LDR are insignificant with ROE and ROA in both Islamic and 
conventional banks.  
- The financial crisis and bank size are positively significant with bank performance 
measured by ROE and ROA in both Islamic and conventional banks. 
- In Islamic banks, it was noted that there are a number of variables that have a similar 
relationship (insignificant association) with bank performance, measured by both 
ROE and ROA; those variables are board size, gender diversity, CEO-turnover, LDR, 
and role duality.  
- The non-executive board members have a significant and negative association with 
ROE and ROA.  
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- The capital ratio is positively and significantly associated with ROE and ROA. 
- In Conventional banks, it was found that there are a number of variables that have a 
similar relationship with both ROE and ROA as follows; Gender diversity, role 
duality, audit committee, credit and investment committee, and LDR are 
insignificantly associated with ROE and ROA.  
- The CEO-turnover and risk committee are significantly and negatively associated 
with ROE and ROA. 
Model (2): risk management and bank performance  
The regression analysis has been done to investigate the relationship between risk 
management’s variables and bank performance measured by ROE and ROA for all banks 
data, Islamic banks and conventional banks. The highlighted findings as per table 5-41 is as 
follow;  
- The CAR and credit risk have the same relationship with ROE and ROA in both 
banks’ data, Islamic and Conventional banks, whereas CAR is positive and significant 
with performance in Islamic and conventional banks.  
- Credit risk is insignificant with performance in Islamic banks, however, it is 
significant and negative with performance in conventional banks. 
- Interestingly, in Islamic banks the capital risk and liquidity risk are insignificant with 
ROE; however, it was significant with ROA.  
- Regarding the NPL, it was noted that the NPL is insignificant with ROE and ROA in 
Islamic banks; however in Conventional banks, this association was significant with 
ROE and insignificant with ROA.  
- Regarding the control variables, both financial crisis and government ownership have 
the same association with ROE and ROA in Islamic banks and Conventional banks. 
Model (3): corporate governance and risk management and bank performance  
the regression analysis has been done investigate the relationship between both corporate 
governance and risk management’s variables and bank performance measured by ROE and 
ROA for all banks’ data, Islamic banks and conventional banks. The highlighted findings as 
per table 5-42 is as follow; 
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- It was concluded that there are a number of corporate governance and risk 
management variables that have the same association with ROE and ROA in both 
Islamic banks and Conventional banks, whereas, gender diversity, role duality, LDR, 
NPL, credit risk, capital risk and liquidity risk are insignificant with bank performance 
measured by ROE and ROA in both Islamic and conventional banks.  
- In addition, the non-executive board member is negative and significant with bank 
performance measured by ROE and ROA in both Islamic and conventional banks.  
- Financial crisis and Bank size are positive and significant with performance measured 
by ROE and ROA in both Islamic and conventional banks. 
- Interestingly, the audit committee was significant only with ROA in Islamic banks, 
while the credit and investment committee was significant only with ROE in Islamic 
banks. 
Model (4): corporate governance and risk management 
The regression analysis has been used to investigate the effect of corporate governance on 
risk management measured by NPL for all banks’ data, Islamic banks and conventional banks. 
The highlighted findings is as follow;  
- It was concluded that there are a number of corporate governance variables which 
have the same relationship with NPL in both Islamic banks and Conventional banks; 
whereas non-executive board member and CEO- turnover are insignificant with risk 
management measured by NPL.  
- In addition, gender diversity and bank size are negative and significant with risk 
management measured by NPL. 
- Board size, Role duality, LDR, Risk committee, and financial crisis were negatively 
and significantly associated with risk management in conventional banks; those 
variables were insignificant with risk management in Islamic banks.  
- Both of audit committee and government ownership are positively and significantly 
associated with risk management measured by NPL in Conventional banks, but this 
association was insignificant in Islamic banks. 
Generally, in the current study there is variety in the results; some of the results support the 
predefined hypotheses, while other results were noted to disagree with the hypotheses. On the 
 Page 215 of 272 
 
other hand, the current study identifies the determinants of corporate governance and risk 
management and performance, and highlights that there is further need in the future to study 
and analyse this relationship (over a different period) in order confirm the results and find out 
the variation based on the maturity of the banking sector in the GCC region. 
6.4 Contribution to knowledge 
The results of the current study have significant contributions to the literature by 
comprehensively clarifying and analysing the current relationship between corporate 
governance and risk management and their implications on bank performance among the 
Islamic banks and conventional banks located in the GCC region. This would subsequently 
have significant implications to all stakeholders; policy makers, regulators, management, 
board of directors, CEOs and shareholders, to whom the findings provide important insights 
on the areas which need to be strengthened for more effective and efficient corporate 
governance and risk management.  
Empirically, this study contributes to the corporate governance and risk management 
literature as follows: 
1. As indicated in chapter three, due to the few number of studies in the area of corporate 
governance, risk management, and bank performance in the GCC banking sector, this 
study will fill the gap in literature by investigating and analysing the relationship 
between the above mentioned constructs, and providing new empirical evidence from 
the GCC region. 
2. This study provides evidence that the independent variables of corporate governance 
and risk management vary in their impact on bank performance of both of Islamic and 
conventional banks in GCC banking sector. 
3. The results of this study could be used as a benchmark for similar studies in other 
countries that have similar cultural and regulatory characteristics.  
4. The conclusions of this study are consistent with GCC culture and the degree of 
maturity of the banking sector, as follows; 
- Gender diversity as a proxy variable for corporate governance, it was found that 
the existence of female members is insignificant with bank performance in both 
Islamic and Conventional banks. In addition, the existence of female members is 
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related to worse risk management represented in higher NPL; this result is 
consistent with the GCC culture and the fact that the women in this region need 
more time to acquire the experience and qualifications needed to become familiar 
with the business management sphere. 
- This study concluded that the existence of committees belonging to the board is 
mostly associated with lower performance ROE and ROA or Higher NPL, and in 
some associations it was insignificant. This result gives us an indication that these 
committees still need time to be matured enough to affect the bank performance 
and risk management positively. 
- Furthermore, in most of the results in Islamic banks and Conventional banks, the 
larger bank size is almost related to better bank performance and better risk 
management by higher ROE and ROA and Lower NPL. This result is consistent 
with many previous literature. 
- The results in conventional banks refer to the fact that the banks owned by 
government are related more to better bank performance and better risk 
management. This result reflects the power of the GCC government in 
conventional banks in enhancing performance and risk management. On the other 
hand, the governments in the GCC in Islamic banks need some time to acquire the 
tools and experience required in managing such banks. 
6.5 Implication of the study 
There is a very important implication for this study on all stakeholders (government 
authorities, shareholders, board of directors, management, clients, central banks and 
investors….etc.). The banking sector’s stakeholders may rely on some of the important results 
as follows: 
- Most of the results referred to that the existence of executive directors in the board 
is associated with better bank performance. As per this result, the boards should hire 
executive directors who deeply understand the financial and the operational 
prospective.   
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- The boards of directors in the GCC banking sector (Islamic and conventional) 
should apply more efforts to enhance and maximize the role of audit committees in 
order to positively affect the bank performance. 
- In addition to the above, the boards of directors in the GCC should give better 
opportunities to females in the boards, and give them enough time to be matured 
sufficiently, similar to females in western countries, to positively affect the 
performance. Furthermore and as per the results, females should be trained and 
experienced in dealing with risk management. 
- There is a consensus that banks performance before the crisis was better than after 
the crisis, so boards and managements should be ready for crisis by maintaining 
tools and mechanisms that enable them to deal with the crisis’ side effects. 
- In addition, as per the results, the audit committees in both Islamic and conventional 
banks are not playing an effective role in risk management, therefore the boards of 
directors should take actions to maximize the benefits from audit committees in 
mitigating and controlling risks. 
- In relation to the results, the association between credit risk and bank performance 
in conventional banks is significant and negative; however, it is insignificant in 
Islamic banks. The implication of this result is that this association is healthy in 
conventional banks and reflects the logical concept of the fact that effective risk 
management is related to better performance; however in Islamic banks, the 
management should play an advanced role in maintaining the credit risk at low 
levels and bank returns at high levels. 
6.6 Limitations of the study 
The current study has some limitations that need to be acknowledged and identified when 
assessing the results of the study. This section will present these limitations as follows: 
1. The current study depends on a quantitative method in collecting and analysing data. 
Qualitative methods were not adopted in the current study. However, the use of qualitative 
techniques, such as interviews, questionnaire and case studies in addition to the 
quantitative approach may improve understanding of the issue of corporate governance 
and risk management.  
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2. In addition to the above, this study relies on secondary data as a main source for collecting 
data, Primary data may be a useful tool if it is accompanied by secondary data. 
3. Furthermore the lake of qualitative information on the variables being used (such as the 
characteristics of female on the board) makes interpretation of the results are limited. 
4. The current study relies on profitability as a proxy variable for bank performance; return 
on equity ROE and return on assets ROA. Furthermore, the NPL has been used only as a 
proxy for risk management. But as mentioned in chapter four there are so many variables 
could be used as a proxy for bank performance and risk management, if those variables 
were used in this study, the results could be more enriched and more interpreted. ies.    
6.7 Recommendations for future research 
As per practice and experience in this field, the following recommendations will be presented 
for future research: 
1. The current study provides evidence that the determinants of bank performance in the 
GCC banking sector vary among the different independent variables. There was no single 
variable that could explain the changes in bank performance. This highlights that there is 
a need for more analysing of the three constructs, in different regions with different 
cultures and conditions. 
2. For future research related to this topic, the researchers can select different types of 
performance; productivity, liquidity, marketability and human resources to use as a proxy 
for bank performance. They can additionally use another dependent variable as a proxy 
for risk management such as interest risk, market risk, off-balance risk, technology and 
operational risk, foreign exchange risk, country risk and insolvency risk. 
3. For future research, the researchers can investigate the same relationships in the GCC 
banking sector but only after 2012, and make comparisons between the results to discover 
the maturity of corporate governance and risk management in this region. 
4. The future research may employ different qualitative techniques such as questionnaire 
and interviews as much as possible. 
5. The establishment of dedicated committees in the GCC banking sector has started during 
the last few years, which is why this study measured their existence. Future research can 
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develop different variables with more characteristic such as; number of meetings, 
qualification of members, member’s experience, gender diversity and age. 
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Appendix 1: List of 90 Banks (30 Islamic and 60 Conventional) 
Islamic Banks Conventional Banks 
Bank Name  
Countr
y 
Bank Name Countr
y 
1 Dubai Islamic Bank  UAE 1 Emirates NBD Bank UAE 
2 Emirates Islamic Bank UAE 2 National Bank of Abu Dhabi UAE 
3 Sharjah Islamic Bank UAE 3 Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank  UAE 
4 Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank UAE 4 First Gulf Bank  UAE 
5 Noor Islamic Bank UAE 5 Union National Bank  UAE 
6 Al Hilal Bank UAE 6 Mashreq Bank  UAE 
7 Ajman Bank UAE 7 Commercial Bank of Dubai 
P.S.C. 
UAE 
8 Al Rajhi Bank SA 8 Bank of Sharjah  UAE 
9 Islamic Development Bank SA 9 National Bank of Fujairah  UAE 
10 Al Inma bank    SA 10 Commercial Bank International  UAE 
11 Bank Al Bilad   
SA 
11 
Arab Bank for Investment & 
Foreign Trade-Al Masraf 
UAE 
12 Boubyan Bank (K.S.C)  Kuwait 12 National Bank of U.A.Q  UAE 
13 Kuwait International Bank 
(K.S.C)  
Kuwait 13 Invest Bank   UAE 
14 Al Baraka Islamic Bank Bahrain 14 Emirates Investment Bank 
PJSC 
UAE 
15 Arcapita Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 15 Credit Europe Bank (Dubai) 
Ltd 
UAE 
16 Al-Salam Bank -Bahrain 
B.S.C. 
Bahrain 16 National Commercial Bank SA 
17 ahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 17 Riyadh Bank SA 
18 Khaleeji Commercial Bank Bahrain 18 Banque Saudi Fransi SA 
19 Gulf Finance House BSC 
(Bank) 
Bahrain 19 The Saudi British Bank SA 
20 Bank Al-Khair Bahrain 20 Arab National Bank SA 
21 Elaf Bank Bahrain 21 Saudi Hollandi Bank SA 
22 Seera Investment Bank Bahrain 22 Bank Al-Jazira SA 
23 Venture Capital Bank Bahrain 23 National Bank of Kuwait (K.S.C) Kuwait 
24 Global Banking Corporation Bahrain 24 Burgan Bank (K.S.C) Kuwait 
25 Investors Bank Bahrain 25 Gulf Bank (K.S.C) 
 
Kuwait 
26 Citi Islamic Investment Bank Bahrain 26 Commercial Bank of Kuwait 
(K.S.C) 
Kuwait 
27 Qatar Islamic Bank  Qatar 27 Al Ahli Bank of Kuwait (K.S.C) Kuwait 
28 Masraf AL Rayan  Qatar 28 Al Ahli United Bank   Kuwait 
29 Al Khalij Commercial Bank 
Qatar 
29 
The Industrial Bank of Kuwait 
(K.S.C) 
Kuwait 
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30 Qatar International Islamic  Qatar 30 Ahli United Bank Bahrain 
   31 Arab Banking Corporation Bahrain 
   32 Gulf International Bank Bahrain 
   33 Bank of Bahrain and Kuwiat 
BBK B.S.C.  
Bahrain 
   34 National Bank of Bahrain Bahrain 
   35 Ithmaar Bank Bahrain 
   36 Investcorp Bank Bahrain 
   37 BMI Bank BSC Bahrain 
   38 Future Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 
   39 United Gulf Bank (BSC) EC Bahrain 
   40 Alubaf Arab International Bank Bahrain 
   41 Bahrain Development Bank Bahrain 
   42 TAIB Bank B.S.C. Bahrain 
   43 Gulf One Investment Bank Bahrain 
   44 Addax Bank BSC Bahrain 
   45 BMB Investment Bank-Bahrain 
Middle East Bank B.S.C. 
Bahrain 
   46 Bank Muscat SAOG Oman 
   47 National Bank of Oman SAOG Oman 
   48 HSBC Bank Oman Oman 
   49 Bank Dhofar SAOG Oman 
   50 Bank Sohar SAOG Oman 
   51 Oman Arab Bank SAOC Oman 
   52 Ahli Bank SAOG Oman 
   53 Oman Housing Bank Oman 
   54 Oman Development Bank 
SAOC 
Oman 
   55 Qatar National Bank  Qatar 
   56 Commercial Bank  Qatar 
   57 Doha Bank  Qatar 
   58 International Bank of Qatar 
Q.S.C. 
Qatar 
   59 AL Ahli Bank  Qatar 
   60 Qatar Development Bank  Qatar 
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Appendix 2: Summary of previous studies 
 
# By Objectives Variables Methods/Data 
Collection 
Main Results 
1 Peni et al. 
(2013), USA 
The main objective of this 
study is to examine the 
association between bank 
corporate governance and 
real estate lending and loan 
losses during the period of 
financial crisis. 
Bank profitability Variables: will 
be measured by return on assets 
ROA,  
Corporate governance will be 
measured by three variables as 
follows: (1) loans to total assets 
(LOANTA), (2) loan losses to total 
assets (LOSSTA), and (3) loan losses 
to real estate loans (LOSSLN),  
There are three different types of 
loans for real estate activities; 1) 
Commercial loans, 2) Residential 
loans, 3) Construction and land 
development loans. 
This study used a data on 
publicly traded bank 
holding companies during 
the period from (2006 to 
2009) i.e. before during 
after the financial crisis.  
This study includes the 
S&P 1500 index and have 
number of forms of real 
estate lending. 
The results of this study indicated 
that:  
1) Banks with good corporate 
governance is associated significantly 
with higher profitability during selected 
period.  
2) There are different levels of effects 
for the corporate governance on 
performance, and this effect is depend 
on the definition of the financial crisis 
duration.   
3) Banks with stronger corporate 
governance mechanism is associated 
significantly with lower amount of loan 
losses during the selected period, in 
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addition, banks in sample are associated 
significantly with larger losses in 2009.  
2 Uwuigbe 
and Fakile 
(2012), 
Nigeria 
The main objective of this 
study is to examine the 
association between board 
size and bank performance, 
for this purpose they 
concentrate the sample on 
Nigeria listed banks.   
The two constructs involved in this 
study are corporate governance 
represented by board size and bank 
Performance represented by return 
on equity ROE. 
This study made use of 
secondary data and used a 
range of data drawn from 
the annual reports of the 
banks under review and 
also the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange Fact Book 
(2008). This data base 
contains detailed 
information on the 
financial performance of 
all listed companies in all 
segments in Nigeria. It 
also contains information 
on ownership pattern and 
board size which was 
useful for the analysis in 
this study. The regression 
analysis is used in 
analysing the impact of 
the corporate governance 
a) This study concluded that there is a 
negative relationship between board 
size and bank financial performance in 
Nigeria.  
b) In addition, larger board is less 
effective than smaller boards because, 
increase in board’s size occurs with 
increase in agency problems.  
c) Large board size leads to the free rider 
problem where most of the board 
members play a passive role in 
monitoring the firm. 
d) This study recommends a smaller 
board size (6 and 8) for better financial 
performance of banks in Nigeria. This 
will reduce the problem of free rider 
and enhance effective monitoring and 
decision-making.  
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proxy (board size) on the 
performance of the listed 
banks. 
3 Epure, 
Lafuente 
(2015), 
Costa Rican 
The main objective of this 
study is to examine the 
effects of corporate 
governance and different 
kind of risks on costa rican 
bank performance. 
Economic Performance Variables: 
ROA, Return on assets. 
NIM, The net interest margin. 
Risk Variables: 
CAR, The capital adequacy ratio.  
NPL, For the non-performing loans 
ratio. 
Corporate Governance Variables: 
CEO turnover 
Data come from the 
Costa Rican Central 
Bank, are publicly 
available, and comprise 
information for all banks 
operating in the industry 
during 1998-2007. The 
analysis consistently 
includes all three state-
owned banks and the 
three mutual banks. The 
number of private banks 
decreased from 18 in 
1998 to 11 in 2007. 
Finally, cooperative 
banks accounted for 25 
between 1998 and 2003 
and for 23 of the 
observations during 
2004-2007. Thus, the 
Results reveal that performance 
improvements follow regulatory 
changes and that risk explains 
differences in performance. Non-
performing loans negatively affect 
efficiency and return on assets, whereas 
the capital adequacy ratio positively 
affects the net interest margin. This 
supports that incurring monitoring costs 
and having higher levels of 
capitalization may enhance 
performance. Finally, results confirm 
that appointing CEOs from outside the 
bank significantly improves 
performance, thus suggesting the 
potential benefits of new organizational 
practices. 
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total analyzed sample 
comprises 454 firm-year 
observations. 
4 Berger et al. 
(2014), 
Germany 
The main objective in this 
literature is to investigate 
the association between 
corporate governance 
measured by board 
composition such as; 
(gender diversity, age of 
directors, and their 
qualification) and risk 
management and their 
implication on 
performance. 
 
a) The dependent variable is the ratio 
of return to risk-weighted assets 
(RORWA) as measure of 
performance. 
b) The three main explanatory 
variables are average board age, the 
share of female board members, 
and the share of board members 
with PhD. 
c) Ratio of Customer loans to total 
assets, and the ratio of Off-balance-
sheet items to total assets. 
d) Capital adequacy ratio (CAR). 
e) Bank size is measured by Total 
assets. 
 
 
This study used a sample 
from German central 
bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank), and then 
match executives to 
banks. The advantage of 
this data sample is that it 
has a complete set of 
information about the 
main characteristics of 
executives such as; age, 
gender, and education, to 
construct indicators of the 
composition of the board 
of director during the 
period from 1994 to 2010 
for 19,750 observations 
on 3,525 banks. 
First, the decreases in average board 
age are robustly associated with 
increased bank risk taking. This effect 
is statistically and economically large. 
Second, female executives self-select 
into stable and well-capitalized banks. 
However, in the three years following 
the increase in female board 
representation, risk taking increases, 
although the change is economically 
marginal. 
Third, educational attainment, 
measured by the presence of executives 
with Ph.D. 
 Page 246 of 272 
 
This study focus on 
managers, rather than 
non-executive directors. 
5 Kim et al. 
2012, 
Malaysia 
The main objective of this 
study  is to investigate the 
association between 
corporate governance 
mechanism and bank 
performance in Malaysia 
1) Capital adequacy ratio CAR,   
2) Ownership structure OWN, 
3) Capital Adequacy Ratio CAR, 
4) Fixed Asset and Inventory to 
Capital FAI, 
5) ROE, Return on Equity. 
This study comprised of 4 
private domestically –
owned banks and 7 
foreign-owned banks.  
This study concluded that banks need to 
make changes in order to be globally 
standard and to be able to compete for 
stability profitability of the banking 
sector.     
6 Aebi et al. 
2011, 
Germany 
The objective of this study 
is to investigate the 
association between 
corporate governance 
specially the risk 
governance and bank 
performance during the 
crisis of 2008. 
Furthermore this literature 
investigates the relationship 
between the existence of a 
a) Three Measures of bank 
performance: 
First, the banks’ buy-and-hold 
returns over the time period July 1, 
2007, to December 31, 2008. 
Second, return on assets ROA. 
Third, return on equity ROE. 
b) Corporate governance variables: 
Empirical Analysis: 
a) Descriptive statistics:               
measures bank crisis 
performance, corporate 
and risk governance 
variables, and the 
financial control 
variables within large 
sample including 372 
bank observations.  
b) Multivariate analysis: 
This study highlighted the importance 
of “risk governance” in banking sector. 
In addition, they referred to that banks 
to be better prepared to face the next 
financial crisis have to significantly 
improve the corporate governance 
system and enhance their risk 
management function. Also banks 
should have dedicated CRO position to 
handle all issues of risks and it should 
be on the same level of CEO, and 
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Chief Risk Officer (CRO) 
on the board and the risk 
management related 
corporate governance 
mechanisms and bank 
performance.  
First, The CRO is a member of the 
executive board (CRO in executive 
board). 
Second, the bank has a (Risk 
committee) 
Third, board size. 
Fourth, board independence as 
measured by the percentage of 
independent outside directors. 
Fifth, percentage of directors with 
experience (present or past). 
c) Financial control variables: 
First, the 18-month buy-and-hold 
returns over the time period July 1, 
2005, to December 31, 2006. 
Second, ratio of deposits to total 
assets (Deposits/assets). 
 
   Depends on regressions 
of Buy-and-hold 
returnson alternative sets 
of corporate / risk 
governance variables, and 
control variables using 
the set of five hand-
collected corporate 
governance variables 
with availability for all 
372 sample banks along 
with Institutional 
shareholdingsand the 
seven control variables. 
ideally both of them should be reporting 
to the board of directors.  
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7 Tsorhe et al. 
(2011), 
Ghana 
This study used a sample 
from Ghanaian banking 
sector to investigate the 
association between 
corporate governance in 
banking sector and risk 
management measured by 
three main variables; 
(capital risk, credit risk and 
liquidity risk). They 
focused mainly in this 
literature on the overall 
health of the financial 
system of Ghanaian banks. 
 
The variables are: 
Capital Risk, equity capital divided 
by total assets. 
Credit Risk, loan loss provision 
divided by total loans. 
Liquidity Risk of the fund,  
The explanatory variables are: 
Board Strength, value of board 
index. 
Central Bank Regulation, 
logarithm of the reserve fund. 
Depositors’ Influence, loans 
divided by deposits. 
Shareholders’ Influence, Total 
Equity divided by total loans. 
Management Efficiency, Operating 
expenses to total income. 
Total Assets of Bank. 
This literature examined 
the association between 
corporate governance and 
the three variables of risk 
management, those 
variables are related to 
liquidity, credit and 
capital. 
This literature got empirical evidence 
that the association between the board 
strength as a measurement for corporate 
governance and the three kinds of risks; 
capital risk, credit risk and liquidity risk 
is insignificant at any significance level, 
and the tendency is for stronger boards 
to impact these risks positively.  
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Inflation and Central Bank 
Lending rate. 
8 Al-Hawary 
(2011),  
Jordanian 
The main objective of this 
study is to investigate the 
association between bank 
governance measured by 
(board size, capital 
adequacy ratio, role duality, 
the concentration of 
ownership the existence of 
non-executive directors, 
and) on bank performance 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
The Main Variables 
1. Board Size 
2. CEO-Chair Duality  
3. Board Composition 
4. Block Holders 
5. Largest shareholder 
6. Capital Adequacy 
7. Return on Assets 
8. Return on Equity 
9. Assets 
10. Leverage 
 
 
In this paper, multiple-
regression analysis has 
been used to investigate 
the association between 
independent variables and 
dependent variables, the 
bank size is the log of 
book value of assets), and 
leverage (debt to total 
equity). 
There is one multiple-
regression analysis model 
is employed. Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF) is 
used, and specified the 
allowed tolerance of each 
independent variable. 
This study used Pearson 
correlation coefficient to 
define if there is any 
The results of this study indicated 
that: 
The association between corporate 
governance variables; (role duality, 
ownership concentration, existence of 
non-executive directors and capital 
adequacy ratio) and bank performance 
is significant.  
The corporations should work 
effectively to have a good corporate 
governance in order to affect the 
performance positively.  
Furthermore, cooperation and 
coordination should be there between 
both of private and public sectors to 
establish corporate governance 
mechanisms to enhance and develop the 
performance and risk management.  
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multicollinearity issues 
between variables.  
9 Farazi et al. 
(2011), 
Middle East 
and North 
Africa 
This study used a sample 
data from MENA banks 
during the period from 
2001 to 2008. The main 
purpose of this study is to 
investigate the general 
trends of banks in MENA 
banking sector in termas of 
performance, and do 
comparison between state 
and private banks; domestic 
banks and foreign banks. It 
also examines the 
association between the 
listing of MENA banks and 
their performance. 
Dependent variables of this 
literature can be grouped into four 
main groups: 
First, general profitability and 
interest-related factors: Return on 
Assets ROA, Net Interest Margin 
(NIM) and Return on Equity ROE to 
investigate the interest-related side 
of the business. 
Second, efficiency variables: total 
Overhead Costs to Assets, and 
Personnel Costs to Assets. 
Third, asset allocation: Securities to 
Assets ratio. 
Fourth, asset quality. 
In line with other empirical studies, 
this study used number of control 
variables total assets, non-interest 
This study adopts a 
comprehensive bank-
level empirical analysis to 
assess the association 
between bank ownership 
and performance in nine 
non-GCC MENA 
countries. 
In a second step they turn 
to bank-level multivariate 
panel regression analysis 
in order to analyze 
ownership while 
simultaneously 
controlling for various 
bank characteristics.  
Most of data are taken 
from Fitch’s Bank scope 
database and include 
unconsolidated 
This study finds that: state banks are 
significantly less profitable than private 
banks in the non-GCC region. 
In addition, Foreign banks have slightly 
higher interest margins and profit ratios 
relative to private domestic banks, but 
the differences are not significant. 
It also finds that listed banks are more 
profitable than non-listed banks, 
controlling for their smaller size and 
balance sheet structures. 
Listed banks have performed better than 
non-listed banks, and this may be due to 
the stricter governance standards and 
disclosure requirements imposed on 
these banks. 
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income to total assets, deposits to 
assets and loans to assets.  
statements of commercial 
banks in MENA. The 
sample roughly 
comprises 600 bank-year 
observations of about 120 
banks in 9 countries for 
the period 2001-08.  
10 Sarens, 
Christopher, 
2010, 
Belgium and 
Australia 
The main objective of this 
literature is to test the 
extent of effective and 
efficient risk management 
as a corporate governance 
tool in Belgian banking 
sector, and there is any 
associated between both.  
respondents were asked to evaluate 
the following four dimensions, 
representing four 
 a) dependent variables:   
1) Formalization of the risk 
management and internal control 
system. Within the company. 
2) Risk and control awareness. 
3) Development of internal 
controls. 
4) Risk management function. 
b) Independent variable: 
Data collection: A 
questionnaire was 
developed, based upon 
literature and a review of 
the corporate governance 
guidelines in both 
countries.  
The target population 
consists 
(e.g. banks, insurance, 
and listed companies). 
 
Overall Conclusion, it was found that 
the poor concentration on Belgian 
corporate governance mechanism in 
relation to risk management and 
internal control is associated with worse 
risk management and internal control 
systems in Belgian companies. In 
comparison with Australian firms, the 
Australian firms are more enhanced and 
developed. 
Both countries firms are not mandated 
to comply with corporate governance 
guidelines. Furthermore, in both 
countries, board of director or audit 
committees also are highly 
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There was only one independent 
variable of interest (dummy variable) 
in this study: 
Country, indicating whether it was a 
Belgian (dummy = 1) or an 
Australian company (dummy = 2). 
Country was considered a proxy for 
the institutionalized corporate 
governance guidelines. 
c) Control Variables: 
- Finance = Company operates in the 
financial industry or not (0/1). 
- IC _ statement = Company 
provides an internal control 
statement in its annual report or not 
(0/1). 
- Industry _ complexity =the 
industry in which the company 
operates is highly complex or not 
(0/1). 
recommended that they should review 
the corporate governance, risk 
management and internal control 
system guidelines regularly. 
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- Company _ growth = Over the past 
two years, company growth was 
positive or not (0/1). 
- Firm _ size = Total assets are more 
than one billion or not (0/1). 
- Reporting _ levels = There are five 
or more reporting levels between 
top management and the lowest 
operating unit or not (0/1). 
- Operation _ countries = the 
company has one or more 
operating units in ten or more 
countries or not (0/1). 
11 Cheung et 
al. (2010), 
Hong Kong 
This literature used a Hong 
Kong Data from SEC in 
purpose of investigating the 
association between 
corporate governance and 
the future firms’ stock 
returns and future firms’ 
risk.  
MTBV, CAR, IRISK, B, STDRET, 
CGI, ∆CGI, market firm Size, 
D/E, ROA, TOP 3, Family firm, 
Board size, BOUT ratio, Dummy 
HR, Firm Size, Debt Equity Ratio, 
ROA and Board size. 
Ownership structure data 
are obtained from annual 
reports. All data are 
processed according to 
the firm’s fiscal date. 
Assessing the impact of 
corporate governance 
(proxy by the CGI) on 
Overall Conclusion, the quality of 
corporate governance (as proxied by the 
level of the scores in the CGI) appears 
very significant in explaining future 
company returns and risk. Good 
corporate governance is associated with 
both higher stock returns and with 
lower unsystematic risk. Similarly, poor 
corporate governance is associated with 
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future company stock 
performance and risk. 
This study measure future 
stock performance as the 
12-month cumulative 
abnormal return adjusted 
by Fama-French (1993) 
three factor model in the 
fiscal year following the 
reading of the CGI or its 
change. 
and measure risk in three 
ways. First, as the B and 
the standard deviation of 
the residuals from a 
market model estimated 
with one fiscal year of 
daily stock returns. 
Second, as the standard 
deviation of daily stock 
returns calculated over 
one fiscal year. 
both lower stock returns and higher 
unsystematic risk. 
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12 Kim, Rasiah 
2010, 
Malaysia 
This study attempts to 
identify and understand the 
differences between two 
types of banking ownership 
– the private domestic-
owned banks and the 
foreign-owned banks in 
term of relationship 
between corporate 
governance and bank 
performance in the pre and 
post Asian financial crisis. 
a) The main proxy for corporate 
governance is capital adequacy 
requirements (CAR). 
b) Other variables that are relevant to 
assess external corporate 
governance in banking are, Capital 
ratio (CR), cash claim on central 
bank (CCC), secondary reserve 
ratio (SRR), loan to deposits ratio 
(LDR), loan loss provisioning 
(LLP) and fixed assets and 
inventories to capital (FAI). 
c) Proxy for bank performance is 
Return on Equity ROE. 
 
Two types of data 
analysis methods are used 
to analyze the sample 
data. First, descriptive 
and inferential statistical 
analysis. Second, 
regression model 
analysis. These 
techniques are used to 
examine the relationships 
among the governance 
mechanisms and 
performance of selected 
private domestically 
owned banks and foreign-
owned banks, this 
research uses the 
simultaneous method as a 
method to analyze the 
selected sample data.  
The main Conclusion is that there is a 
Positive and significant association 
between the corporate governance and 
bank performance in Malaysia. 
Empirical evidence also shows that 
there is a positive and significant 
foreign ownership and government-
connected ownership variables as well 
as governance variables with different 
bank performance measures in foreign-
owned banks and private domestically 
owned banks. Therefore, in the pre-
crisis, foreign-owned banks had a better 
implementation of good corporate 
governance and had gained better 
performance than that of private 
domestically owned banks in Malaysia. 
Nonetheless, in the post crisis, private 
domestically owned banks had a better 
implementation of good corporate 
governance, and had gained better 
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This research attempts to 
determine which types of 
bank ownership differ 
significantly on practices 
of corporate governance 
on bank performance in 
the pre and post financial 
crisis. 
performance than that of foreign-owned 
banks. 
 
13 Gordon et al. 
2009, United 
States 
The main point for this 
study is that the association 
between enterprise risk 
management and 
Performance is contingent 
upon the appropriate match 
between ERM and the 
following five factors 
affecting a firm:  
a) Environmental 
uncertainty,  
b) Industry competition, 
c)  Firm size, 
Firm performance:  is measured in 
this study by the one-year excess 
stock market return to shareholders. 
Environmental uncertainty (EU): 
is defined as the change or 
variability in the organization’s 
external environment. 
Industry competition: is measured 
as one minus the Herfindahl – 
Hirschman Index (1- HHI).  
Firm complexity: is associated with 
the number of business segments 
within a firm.  
This study derives the 
functional relation 
between the ERMI 
(which is used as a proxy 
for a firm’s ERM, and the 
five contingency factors 
for high performing 
firms. The high 
performing firms are 
defined as those with an 
excess return greater than 
2%. In total there are 53 
high performing firms.  
The findings from this study confirm 
the argument that the ERM-firm 
performance relation is indeed 
contingent on the proper match between 
ERM and the mentioned five variables. 
The findings from the analyses suggest 
that the ERM Index (ERMI) is a 
reasonable (although not perfect) 
measure of the effectiveness of ERM. 
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d) Firm complexity,  
e) And board of directors’ 
monitoring. 
Firm size: measured as the natural 
logarithm of average total assets. 
Monitoring by Board of Directors: 
measured by dividing the number of 
directors for each firm by the natural 
logarithm of sales ((number of 
directors)/ log (sales)). 
The Enterprise Risk Management 
Index (ERMI): Index is based on 
COSO’s four objectives of ERM. 
The coefficients for the 
five contingency factors 
are derived based on 
these high performing 
firms. In other words, the 
high performing firms are 
used as the ‘‘best 
practice” (or benchmark) 
group of firms for 
deriving the relation 
between ERM and the 
five contingency 
variables. 
14 Christopher,  
Yung, 2009, 
Hong Kong  
The main objective of this 
study is to examine the 
relationship between 
corporate governance, bank 
performance, while 
controlling for a number of 
firm specific factors that 
may affect bank 
performance. 
a) The measures of bank 
performance are: 
Return on assets ROA, 
Return on equity ROE,  
Market-to-Book Ratio, 
 Risk-adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC), 
The methodology: The 
impact on bank 
performance from 
corporate governance 
policy may be subject to 
time lags. This study 
adopts the research 
method of Cordeiro and 
Veliyath (2003) in using 
panel methods to analyze 
This study has found that banks with 
larger board size is associated with 
lower level of related-party loans and 
tend to have better performance. This 
finding reflect the importance of 
corporate governance in enhancing the 
bank performance.  
Furthermore, loans is considered very 
important to manage and control to 
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Efficiency of interest management, 
Efficiency of non-interest 
management, 
and Cost efficiency ratio. 
b) The measures of corporate 
governance are: 
Size of board of directors, 
Level of loans from related-party. 
c) Controlling variables: 
Market share of debt.  
Bank’s size in terms of assets. 
the relationship between 
corporate governance and 
bank performance.  
The sample of companies 
consists of data for 23 
banks from 2005 to 2007 
giving a total sample size 
of 23*3 = 69 observations 
for every variable. 
There are two parts in the 
empirical analysis. First, 
Mean Equality Tests are 
used to assess if there are 
differences in 
performance between two 
different groups of banks 
(listed banks and non-
listed banks). Secondly, 
Panel Regression 
methods are used to 
analyze the relationship 
between bank 
have a good corporate governance 
system and achieve the best practice in 
Hong Kong banking sector.  
The high levels of related-party lending 
may deliver message to people outside 
that the corporate governance 
mechanism is poor and not effective, 
which may adversely affect the 
reputation of the bank. 
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performance and 
corporate governance. 
15 Rogers, 
2008, 
Uganda 
 
This paper mainly was to 
explore the association 
between corporate 
governance and financial 
bank performance in the 
banking sector of Uganda. 
This study used the following 
variables; 
Trust Scale, Disclosure Scale, 
Financial Transparency Scale, 
Financial performance Scale. 
Pearson correlation technique was 
used to explore the relationship 
between dependent variables and 
independent variables.  
This study was conducted 
on the level of a cross-
sectional. The main target 
for this study is to 
investigate the 
relationship between 
Corporate governance 
mechanism and financial 
performance in Uganda’s 
banking sector.  
SPSS version 11.0 has 
been used in this study to 
analyse the data and do 
the descriptive analysis.  
Pearson’s correlation 
statistical techniques 
were used to test and 
explore the relationship 
between dependent 
The main conclusion of this thesis are; 
Conventional banks need to have an 
effective corporate governance 
mechanism especially the principle of 
timeliness of signalling and issuing the 
financial information to the market, and 
showing the details of Loan quality, 
which means that all aspects related to 
transparency and timeliness should not 
be ignored by such banks. 
Furthermore, results indicated that 
Corporate Governance in terms of 
transparency, trust and disclosure can 
predicts around 35 % of the change in 
financial performance of Commercial 
banks.  
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variable and independent 
variables.   
16 Tandelilin,et 
al. May 
2007 
- Improving the 
understanding about 
corporate governance 
practices in Indonesian 
banking, and in what ways 
the banks can implement 
good corporate governance 
that aligns with bank 
performance.  
- Providing general 
indicators of corporate 
governance useful for both 
regulator and business 
people in making policies 
and decisions. 
 
a) Proxy Variables for Corporate 
Governance: 
a) Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR). 
b) Capital Ratio (CR). 
c) Cash Claim on Central Bank 
(CCC). 
d) Secondary Research Ratio (SRR). 
e) Loan to Deposit Ratio (LDR). 
f) Loan Loss Provisioning (LLP). 
g) Fixed Assets and Inventories to 
Capital (FAI). 
b) Proxy Variables for Risk 
Management: 
a) Value at Risk (VAR). 
b) Non- performing Loan Ratio 
NPL. 
secondary data: The 
data are collected from 
Indonesian Banking 
Directory and quarterly 
banks’ financial 
statements for the period 
of analysis 1999-2004.  
The research employs 51 
banks that geographically 
operate in Indonesia.  
The sample consists of 25 
private domestic-owned 
banks, four state-owned 
banks, 13 joint-venture-
owned banks, and nine 
foreign-owned banks. 
Primary Data: The 
survey research method 
has been conducted based 
on primary data. The data 
The results can be 
concluded as follows: 
a) Ownership structure has no significant 
effect on corporate governance. 
b) There is significant negative inter-
relationship between risk management 
and bank performance. 
c) Corporate governance has significant 
and negative effect on risk 
management.  
d) Corporate governance has nonlinear 
effect on bank performance.  
e) Relationship between corporate 
governance and risk management is 
sensitive to type of bank ownership. 
The results are statistically robust for 
all types of bank ownership, except 
state-owned banks.  
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c) Business Risk (BR). 
c) Proxy Variables for Bank 
Performance: 
a) Return on Equity ROE. 
b) Net Profit Margin (NPM). 
 
were collected from 
Indonesian bankers 
(commissioners, 
directors, and managers) 
with cooperation with 
Risk Management Center 
Indonesia using 
questionnaires. 
f) Relationship between corporate 
governance and bank performance is 
sensitive to different types of bank 
ownership.  
17 Brogi 
(2008), Italy 
The aim of this paper it to 
investigate the association 
between corporate 
governance of financial 
intermediaries represented 
by; board size and 
performance.  
The role of committees that 
which is related to risks in 
European financial system 
should take in consideration 
all type of governance 
tools.  
This study will explore the 
relationship between Qualitative and 
quantitative principles of corporate 
governance in firms and their 
implication on performance. Firms 
with larger boards does not seem to 
have a negative implication on 
performance. 
There are two different 
international samples of 
firms to do the 
investigation, the first is 
the largest European 
firms which represent the 
European top 100 index, 
the second type of sample 
is the top 40 European 
financial firms by market 
cap. 
This study concluded that the policy 
makers and investors seems to give 
highly importance to the corporate 
governance mechanism. The there is an 
evidence on the association between 
board size and board composition and 
performance. Financial intermediaries 
firms seems to have larger boards 
compared to other companies, 
furthermore the board size does not 
seem to negatively affect performance. 
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18 Laeven and 
Levine, 
(2007), USA 
This study examines the 
association between bank 
risk taking and; ownership 
structure, national laws and 
regulations and managerial 
shareholdings.  
In addition, it will try to 
add a new value on the 
concept of corporate 
governance in banking 
sector.  
The main variables are: 
Z score, Equity volatility, Earnings 
volatility, Control, CF Managerial 
ownership, Large owner on 
management board, Wedge, High 
CF, Revenue growth, Too-big-to-
fail, Loan loss provision ratio, 
Liquidity ratio, Size, State, Founder, 
Descendant, Founded, Legal origin, 
Religion, Restrict, Diversification, 
Capital, Official, Independence, DI, 
Per capita, income, Rights, Enforce, 
Corrupt, Law, Concentration, 
Country-average ROA, M&A 
activity. 
The data sample of this 
study represent the 10 
largest public banks. And 
Since number of 
countries have lower than 
10 public banks, this 
yields information on a 
maximum number of 296 
banks over 48 countries. 
This study focus on the 
comparison between the 
largest banks. 
Overall, the sample takes 
in consideration more 
than 80% of total system 
assets of banks.  
This study indicated that large owners 
who have substantial rights to cash-flow 
tend to increase bank risk,  
Furthermore, the association between 
ownership structure and risk taking is 
depending on number of factors; large 
owner, investor protection laws, and 
rules and regulations.  
 
19 Al Karasneh 
and Bolbol, 
2006, Abu 
Dhabi, UAE 
The main objective of this 
literature is to investigate 
the association between 
business growth and 
corporate governance 
mechanism and market 
RGDPG = Real Gross Domestic 
Product Growth  
Concentration = Market structure 
measure, calculated by 3-bank asset 
concentration ratio and HHI index.  
The banking data sample 
used in this analysis will 
cover 50 GCC banks 
during the period from 
1995 to 2004, and the 
data also collected from 
The main conclusion of this literature is 
that the good corporate governance in 
banking sector will help in the stability 
and growth of the whole financial 
system. 
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concentration in GCC 
banking sector. 
Furthermore it will 
investigate the association 
between financial structure 
and economic growth, this 
will be done through 
analysing the impact of 
banking market 
concentration and growth 
level in GCC banking 
sector. 
Bank Development = Credit to the 
private sector to GDP (Credit/GDP) 
as an indicator or measure of 
financial intermediation. 
Bank Development * Bank 
Concentration = Interaction 
variable to capture the variation of 
the effect of banking structure at 
different stages of financial 
development.  
Control = Control variables which 
include inflation and budget balance 
to GDP (BB/GDP). 
I , k = number of years and countries 
respectively. 
the annual financial 
reports of the GCC Banks 
which are published by 
the IBS in Kuwait.  
The test was conducted 
using the regression 
analysis technique.  
The good corporate governance is 
significantly associated with high 
competition in the GCC financial 
system as a whole.  
Reducing measures concentration may 
positively affect the growth in the GCC 
banking sector, this association will be 
appear clearly in UAE and Kuwait.  
20 Cornett et al. 
(2003), Far 
east contries 
This study examines how 
corporate governance via 
share ownership and the 
characteristics 
of a bank’s shareholders 
can affect firm performance 
bank performance variables: 
a) Profitability Indicators. 
b) Capital Adequacy Indicators. 
c) Asset Quality Indicators. 
d) Operating Efficiency Indicators. 
This study examines 
financial data during the 
period from 1989 to 1998 
for 16 Far East countries 
as follows; India, 
Bangladesh, China, Hong 
Kong, Malaysia, 
This study concluded that state banks 
generally generate lower level of 
profitably and efficiency compared to 
private banks during the test period. 
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e) Liquidity Risk Indicators. 
f) Growth Indicator. 
Dependent Variables: 
a) Operating pre-tax cash flows / 
Total assets. 
b) Net interest margin / Total assets. 
c) Core capital / total assets. 
d) Allowances for loan losses / 
Loans. 
e) Loan loss provisions / Loans. 
f) Noninterest expenses / Net 
operating income. 
g) Personnel expenses / Total assets. 
h) Fixed Assets/Total assets. 
i) Loans / Deposits. 
j) Core deposits / Total assets. 
k) Cash and marketable securities / 
Total assets. 
Indonesia, Macau, Nepal, 
Pakistan, South Korea, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand, Sri Lanka, 
Taiwan and Vietnam). 
The data was gathered 
through Bank Scope. This 
database contains detailed 
information on the annual 
bank financial 
information. 
This literature also noted that bank 
performance in both state and private 
banks deteriorated sharply.  
However, the deterioration in state bank 
performance was higher than that one in 
private banks. 
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21 Kleffner et 
al. 2003, 
Canada  
This study tries to explore 
the extent of applying the 
concept of enterprise risk 
management (ERM) in 
Canadian firms. 
Furthermore it investigate 
the main principles and 
obstacles that are associated 
with the implementation of 
ERM. And what is the role 
of corporate governance 
guidelines related to ERM. 
A number of factors may influence a 
company’s decision regarding 
whether to adopt an ERM strategy. 
These include the Toronto Stock 
Exchange (TSE) guidelines for 
effective corporate governance and 
company characteristics such as 
industry, size, and how the risk 
management function is organized in 
the company. 
ERM in Practice: United Grain 
Growers and British Columbia, 
Two examples of organizations that 
have responded to the new 
guidelines by adopting an ERM 
approach are United Grain Growers 
(UGG) and the province of British 
Columbia (BC).  
Company Characteristics, 
In terms of company characteristics, 
size is one factor that Colquitt et al. 
(1999) found to be significant in 
In order to determine the 
extent to which ERM is 
practiced in Canada, a 
survey'* was sent (in June 
2001) to all companies 
listed as members in 
RIMS. The survey was 
sent to the individual who 
is primarily responsible 
for risk management in 
the company (The survey 
was sent to all Canadian 
Primary Deputies—the 
individual primarily 
responsible for risk 
management in the 
company). 
 
The conclusion is that, the ERM is a 
concept that has drawn a great deal of 
attention in the trade press, yet 
conflicting evidence exists regarding 
what it means and how common it 
actually is. This study has provided 
evidence regarding the use of ERM in 
Canada and the impact of the TSE 
guidelines on companies' risk 
management strategies. Although ERM 
is still not widely practiced, evidence is 
clear that even those companies that 
have not adopted ERM are taking a 
more integrated approach to risk 
management than in the past. 
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whether a company used integrated 
risk management tools. 
22 Lai, P. F., & 
CHOI, O. N. 
(2014), Asian 
Regions 
The main objective of this 
literature is to investigate 
the association between 
corporate governance and 
financial performance in 
Asian region. 
• Board sizes (BS). 
• The frequencies of board of 
directors meetings (BM). 
• Capital: Capital adequacy ratio 
(CAR). 
• Asset Size: Total Assets (TA). 
• Profitability: profit before tax / tier 
1 capital (PTC). 
• Profitability: Return on average 
assets (ROAA): profit before tax/ 
average equity. 
• Asset Quality: Non-performing 
loan (NPL): non-performing loans 
/ total loans 
In this study, the data 
were collected from 
different bank in Asian 
regions such as Hong 
Kong and China. 
Furthermore, this data 
collected from updated 
annual report of each 
bank for the period from 
Year 2007-2012. 
This study concluded that there is 
statistically significant relationship 
between Capital adequacy ratio and 
corporate governance.  
The NPL and ROA are not statistically 
significant with corporate governance.  
There is also statistically significant 
relationship between Capital adequacy 
ratio and board size.  
The association between NPL and ROA 
are not statistically significant with 
board sizes. 
Moreover, there is statistical significant 
association between ROA and board of 
director meetings. 
 There is no statistical significant 
relationship between CAR, NPL with 
board meetings.  
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23 Durgavanshi 
(2014), 
The objective of this paper 
is to investigate and discuss 
the effect of corporate 
governance mechanisms on 
financial performance of 
the Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) in India. 
Corporate Governance Variable: 
• Independent Audit committee  
• Board Size  
• Banker in the board  
• International Director  
• Independent Director  
• MFI’s age  
• Asset Size  
• CEO’s Experience  
Financial Performance 
• OSS: (Operational self sufficiency; 
Operating revenue / (Financial 
Expense + Loan loss provision + 
operating expense)  
• Yield on gross portfolio  
• RoE  
 
Data on financial ratios 
(RoE, OSS and Portfolio 
Yield) have been 
collected from 
www.mixmarket.org (an 
industry database) and 
partially from the rating 
reports for ratings 
conducted between 2009 
to 2012. Data on board 
characteristics collected 
from annual reports, MFI 
firm’s websites and rating 
reports.  
The important results of this study is: 
the larger board is expected to 
negatively affect the return on equity 
ROE.  
In addition, it indicates that the 
separation of CEO and the board 
chairman does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the financial 
performance.  
Moreover, there is no significant 
relationship between the existence of 
audit committee and both Return on 
Equity ROE and Operational Self 
Sufficiency (OSS). 
 
24 Fanta et al. 
(2013) 
This study assessed the 
relationship between 
selected internal 
and external corporate 
governance mechanisms, 
and bank performance as 
• ROE is the return on equity 
• ROA return on asset  
• BDSZ board size 
• AUDC existence of audit 
committee, dummy variable taking 
1 if there is audit committee, and 0 
otherwise. 
The data of this study was 
obtained from two 
sources: Audited annual 
financial statements of 
the banks covering the 
period 2005 to 2011 were 
obtained from the 
National Bank of 
The result of the two regression models 
are as follow: 
CAR as a proxy of external corporate 
governance has positive relationship 
with bank performance  
• The effect of CAR on ROE is non-
linear due to government regulation. 
Hence, the negative effect of CAR on 
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measured by ROE and 
ROA. 
• CAR capital adequacy ratio year-
end capital of the bank divided by 
year–end total risk-weighted assets. 
• LLP loan loss provision allowance 
for loan loss divided by year-end 
total loans. 
• CAR2 is the square of capital 
adequacy ratio. 
 
This study uses two control 
variables:  
• BKSZ is bank size measured as a 
log of the year-end total assets. 
• OWTP is ownership type with 
dummy variable taking 1 if the 
bank is a state-owned and 0 
otherwise. 
Ethiopia (NBE). Data on 
board characteristics is 
obtained 
from each bank in the 
study. The study included 
9 commercial banks for 7 
years (63 observations). 
ROE is expected to turn in to positive 
when CAR increases to a certain level 
where the financial health of the bank 
improves.  
• The size of board of directors 
negatively affects the profitability, 
implying that the less the number of 
directors in the board, the better 
profitable a bank becomes.  
• The existence of audit committee in 
the board has adverse impact on the 
profitability.  
• The size of the bank is an important 
factor with a positive contribution to 
its profitability. 
• The profitability will be basically the 
same when the bank is owned by the 
state or by the private investors. 
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25 Hoque and 
Muradoglu 
(2013) 
This study focused on the 
association between board 
composition and CEO 
incentives and how much 
they affect the bank 
performance 
Return: Buy-and-hold returns on an 
annual basis.  
ROAA:Net Income divided by 
average book assets. 
Board size. 
Duality. 
Independent directors. 
Female: Percentage of female 
directors in the board. 
CEO network: Number of CEO 
network. 
Log(size):Size of the bank as 
measured by total assets. 
This study collected bank 
data from Bankscope and 
used the largest 350 listed 
banks in Bankscope by 
asset size at the end of 
2006. 
This findings of this study will be as 
follows; 
Board size is negatively and significantly 
associated with stock market 
performance.  
The high percentage of the existence of 
independent directors is associated with 
lower returns. 
Role duality and gender diversity is 
insignificantly associated with stock 
market returns. 
The board size is significantly and 
negatively associated with the 
performance.  
26 Jiang et al.  
(2012) 
This paper examines the 
effects of corporate 
governance on bank 
performance in China over 
the period 1995-2008. 
• CCB: 1 if the bank is a regional city 
commercial bank and zero otherwise. 
•  JSCB: 1 if the bank is a national 
wide joint-stock commercial bank 
and zero otherwise. 
SOCB: 1 if the bank is a stateowned 
commercial bank (with majority 
state ownership) and zero otherwise.  
FB: 1 if the bank is a foreign bank 
(with majority foreign 
ownership) and zero otherwise.  
For-Minority: 1if the bank has 
foreign minority ownership 
Data are collected from 
BankScope 
complemented by the 
Almanac of China’s 
Finance and Banking 
(1986-2009). The sample 
includes 47 commercial 
banks operating in China 
for the period 1995-2008. 
1. This study finds no significant 
difference in performance for banks 
with or without foreign minority 
ownership. 
2. There is weak evidence that foreign 
banks (with majority foreign 
ownership) are more efficient than 
domestic banks. 
3. Majority state ownership is 
associated with a rather low 
efficiency and SOCBs are the most 
unprofitable banks. 
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regardless of its original ownership 
nature and zero otherwise.  
LIST: 1 if the bank is listed on a 
stock market and zero otherwise.  
Capital risk: is the natural logarithm 
of equity to total asset ratio.  
Credit risk: is the natural logarithm 
of loan loss reserve to gross loan 
ratio.  
Market risk: is the natural logarithm 
of interbank interest to interest on 
deposit. 
Liquidity risk: is the natural 
logarithm of gross loan to customer 
deposits ratio. 
GDP: is the natural logarithm of 
GDP growth rate. 
4. Banks with more dispersed 
ownership structure are more 
efficient. 
5. Moreover, all risks under 
consideration have significant 
adverse impacts on bank profitability 
except for: 
• Capital risk that has no significant 
impact.  
• Banks with higher credit risk, 
market risk and liquidity risk are 
more inefficient.  
27 Oluwafemi 
et al. (2013) 
, Nigeria 
This study examines the 
relationship between 
corporate governance and 
performance in Nigeria 
banking sector. 
performance: 
ROA: Return on Assets. 
Governance:  
BDS: Board of director size. 
BDC: number of outside directors 
divided by total number of directors. 
Control Variables 
SIZE: this is the size of the firm 
measured by the value of its asset 
base. 
This study employs 
basically secondary data 
from the financial 
statements of some 
selected banks in Nigeria. 
The data covers the six 
years period from 2005 -
2010. 
This study concludes that the need for 
increase in 
board size and decrease in board 
composition in order to increase the 
bank performance. 
 
 Page 271 of 272 
 
28 Quaresma et 
al. (2014) 
This research aims to 
analyze the relation 
between the quality of 
corporate governance 
practices and the financial 
performance of 
international listed banks. 
Corporate governance variables used 
are INDBD (Independence of the 
Board of Directors), INDPR 
(Independence of the President of the 
Board of Directors), SZBD (Size of 
the Board of Directors), VPC 
(Voting Power Concentration), and 
BvDep (Company’s Shareholders 
Independence Indicator). 
The data of this study 
comes from Bankscope 
and annual financial 
reports from 64 listed 
banks of 14 different 
countries. This study was 
for the period 2006 - 
2009. 
• This research provide evidence that 
better corporate governance is related 
to a more favorable rating as well as to 
an improved financial performance. 
• The size of the board of directors 
(SZBD) was negatively related to 
IL/GL ratio. 
• Statistically significant correlations 
were identified between shareholder 
independence indicator (BvDep) and 
Tier 1 Ratio. 
 
29 Rachdi and 
Ameur 
(2011), 
Tunis 
This study investigate the 
relationship among board 
characteristics; 
performance 
(Return on Assets and 
Return on Equity) and bank 
risk taking (Z-score). 
Performance: 
• ROA (return on assets).  
• ROE (return on equity). 
Bank risk: 
Z-score of each bank. 
Board size (BS): 
The number of directors in the bank 
board. 
Independent directors (INDIR): 
percentage of total directors who are 
independent. 
The sample examined in 
this paper consists of the 
largest banks in Tunisia 
over the period 1997-
2006. The data is sourced 
from Tunis Stock 
Exchange. 
• The small board size is associated with 
better performance and more risk-
taking.  
• Lower CEO ownership is significantly 
related to lower performance in 
Tunisian banks,  
• Banks with increased charter value are 
significantly associated with lower 
ROA and ROE.  
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CEO ownership (CEOWN): The 
percentage of the banks CEO’s 
shareholdings. 
Bank size (TA): Total assets as at 
the end of each fiscal year. 
 
